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विश्वनाथपञ्चाननकृतसिद्धान्तमुक्तावलीसहित-
भाषापरिच्छेदः ॥

DIVISION

OF THE

CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY,

WITH A COMMENTARY

BY

VISWANA'THA PANCHA'NANA.

EDITED, AND THE TEXT TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT,

BY DR. E. RÖER.

~~FASCICULUS I.~~

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अथ सिद्धान्तमुक्तावलीसहितभाषापरिच्छेदः ।

PREFACE.

The Asiatic Society accepted already in 1847 my offer to publish the text of the Nyáya with a translation, but only the Introduction to this work appeared in the Journal of the Society, the MS. of the translation having meanwhile been lost (*vide* Journal of the Asiatic Society, July, 1847). The present translation is based upon a rough copy of the former, which I afterwards found among my papers. The notes are entirely new, and the introduction has received so many additions, that it is almost a new essay. The Sanscrit text, in accordance with an enlarged plan, is now accompanied with its commentary; it will thus form another edition of the one published by the Committee of Public Instruction, which is out of print, and satisfy thereby a desideratum, long felt in the Government Sanscrit Colleges, where the Bhásha Paricchéda is introduced as a class-book.

भाषापरिच्छेदस्य निर्घण्टपत्रं।

इति गुणपदार्थनिरूपणं चतुर्थभागः ॥

इति भाषापरिच्छेदनिर्घण्टपत्रं सम्पूर्णं ॥

भाषापरिच्छेदः ॥

मङ्गलाचरणं ॥

ॐ नमो गणेशाय ॥

नूतनजलधररुचये गोपवधूटीदुकूलचौराय ।

सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली ॥

मङ्गलाचरणं ॥

ॐ नमो गणेशाय ॥

चूडामणीकृतविधुर्व्वलयीकृतवासुकिः ।
भवो भवतु भव्याय लीलाताण्डवपण्डितः ॥

प्रतिज्ञा ॥

निजनिर्म्मितकारिकावलीमतिसंक्षिप्तचिरन्तनोक्तिभिः ।
विषदीकरवाणि कौतुकान्नु राजीवदयावशम्वदः ॥

ग्रन्थप्रशंसनेन तत्प्रतिपाद्यकथनं ॥

सद्द्रव्या गुणगुम्फिता सुकृतिनां सत्कर्म्मणां ज्ञापिका
सत्सामान्यविशेषनित्यमिलिता भावप्रकर्षोज्ज्वला ।
विष्णोर्वक्षसि विश्वनाथकृतिना सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली
विन्यस्ता मनसो मुदं वितनुतां सद्युक्तिरेषा चिरं ॥

विघ्नविघाताय कृतं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षायै निबध्नाति । नूतनेत्यादि ॥ ननु मङ्गलं न विघ्नध्वंसं प्रति न वा

भाषा० तस्मै नमः कृष्णाय संसारमहीरुहस्य बीजाय ॥

सिद्धा० समाप्तिं प्रति कारणं विनापि मङ्गलं नास्तिकादीनां ग्रन्थे निर्व्विघ्नपरिसमा-प्तिदर्शनादिति चेत् । न । अविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वेन मङ्गलस्य सफलत्वे सिद्धे तत्र च फलजिज्ञासायां सम्भवति दृष्टफलकत्वेऽदृष्ट-फलकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् उपस्थितत्वाच्च। समाप्ति-रेव हि फलं कल्प्यते। इत्यञ्च यत्र मङ्गलं न दृश्यते तत्रापि जन्मान्तरीयं तत् कल्प्यते । यत्र च सत्यपि मङ्गले समाप्तिर्न दृश्यते तत्र बलवत्तरो विघ्नो विघ्न-प्राचुर्य्यं वा बोध्यं। प्रचुरस्यास्यैव बलवत्तरविघ्ननिरा-करणकारणत्वं । विघ्नध्वंसस्तु मङ्गलस्य द्वारमित्याहुः। नव्यास्तु मङ्गलस्य विघ्नध्वंस एव फलं। समाप्तिस्तु बुद्धि-प्रतिभादिकारणकलापात्। न च स्वतःसिद्धविघ्नविरह-वता कृतमङ्गलस्य निष्फलत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यं। इष्टा-पत्तेः विघ्नाशङ्कया तदाचरणात्। तथैव शिष्टाचर-णाच्च। न च तस्य निष्फलत्वे तद्बोधकशिष्टाचारानु-मितवेदाप्रामाण्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यं। सति विघ्ने तन्ना-शस्यैव वेदबोधितत्वात्। अत एव पापभ्रमेण कृतप्राय-श्चित्तस्य निष्फलत्वेऽपि न तद्बोधकवेदाप्रामाण्यं। मङ्ग-लन्तु यविघ्नध्वंसविशेषे कारणं। विघ्नध्वंसविशेषे च विनायकस्तवपाठादि। क्वचिच्च विघ्नात्यन्ताभाव एव समाप्तिसाधनं। प्रतिबन्धकसंसर्गाभावस्यैव कार्य्यजनक-

भाषा॰ द्रव्यं गुणास्तथा कर्म्म सामान्यं सविशेषकं।

सिद्धा॰ त्वात्। इत्यञ्च नास्तिकादिकृतग्रन्थेषु जन्मान्तरीयमङ्गलजन्यदुरितध्वंसः स्वतः सिद्धविघ्नात्यन्ताभावो वास्तीति न व्यभिचार इत्याहुः॥ संसारेति। संसार एव महीरुहो वृक्षस्तस्य वीजाय। एतेन ईश्वरे प्रमाणमपि दर्शितं भवति। तथाहि। यथा घटादिकार्य्यं कर्त्तृजन्यं तथा क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकमपि। न च तत् कर्त्तृत्वमस्मदादीनां सम्भवतीत्यतस्तत्कर्त्तृत्वेनेश्वरसिद्धिः। न च शरीराजन्यत्वेन कर्त्त्रजन्यत्वसाधकेन सत्प्रतिपक्ष इति वाच्यं। अप्रयोजकत्वात्। मम तु कर्त्तृत्वेन कार्य्यत्वेन कार्य्यकारणभाव एव अनुकूलतर्कः। द्यावाभूमी जनयन्देव एक आस्ते विश्वस्य कर्त्ता भुवनस्य गोप्ता इत्यादय आगमा अप्यनुसन्धेयाः॥

पदार्थानामुद्देशमाह। द्रव्यं गुण इत्यादि। सप्तमस्याभावत्वकथनादेव षण्णां भावत्वं प्राप्तं तेन भावत्वेन पृथगुपन्यासो न कृतः। एते च पदार्था वैशेषिकप्रसिद्धा नैयायिकानामप्यविरुद्धाः। प्रतिपादितञ्चैवमेव भाष्ये। अत एव उपमानचिन्तामणौ सप्तपदार्थभिन्नतया शक्तिसादृश्ययोरतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वमाशङ्कितं। ननु कथमेत एव पदार्थाः शक्तिसादृश्यादीनामप्यतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वात्। तथाहि। मण्यादिसमवहितेन वह्निना दाहो न जन्यते तच्छून्येन तु जन्यते। तत्र मण्यादिना

भाषा० समवायस्तथाऽभावः पदार्थाः सप्त कीर्त्तिताः ॥ १ ॥
क्षित्यप्तेजो मरुद्व्योमकाला दिग्देहिनौ मनः ।

सिद्धा० वह्नौ दाहानुकूला शक्तिर्नाश्यते उत्तेजकेन मण्याद्यपसरणेन च जन्यत इति कल्प्यते। एवं सादृश्यमप्यतिरिक्तः पदार्थः। तद्धि न षट्पदार्थेष्वन्तर्भवति सामान्येऽपि सत्त्वात्। यथा गोत्वं नित्यं तथा अश्वत्वमपीति सादृश्यप्रतीतेः। नाप्यभावे। सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वादिति चेत्। न। मण्याद्यभावविशिष्टवह्न्यादेर्दाहादिकं प्रति स्वातन्त्र्येण मण्यभावादेरेव वा हेतुत्वकल्पनेन सामञ्जस्ये अनन्तशक्तितत्प्रागभावध्वंसकल्पनानौचित्यात्। न चोत्तेजके सति मणिप्रतिबन्धकसद्भावेऽपि कथं दाह इति वाच्यं। उत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमणिसामान्याभावस्य हेतुत्वात्। सादृश्यमपि न पदार्थान्तरं किन्तु तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तद्गतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वं। यथा चन्द्रभिन्नत्वे सति चन्द्रगताह्लादकत्वादिमत्त्वं मुखे चन्द्रसादृश्यमिति ॥ १ ॥

द्रव्याणि विभजते। क्षित्यबिति। एतानि नव द्रव्याणि इत्यर्थः। ननु द्रव्यत्वजातौ किं मानं। न हि तत्र प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं घृतजतुप्रभृतिषु द्रव्यत्वाग्रहादिति चेत्। न। कार्य्यसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया संयोगस्य विभागस्य वा समवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया तत्सिद्धिरिति ॥ ननु दशमं द्रव्यन्तमः कुतो नोक्तं।

भाषा० द्रव्याण्य ऽथ गुणा रूपं रसो गन्धस्ततः परं ॥ २ ॥
स्पर्शः संख्या परिमितिः पृथक्त्वञ्च ततः परं ।
संयोगश्च विभागश्च परत्वञ्चापरत्वकं ॥ ३ ॥
बुद्धिः सुखं दुःखमिच्छा द्वेषो यत्नो गुरुत्वकं ।
द्रवत्वं स्नेहसंस्कारावदृष्टं शब्द एव च ॥ ४ ॥
उत्क्षेपणं ततोऽवक्षेपनमाकुञ्चनं तथा ।
प्रसारणञ्च गमनं कर्म्माण्येतानि पञ्च च ॥ ५ ॥
भ्रमणं रेचनं स्यन्दनोर्द्ध्वज्वलनमेव च ।

सिद्धा० तद्धि प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते । तस्य च रूपवत्त्वात् कर्म्मवत्त्वाच्च द्रव्यत्वं। तच्च गन्धशून्यत्वात् न पृथिवी। नीलरूपवत्त्वाच्च न जलादिकं । तत्प्रत्यक्षे चालोकनिरपेक्षं चक्षुः कारणं इति चेत् ।न। आवश्यकतेजोऽभावेनोपपत्तौ द्रव्यान्तर-कल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । रूपवत्ताप्रतीतिस्तु भ्रमरूपा। कर्म्मवत्त्वप्रतीतिरपि आलोकापसारणौपाधिकी भ्रान्ति-रेव । तमसोऽतिरिक्तत्वेऽनन्तावयवादिकल्पनागौरवञ्च स्यात् । स्वर्णस्य यथा तेजस्यन्तर्भावस्तथा वक्ष्यते ॥

गुणान् विभजते । अथ गुणा इति । एते गुणास्चतु-र्व्विंशतिसङ्ख्यकाः कणादेन कण्ठतश्चशब्देन च दर्शिताः । तत्र गुणत्वादिकजातिसिद्धिरग्रे वक्ष्यते ॥ २ ॥ ३ ॥ ४ ॥

कर्म्माणि विभजते । उत्क्षेपणमिति । कर्म्मत्वजातिस्तु प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा । एवमुत्क्षेपणत्वादिकमपि । नन्वत्र भ्रम-

भाषा० तीर्थ्यगमनमप्यत्र गमनादेव लभ्यते ॥ ६ ॥
सामान्यं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं परञ्चापरमेव च ।
द्रव्यादित्रिकवृत्तिस्तु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ॥ ७ ॥
परभिन्ना च या जातिः सैवापरतयोच्यते ।

सिद्धा० णादिकमपि पञ्चकर्माधिकतया कुतो नोक्तमत आह ।
भ्रमणमित्यादि ॥ ५ ॥ ६ ॥

सामान्यं निरूपयति । सामान्यमिति । तल्लक्षणन्तु नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वं । अनेकसमवेतत्वं संयोगादीनामप्यस्त्यत उक्तं । नित्यत्वे सतीति । नित्यत्वे सति समवेतत्वं गगणपरिमाणादीनामप्यस्त्यत उक्तं । अनेकेति । नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकवृत्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावे ऽप्यस्त्यतो वृत्तित्वसामान्यं विहाय समवेतत्वमित्युक्तं । एकमात्रव्यक्तिवृत्तिस्तु न जातिः । तथाचोक्तं । व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करो ऽथानवस्थितिः । रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधकसङ्ग्रहः ॥ एकव्यक्तिकत्वादाकाशत्वं न जातिः । तुल्यव्यक्तिकत्वात् घटत्वं कलसत्वं न जातिद्वयं । सङ्कीर्णत्वात् भूतत्वं मूर्त्तत्वं न जातिः । अनवस्थाभयात् सामान्यत्वं न जातिः । विशेषस्य व्यावृत्तस्वभावस्य रूपहानिः स्यादतो विशेषत्वं न जातिः । समवायसम्बन्धाभावात् समवायो न जातिः ॥ द्रव्यादीति । परत्वं अधिकदेशवृत्तित्वं । अपरत्वं अल्पदेशवृत्तित्वं ।

भाषा० द्रव्यत्वादिकजातिस्तु परापरतयोच्यते ॥ ८ ॥
व्यापकत्वात् परापि स्याद्व्याप्यत्वादपरापि च ।
अन्त्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिर्व्विशेषः परिकीर्त्तितः ॥ ९ ॥
घटादीनां कपालादौ द्रव्येषु गुणकर्म्मणोः ।

सिद्धा० सकलजात्यपेक्षयाऽधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् सत्तायाः परत्वं । एतद्बोधनायैव द्रव्यादित्रिकवृत्तिरित्युक्तं । तदपेक्षया चान्यासां जातीनामपरत्वं । परभिन्ना सत्ताभिन्ना । व्यापकत्वादिति ॥ ७ ॥ ८ ॥

पृथिवीत्वाद्यपेक्षया व्यापकत्वादधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् द्रव्यत्वादेः परत्वं । सत्तापेक्षया व्याप्यत्वात् अल्पदेशवृत्तित्वाच्च द्रव्यत्वस्यापरत्वं । तथाच धर्म्मद्वयसमावेशादुभयमविरुद्धं ॥

विशेषं निरूपयति । अन्त्य इति । अन्ते अवसाने वर्त्तत इत्यन्त्यः । यदपेक्षया विशेषो नास्तीत्यर्थः । एकमात्रवृत्तिरिति फलितार्थः । घटादीनां द्व्यणुकपर्य्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात् परस्परं भेदः । परमाणूनां परस्परभेदको विशेष एव । स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तः । तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्तीति भावः ॥ ९ ॥

समवायं दर्शयति । घटादीनामिति । अवयवावयविनोर्जातिव्यक्त्योर्गुणगुणिनोः क्रियाक्रियावतोर्नित्यद्रव्यविशेषयोश्च यः सम्बन्धः स समवायः । समवायत्वं

भाषा० तेषु जातेश्च सम्बन्धः समवायः प्रकीर्त्तितः ॥ १० ॥

अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गान्योन्याभावभेदतः ।

सिद्धा० नित्यसम्बन्धत्वं । तत्र प्रमाणन्तु गुणक्रियादिविशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात् दण्डी पुरुष इति विशिष्टबुद्धिवत् इत्यनुमानं । तत्र संयोगादिबाधात् समवायसिद्धिः। न च स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन सिद्धसाधनं अर्थान्तरं वा । अनन्तस्वरूपाणां सम्बन्धत्वकल्पने गौरवात्। लाघवादेकसमवायसिद्धिः । न च समवायस्यैकत्वे वायौ रूपवत्ताबुद्धिप्रसङ्गः । तत्र रूपसमवायसत्त्वेऽपि रूपाभावात्। न चैवं अभावस्य वैशिष्ट्यं सम्बन्धान्तरं सिध्येदिति वाच्यं । तस्य नित्यत्वे भूतले घटानयनानन्तरमपि घटाभावबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । घटाभावसम्बन्धस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् तस्य नित्यत्वात् । अन्यथा देशान्तरेऽपि तत्प्रतीतिर्न स्यात्। वैशिष्ट्यस्य च तत्र सत्त्वात्। मम तु मते घटे पाकरक्ततादशायां श्यामरूपस्य नष्टत्वान्न तद्वत्ताबुद्धिः । वैशिष्ट्यस्यानित्यत्वे त्वनन्तवैशिष्ट्यकल्पने तवैव गौरवं। इत्थञ्च तत्तत्कालीनतत्तद्भूतलादिकं तत्तदभावानां सम्बन्धः॥ १० ॥

अभावं विभजते। अभावस्त्विति । अभावत्वं द्रव्यादिषट्कान्योन्याभावत्वं। संसर्गेति। संसर्गाभावान्योन्याभावभेदादित्यर्थः ॥ अन्योन्याभावस्यैकविधत्वात्तद्वि-

भाषा० प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वंसोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च ॥ ११ ॥

सिद्धा० भागाभावात् संसर्गाभावं विभजते । प्रागभाव इति । संसर्गाभावत्वं अन्योन्याभावभिन्नाभावत्वं । अन्योन्याभावत्वं तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावत्वं । विनाश्यभावत्वं प्रागभावत्वं । जन्याभावत्वं ध्वंसत्वं । नित्यसंसर्गाभावत्वं अत्यन्ताभावत्वं। यत्र तु भूतलादौ घटादिकमपसारितं पुनरानीतञ्च तत्र घटकालस्य सम्बन्धाघटकतया अत्यन्ताभावस्य नित्यत्वेऽपि घटकाले न घटात्यन्ताभावबुद्धिः । तत्र उत्पादविनाशशाली चतुर्थोऽयमभाव इति केचित् । अत्र ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरधिकरणे नात्यन्ताभाव इति प्राचीनमतं । श्यामघटे रक्तो नास्तीति रक्तघटे श्यामो नास्तीति धीश्च प्रागभावं ध्वंसञ्चावगाहते न तु तदत्यन्ताभावं । नव्यास्तु तत्र विरोधे मानाभावात् ध्वंसादिकालावच्छेदेनाप्यत्यन्ताभावो वर्त्तत इति प्राहुः । नन्वस्तु अभावानामधिकरणात्मकत्वं लाघवादिति चेत्। न । अनन्ताधिकरणात्मकत्वकल्पनामपेक्ष्यातिरिक्तकल्पनाया एव लघीयस्त्वात् । एवञ्च आधाराधेयभावोऽप्युपपद्यते । एवञ्च तत्तच्छब्दगन्धरसाद्यभावानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमुपपद्यते। अन्यथा तत्तदधिकरणानां तत्तदिन्द्रियाणामग्राह्यत्वादप्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात् । एतेन ज्ञान-

भाषा० एवं त्रैविध्यमापन्नः संसर्गाभाव इष्यते ।
सप्तानामपि साधर्म्यं ज्ञेयत्वादिकमुच्यते ॥ १२ ॥
द्रव्यादयः पञ्च भावा अनेके समवायिनः ।

सिद्धा० विशेषकालविशेषाद्यात्मकत्वमत्यन्ताभावस्येति प्रत्युक्तं । अप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तेः ॥ ११ ॥

इदानीं पदार्थानां साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यञ्च वक्तुं प्रक्रमते । सप्तानामित्यादि । समानो धर्म्मो येषां ते सधर्म्माणस्तेषां भावः साधर्म्यं । समानो धर्म्म इति फलितार्थः । एवं विरुद्धो धर्म्मो येषां ते विधर्म्माणस्तेषां भावो वैधर्म्यं । विरुद्धो धर्म्म इति फलितार्थः । ज्ञेयत्वं ज्ञानविषयता । सा च सर्व्वत्रैवास्ति । ईश्वरादिज्ञानविषयतायाः केवलान्वयित्वात् । एवं अभिधेयत्वप्रमेयत्वादिकं बोध्यं ॥ १२ ॥

द्रव्येति । द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसामान्यविशेषाणां साधर्म्यमनेकत्वं *भावत्वं समवायित्वञ्च । यद्यप्यनेकत्वं अभावेऽप्यस्ति तथाप्यनेकत्वे सति भावत्वं पञ्चानां साधर्म्यं । तथाच अनेकभाववृत्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं फलितार्थः । तेन घटादौ प्रत्येकं नाव्याप्तिः । समवायित्वं समवायसम्बन्धेन सम्बन्धित्वं न तु समवायवत्त्वं । सामान्यादावभावात् । तथाच समवेतवृत्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं फलितार्थः । तेन नित्यद्रव्येषु नाव्याप्तिः

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* अपूर्व्वमुद्रितमिदं ।

भाषा० सत्तावन्तस्त्रयस्त्वाद्या गुणादिर्निर्गुणक्रियः ॥ १३ ॥
सामान्यपरिहीनास्तु सर्व्वे जात्यादयो मताः ।

सिद्धा० सत्तावन्त इति द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणां सत्तावत्त्वमित्यर्थः । गुणादिरिति । यद्यपि गुणक्रियाशून्यत्वमाद्यक्षणे घटादावतिव्याप्तं क्रियाशून्यत्वञ्च गगणादावतिव्याप्तं तथापि गुणवदवृत्तिधर्म्मवत्त्वं कर्म्मवदवृत्तिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्त्वं तदर्थः । न हि घटत्वादिकं द्रव्यत्वं वा गुणवदवृत्ति कर्म्मवदवृत्ति वा किन्तु गुणत्वादिकं । तथा आकाशत्वादिकन्तु न पदार्थविभाजकोपाधिः * ॥ १३ ॥

सामान्येति । सामान्यानधिकरणत्वं सामान्यादीनामित्यर्थः ॥ पारिमाण्डल्येति । पारिमाण्डल्यं अणुपरिमाणं । कारणत्वं तद्भिन्नानामित्यर्थः । अणुपरिमाणं न तु कस्यापि कारणं । तद्धि स्वाश्रयारब्धद्रव्यपरिमाणारम्भकं भवेत् । तच्च न सम्भवति । परिमाणस्य स्वसमानजातीयोत्कृष्टपरिमाणजनकत्वात् । महदारब्धस्य महत्तरत्ववत् । अणुजन्यस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । एवं परममहत्परिमाणं अतीन्द्रियसामान्यं विशेषा-

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* यद्वा गुणवृत्तित्वे सति कर्म्मवृत्तित्वे सति वा सत्ताव्याप्यजातिशून्याभाववत्वं विवक्षितं । गुणकर्म्मणोरव्याप्तिवारणाय सत्ता व्याप्येति । व्याप्तिश्च भेदगर्भा निवेशिता इत्यतो न दोषः । द्रव्यगुणान्यतरत्वमादाय तत्रैवाव्याप्तिवारणाय जातीति । अभावेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय भावत्वमिति । गुणवद्वृत्तिः सत्ताव्याप्यजातिर्द्रव्यत्वं तच्छून्यत्वं पञ्चानामस्त्येव । पूर्व्वमुद्रितोऽप्ययम् पाठः प्रकृतानुपयोगित्वात् पुस्तकान्तरालिखिताद्यथोमुद्रितः ॥

भाषा० पारिमाण्डल्यभिन्नानां कारणत्वमुदाहृतं ॥ १४ ॥
अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियता पूर्व्ववर्त्तिता ।
कारणत्वं भवेत्तस्य त्रैविध्यं परिकीर्त्तितं ॥ १५ ॥
समवायिकारणत्व ज्ञेयमथाप्यसमवायिहेतुत्वं ।
एवं न्यायनयज्ञैस्तृतीयमुक्तं निमित्तहेतुत्वं ॥ १६ ॥

सिद्धा० स्येति बोध्यं । इदमपि योगिप्रत्यक्षे विषयस्य न कारणत्वं । ज्ञायमानसामान्यं न प्रत्यासत्तिः । ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गं नानुमितिकारणं इत्यभिप्रायेण मानसप्रत्यक्षे आत्ममहत्त्वस्य कारणत्वात् महत्परिमाणं कालादेर्बोध्यं तस्यापि न कारणत्वमित्याचार्य्याणामाशय इत्यन्ये । तन्न । ज्ञानातिरिक्तं प्रति कारणताया एव आचार्य्यैरुक्तत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

ननु कारणत्वं किमत आह । अन्यथेति । तस्य कारणत्वस्य ॥ १५ ॥

तत्र समवायिकारणे । आसन्नं प्रत्यासन्नं कारणं द्वितीयमसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । अत्र यद्यपि तुरीतन्तुसंयोगानां पटासमवायिकारणत्वं स्यात् एवं वेगादीनामपि अभिघाताद्यसमवायिकारणत्वं स्यात् एवं ज्ञानादिकमिच्छाद्यसमवायिकारणं स्यात् तथापि पटासमवायिकारणलक्षणे तुरीतन्तुसंयोगभिन्नत्वं देयं । तुरीतन्तुसंयोगस्तु तुरीपटसंयोगं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणं भवत्येव । एवं वेगादिकं वेगस्पन्दाद्यसमवायिकारणं

भाषा० यत् समवेतं कार्य्यं भवति ज्ञेयन्तु समवायिजनकं तत्।
तत्रासन्नं जनकं द्वितीयमाभ्यां परं तृतीयं स्यात्॥१७॥
येन सह पूर्व्वभावः कारणमादाय वा यस्य।

सिद्धा० भवत्येवेति तत्तत्कार्य्यासमवायिकारणलक्षणे तत्तद्भिन्नत्वं न देयं। आत्मविशेषगुणानान्तु कुत्राप्यसमवायिकारणत्वं नास्ति। तेन तद्भिन्नत्वं सामान्यलक्षणे देयमेव। अत्र समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नं द्विविधं कार्य्यैकार्थप्रत्यासत्त्या कारणैकार्थप्रत्यासत्त्या च। आद्यं यथा घटादिकं प्रति कपालसंयोगादिकं। तत्र कार्य्येण घटेन सह कारणस्य कपालसंयोगस्य एकस्मिन् कपाले प्रत्यासत्तिरस्ति। द्वितीयं यथा घटरूपं प्रति कपालरूपमसमवायिकारणं। तत्र घटरूपं प्रति कारणं घटः। तेन सह कपालरूपस्य एकस्मिन् कपाले प्रत्यासत्तिरस्ति। तथा च क्वचित् समवायसम्बन्धेन क्वचित् स्वसमवायिसमवायसम्बन्धेनेति फलितार्थः। इत्यञ्च कार्य्ये कार्य्यकारणैकार्थान्यतरप्रत्यासत्त्या कारणं ज्ञानादिभिन्नमसमवायिकारणमिति सामान्यलक्षणं पर्य्यवसन्नं। आभ्यां समवायिकारणासमवायिकारणाभ्यां भिन्नं कारणं तृतीयं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः॥ १६॥१७॥

इदानीमन्यथासिद्धत्वमेव कियतां पदार्थानां तदाह। येन सहेत्यादिना। यत्कार्य्यं प्रति कारणस्य

भाषा० अन्यं प्रति पूर्व्वभावे ज्ञाते यत् पूर्व्वभावविज्ञानं ॥१८॥
जनकं प्रति पूर्व्ववर्त्तितामपरिज्ञाय न यस्य गृह्यते ।

सिद्धा० पूर्व्ववर्त्तिता येन रूपेण गृह्यते तत्कार्य्यं प्रति तद्रूपमन्यथासिद्धमिति भावः । यथा घटं प्रति दण्डत्वमिति ॥ द्वितीयमन्यथासिद्धमाह । कारणमिति । यस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणान्वयव्यतिरेकौ न स्तः किन्तु स्वकारणमादायैव अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ गृह्येते तदन्यथासिद्धं । यथा दण्डरूपं ॥ तृतीयमाह । अन्यं प्रतीति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वं गृहीत्वैव यस्य यत्कार्य्यं प्रति पूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वं गृह्यते तस्य तत्कार्य्यं प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धत्वं । यथा घटादिकं प्रत्याकाशस्य । आकाशस्य हि घटादिकं प्रति आकाशत्वेन कारणत्वं स्यात् । आकाशत्वं शब्दसमवायिकारणत्वं । अतः शब्दं प्रति जनकत्वं गृहीत्वैव घटादिकं प्रति जनकत्वं ग्राह्यमतस्तदन्यथासिद्धं । शब्दाश्रयत्वेन कारणत्वे कान्यथासिद्धिरिति चेत् । पञ्चमीति गृहाण । अथाकाशस्य शब्दं प्रति जनकत्वे किमवच्छेदकमिति चेत् । कवत्वादिकं विशेषपदार्थो वेति ॥ १८ ॥

चतुर्थमन्यथासिद्धमाह । जनकं प्रतीति । यत्कार्य्यजनकं प्रति पूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वं गृहीत्वैव यस्य यत्कार्य्यं प्रति पूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वं गृह्यते तस्य तत्कार्य्यं प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धत्वं । यथा कुलालपितुर्घटं प्रति । तस्य कुलालपितृत्वेन

भाषा० अतिरिक्तमथापि यद्भवेन्नियतावश्यकपूर्व्वभाविनः॥१९॥
एते पञ्चान्यथासिद्धा दण्डत्वादिकमादिमं।
घटादौ दण्डरूपादि द्वितीयमपि दर्शितं ॥ २० ॥
तृतीयन्तु भवेद्व्योम कुलालजनकोऽपरः ।

सिद्धा० घटं प्रति जनकत्वेऽन्यथासिद्धिः। कुलालत्वेन जनकत्वे लिष्टापत्तिः। कुलालमात्रस्य घटं प्रति जनकत्वात् ॥ पञ्चममन्यथासिद्धमाह। अतिरिक्तमिति ॥ नियतावश्यकपूर्व्वभाविनः। अवश्यकॢप्तनियतपूर्व्ववर्त्तिन एव कार्य्यसम्भवे तद्भिन्नमन्यथासिद्धमित्यर्थः। अत एव प्रत्यक्षे महत्त्वं कारणमनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वमन्यथासिद्धं। तत्र हि महत्त्वमवश्यं क्लृप्तं। तेनानेकद्रव्यवत्त्वमन्यथासिद्धं। न च वैपरीत्ये किं विनिगमकमिति वाच्यं। महत्त्वत्वजातेः कारणतावच्छेदकत्वे लाघवात् ॥ १९ ॥

रासभादिरिति। यद्घटव्यक्तिं प्रति रासभस्य नियतपूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वमस्ति तत्रापि घटजातीयं प्रति सिद्धकारणभावैर्द्दण्डादिभिरेव तद्व्यक्तेरपि सम्भवे रासभोऽन्यथासिद्ध इति भावः॥ एतेष्विति। एतेषु पञ्चस्वन्यथासिद्धेषु मध्ये पञ्चमोऽन्यथासिद्ध आवश्यकः। तेनैव परेषां चरितार्थत्वात्। तथा हि दण्डादिभिरवश्यकॢप्तनियतपूर्व्ववर्त्तिभिरेव कार्य्यसम्भवे दण्डत्वादिकमन्यथासिद्धं। न च वैपरीत्ये किं विनिगमकमिति

भाषा० पञ्चमो रासभादिः स्यादेतेष्वावश्यकस्त्वसौ ॥ २१ ।
समवायिकारणत्वं द्रव्यस्यैवेति विज्ञेयं ।
गुणकर्म्ममात्रवृत्ति ज्ञेयमथाप्यसमवायिहेतुत्वं ॥ २२॥
अन्यच्च नित्यद्रव्येभ्य आश्रितत्वमिहोच्यते ।
क्षित्यादीनां नवानान्तु द्रव्यत्वगुणयोगिता ॥ २३ ॥

सिद्धा० वाच्यं । दण्डत्वस्य कारणत्वे दण्डघटितपरम्परायाः सम्बन्धत्वकल्पने गौरवात् । एवमन्येषामप्यनेन चरितार्थत्वसम्भवात् ॥ २० ॥ २१ ॥

समवायिकारणत्वमिति । गुणकर्म्मेति । असमवायिकारणत्वं गुणकर्म्मभिन्नानां वैधर्म्म्यं नतु गुणकर्म्मणोः साधर्म्म्यं इत्यत्रापि तात्पर्य्यं । अथवा असमवायिकारणवृत्तिसत्ताभिन्नजातिमत्त्वं तदर्थः । तेन ज्ञानादीनामपि असमवायिकारणत्वविरहेऽपि न क्षतिः ॥ २२ ॥

अन्यच्चेति । नित्यद्रव्याणि परमाण्वाकाशादीनि विहायाश्रितत्वं साधर्म्म्यमित्यर्थः । आश्रितत्वन्तु समवायसम्बन्धेन वृत्तिमत्त्वं । विशेषणतया नित्यानामपि कालादौ वृत्तेः । कालिकसम्बन्धान्यसम्बन्धेन तेषामवृत्तित्वमिति परमार्थः । तेन समवाया*भावयोः समवायेनावृत्तावपि न क्षतिः ॥ इदानीं द्रव्यस्यैव विशिष्य साधर्म्म्यं वक्तुमारभते । क्षित्यादीनामिति ॥ २३ ॥

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* नाङ्कितपूर्व्वमिति ।

भाषा० क्षितिर्जलं तथा तेजः पवनो मन एव च।
परापरत्वमूर्त्तत्वक्रियावेगाश्रया अमी ॥ २४ ॥
कालखात्मदिशां सर्व्वगतत्वं परमं महत्।

सिद्धा० क्षितिर्जलमिति। पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुमनसां परत्वापरत्ववत्त्वं मूर्त्तत्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वेगवत्त्वञ्च साधर्म्यं। न च यत्र घटादौ परत्वमपरत्वं वा नोत्पन्नं तत्राव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं। परत्वादिसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। मूर्त्तत्वं अपकृष्टपरिमाणवत्त्वं। तच्च तेषामेव गगणादिपरिमाणस्य कुतोऽप्यपकृष्टत्वाभावात् पूर्व्ववत् कर्म्मवत्त्वं* वेगवत्त्वं कर्म्मसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं वेगवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वञ्च बोध्यं॥ २४ ॥

कालेति। कालाकाशात्मदिशां सर्व्वगतत्वं सर्व्वमूर्त्तसंयोगित्वं परममहत्त्वञ्च। परममहत्त्वत्वं जातिविशेषोऽपकर्षानाश्रयपरिमाणत्वं वा। क्षित्यादीति। पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशानां भूतत्वं। तच्च वहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणवत्त्वं। अत्र ग्राह्यत्वं लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्वरूपयोग्यत्वं बोध्यं। तेन ज्ञातो घट इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षे ज्ञानस्याप्युपनीतभानविषयत्वात् तद्वति आत्मनि नातिप्रसङ्गः। न वा प्रत्यक्षाविषयरूपादिमति परमाणा-

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* अपूर्व्वमुद्रितमिदं।

भाषा० क्षित्यादिपञ्च भूतानि चत्वारि स्पर्शवन्ति हि ॥ २५ ॥
द्रव्यारम्भश्चतुर्षु स्यादथाकाशशरीरिणां ।

सिद्धा० दावव्याप्तिः । तस्यापि स्वरूपयोग्यत्वात् महत्त्वलक्षण-कारणान्तरासन्निधानाच्च न प्रत्यक्षं । अथवा आत्मा-वृत्तिविशेषगुणवत्त्वं तत्त्वं ॥ चत्वारीति । पृथिव्यप्तेजो-वायूनां स्पर्शवत्त्वं ॥ २५ ॥

द्रव्यारम्भ इति । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुषु चतुर्षु द्रव्या-रम्भकत्वं । न च द्रव्यानारम्भके घटादावव्याप्तिः । द्रव्यसमवायिकारणवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य वि-वक्षितत्वात् ॥ आकाशशरीरिणामिति । आकाशात्म-नामव्याप्यवृत्तिक्षणिकविशेषगुणवत्त्वं ॥ आकाशस्य वि-शेषगुणः शब्दः । स चाव्याप्यवृत्तिः । यदा किञ्चि-दवच्छेदेन शब्द उत्पद्यते तदन्यावच्छेदेन तदभावस्यापि सत्त्वात् । क्षणिकत्वञ्च तृतीयक्षणवृत्तिध्वंसप्रतियो-गित्वं । योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां स्वोत्तरवर्त्तिगुणनाश्य-त्वात् प्रथमशब्दस्य द्वितीयशब्देन नाशः ॥ एवं ज्ञा-नादीनामपि । ज्ञानादिकं हि आत्मनि विभौ शरी-राद्यवच्छेदेनोत्पद्यते । घटाद्यवच्छेदेन तदभावोऽस्त्येव । एवं ज्ञानादिकमपि क्षणद्वयावस्थायि । इत्यञ्चाव्याप्य-वृत्तिविशेषगुणवत्त्वं क्षणिकविशेषगुणवत्त्वञ्चार्थः ॥ पृथि-व्यादौ रूपादिर्विशेषगुणोऽस्तीत्यतोऽव्याप्यवृत्तिरित्युक्तं ।

भाषा० अव्याप्यवृत्तिः क्षणिको विशेषगुण इष्यते ॥ २६ ॥
रूपद्रव्यत्वप्रत्यक्षयोगि स्यात् प्रथमत्रिकं ।

सिद्धा० पृथिव्यादावव्याप्यवृत्तिसंयोगादिरस्तीत्यतो विशेषगुण इत्युक्तं । न च रूपादीनामपि कदाचित् तृतीयक्षणे नाशसम्भवात् क्षणिकविशेषगुणवत्त्वं क्षित्यादावतिव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । चतुःक्षणवृत्तिजन्यावृत्तिजातिमद्विशेषगुणवत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिः क्षणत्रयं तिष्ठति । क्षणचतुष्टयन्तु किमपि ज्ञानादिकं न तिष्ठति । रूपत्वादिकन्तु क्षणचतुष्टयस्थायिन्यपि रूपादौ वर्त्तत इति व्युदासः । ईश्वरज्ञानस्य चतुःक्षणवृत्तित्वाज् जन्येत्युक्तं । यद्वाकाशजीवात्मनोः साधर्म्यं तदा जन्येति न देयं द्वेषत्वादिकमादाय लक्षणसमन्वयात् परममहत्त्वस्य तादृशगुणत्वाच्च । चतुर्थक्षणे द्वित्वादीनामपि नाशाभ्युपगमाद् द्वित्वादीनामपि तथात्वात् तद्वारणाय विशेषेति त्रिक्षणवृत्त्यवृत्तित्वं वा वाच्यं । द्वेषत्वादिकमादायात्मनि लक्षणसमन्वयात् ॥ २६ ॥

रूपेति । पृथिव्यप्तेजसां रूपवत्त्वं द्रव्यत्ववत्त्वं प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वञ्चेत्यर्थः । न च चक्षुरादीनां भर्जनकपालस्थवह्नेरूष्मणश्च रूपवत्त्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि तेजस्त्वेन रूपानुमानात् । एवं वाय्वानीतपृथिवीजलतेजोभागानामपि पृथिवीत्वादिना रूपानुमानं बोध्यं ।

भाषा० गुरुणी द्वे रसवती द्वयोर्नैमित्तिको द्रवः ॥ २७ ॥
आत्मानो भूतवर्गाश्च विशेषगुणयोगिनः ।
यदुक्तं यस्य साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यमितरस्य तत् ॥ २८ ॥

सिद्धा० न च पटादौ द्रुतसुवर्णादिभिन्ने तेजसि च द्रवत्ववत्त्वमव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । द्रवत्ववद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । घृततैलप्रभृतिषु पृथिवीषु जलेषु द्रुतसुवर्णादौ तेजसि च द्रवत्वसत्त्वात् । तत्र च पृथिवीत्वादिमत्त्वात्तदादाय सर्वत्र लक्षणसमन्वयः । न च प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं परमाण्वादावव्याप्तं अतिव्याप्तञ्च रूपादाविति वाच्यं । चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षविषयवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । आत्मन्यतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चाक्षुषेति ॥ गुरुणी इति । गुरुत्ववत्त्वं रसवत्त्वं पृथिवीजलयोरित्यर्थः । न च घ्राणेन्द्रियादीनां वाय्वानीतपार्थिवादिभागानाञ्च रसादिमत्त्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि पृथिवीत्वादिना तदनुमानात् ॥ द्वयोरिति पृथिवीतेजसोरित्यर्थः । न च नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववत्त्वं घटादौ वह्न्यादौ चाव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

आत्मान इति । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशात्मनां विशेषगुणवत्त्वमित्यर्थः । यदुक्तमिति । ज्ञेयत्वादिकं वि-

भाषा० स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगाख्यसंस्कारो मरुतो गुणाः ।
अष्टौ स्पर्शादयो रूपं द्रवो वेगश्च तेजसि ॥ २९ ॥
स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगश्च गुरुत्वञ्च द्रवत्वकं ।
रूपं रसस्तथा स्नेहो वारिण्येते चतुर्दश ॥ ३० ॥
स्नेहहीना गन्धयुताः क्षिताविते चतुर्दश ।
बुद्ध्यादिषट्कं संख्यादिपञ्चकं भावना तथा ॥ ३१ ॥
धर्माधर्मौ गुणा एते आत्मनः स्युश्चतुर्दश ।
सङ्ख्यादि पञ्चकं कालदिशोः शब्दश्च ते च खे ॥ ३२ ॥
संख्यादयः पञ्च बुद्धिरिच्छा यत्नोऽपि चेश्वरे ।
परापरत्वसङ्ख्याद्याः पञ्च वेगश्च मानसे ॥ ३३ ॥
तत्र क्षितिर्गन्धहेतुर्नानारूपवती मता ।

सिद्धा० हाय इति बोध्यं । तत्तु न कस्यापि वैधर्म्यं । केवला-न्वयित्वात् । ते च सङ्ख्यादयः पञ्च खे आकाशे ॥ २८ ॥ २९ ॥ ३० ॥ ३१ ॥ ३२ ॥ ३३ ॥

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्ये निरूप्य सम्प्रति प्रत्येकं पृथिव्यादिकं निरूपयति । तत्र क्षितिरित्यादिना । गन्धहेतुरिति गन्धसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । यद्यपि गन्धवत्त्वमात्रं लक्षणमुचितं तथापि पृथिवीत्वजातौ प्रमाणोपन्यासाय कारणत्वमुपन्यस्तं । तथाहि पृथिवीत्वं हि गन्धसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया सिध्यति । अन्यथा

भाषा० षड्विधस्तु रसस्तत्र गन्धस्तु द्विविधो मतः ॥ ३४ ॥

सिद्धा० गन्धत्वावच्छिन्नस्याकस्मिकत्वापत्तेः । न च पाषाणादौ गन्धाभावाद्गन्धवत्त्वमव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि गन्धसत्त्वात्। अनुपलब्धिस्तु अनुत्कटत्वेनाप्युपपद्यते। कथमन्यथा तद्भस्मनि गन्ध उपलभ्यते। भस्मनो हि पाषाणध्वंसजन्यत्वात् । पाषाणोपादानोपादेयत्वं सिध्यति । यद्द्रव्यं यद्द्रव्यध्वंसजन्यं तत्तदुपादानोपादेयमिति व्याप्तेः। दृष्टञ्चैतत् खण्डपटे महापटध्वंसजन्ये। इत्थञ्च पाषाणपरमाणोः पृथिवीत्वात्तज्जन्यस्य पाषाणस्यापि पृथिवीत्वं। तथाच तस्यापि गन्धवत्त्वे बाधकाभावः ॥ नानारूपेति । शुक्लनीलादिभेदेन नानाजातीयं रूपं पृथिव्यामेव वर्त्तते न तु जलादौ। तत्र शुक्लस्यैव सत्त्वात् । पृथिव्यान्तु एकस्मिन्नपि धर्म्मिणि पाकवशेन नानारूपसम्भवात्। न च यत्र नानारूपं नोत्पन्नं तत्राव्याप्तिः । रूपद्वयवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य रूपनाशवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य वा वाच्यत्वात् । वैशेषिकनये पृथिवीपरमाणौ रूपनाशस्य रूपान्तरस्य च सत्त्वात् । न्यायनये घटादावपि तत्सत्त्वाल्लक्षणसमन्वयः ॥ षड्विध इति । मधुरकटुकषायादिभेदेन यः षड्विधो रसः स पृथिव्यामेव। जले च मधुर एव रसः । अत्रापि पूर्व्ववद्रसद्वयवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं रस-

भाषा० स्पर्शस्तस्यास्तु विज्ञेयो ह्यनुष्णाशीतपाकजः ।
नित्याऽनित्या च सा द्वेधा नित्या स्यादणुलक्षणा ॥३५॥

सिद्धा० नाशवद्वृत्तिव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं वा लक्षणार्थोऽवसेयः । गन्धस्त्विति ॥ द्विविध इति । वस्तुस्थितिमात्रं न तु द्विविधगन्धवत्त्वं लक्षणं । द्विविधस्य व्यर्थत्वात् । द्वैविध्यञ्च सौरभासौरभभेदेन बोध्यं ॥ ३४ ॥

स्पर्श इति । तस्याः पृथिव्याः । अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोरपि वर्त्तत इत्युक्तं ॥ पाकज इति । इत्थञ्च पृथिव्याः स्पर्शोऽनुष्णाशीतताज्ञापनार्थं तदुक्तं । वस्तुतस्तु पाकजस्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रं लक्षणं । अधिकस्य वैयर्थ्यात् । यद्यपि पाकजस्पर्शो पटादौ नास्ति तथापि पाकजस्पर्शवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वमर्थो बोध्यः ॥ नित्येति । सा पृथिवी द्विविधा नित्या अनित्या चेत्यर्थः । अणुलक्षणा परमाणुलक्षणा पृथिवी नित्या । तदन्या परमाणुभिन्ना पृथिवी द्व्यणुकादिरूपा सर्व्वाऽप्यनित्येत्यर्थः । सैव अनित्या पृथिव्येव अवयववतीत्यर्थः । ननु अवयविनि किं मानं । परमाणुपुञ्जैरेवोपपत्तेः । न च परमाणूनामतीन्द्रियत्वाद् घटादेः प्रत्यक्षं न स्यादिति वाच्यं । एकस्य परमाणोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि तत्समूहस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । यथा एकस्य केशस्य दूरेऽप्रत्यक्षत्वे तत्समूहस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं । न च एकः स्थूलो महान् घट इति बुद्धे-

 रनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यं। एको महान् धान्यराशिरिति-वदुपपत्तेः । मैवं । परमाणोरतीन्द्रियत्वेन तत्समूहस्यापि प्रत्यक्षायोग्यत्वात्। दूरस्थकेशस्तु नातीन्द्रियः। सन्निधाने तस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। न च तदानीं अदृश्य-परमाणुपुञ्जात् दृश्यपरमाणुपुञ्जस्योत्पन्नत्वात् न प्रत्यक्षत्वे विरोध इति वाच्यं। अदृश्यस्य दृश्यानुपादानत्वात् । अन्यथा चक्षुरुष्मादिसन्ततौ कदाचिद्दृश्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न चातितप्ततैलादौ कथमदृश्यदहनसन्ततेर्दृश्यदहनोत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यं। तत्र तदन्तःपातिभिर्दृश्यदहनावयवैः स्थूलदहनोत्पत्तेरुपगमात्। न चादृश्यद्व्यणुकेन कथं त्रसरेणोरुत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यं । यतो न वयं दृश्यत्वमदृश्यत्वं वा कस्यचित् स्वभावादाचक्ष्महे परन्तु महत्त्वोद्भूतरूपादिकारणसमुदायवशाद् दृश्यत्वं। तथाच त्रसरेणोर्महत्त्वात् प्रत्यक्षं न तु द्व्यणुकादेस्तदभावात् । न हि तन्मतेऽपीदं सम्भवति परमाणौ महत्त्वाभावात् इत्थं चावयविसिद्धौ तेषामुत्पादविनाशयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वादनित्यत्वं तेषां चावयवावयवधाराया अनन्तत्वे मेरुसर्षपयोरपि साम्यप्रसङ्गः । अतः क्वचिद्विश्रामो वाच्यः। यत्र च विश्रामस्तस्यानित्यत्वे त्वसमवेतभावकार्य्योत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । अतस्तस्य नित्यत्वं मह-

भाषा॰ सा च त्रिधा भवेद्देह इन्द्रियं विषयस्तथा ॥ ३६ ॥
योनिजादिर्भवेद्देह इन्द्रियं घ्राणलक्षणं ।

सिद्धा॰ त्परिमाणतारतम्यस्य गगणादौ विश्रान्तत्वमिवाणुपरिमाणतारतम्यस्यापि क्वचिद्विश्रान्तत्वमस्तीति तस्य परमाणुत्वसिद्धिः । न च त्रसरेणावेव विश्रामोऽस्त्विति वाच्यं । त्रसरेणुः सावयवश्चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वाद् घटवदित्यनुमानेन तदवयवसिद्धौ त्रसरेणोरवयवाः सावयवा महदवयवत्त्वात् कपालवदित्यनुमानेन तदवयवसिद्धिः। न चेदमप्रयोजकं। अपकृष्टमहत्त्वं प्रति अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वस्य प्रयोजकत्वात्। न चैवं क्रमेण तदवयवधारापि सिध्येदिति वाच्यं। अनवस्थाभयेन तदसिद्धेः । सा च त्रिधेति। सा कार्य्यरूपा पृथिवी त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदादित्यर्थः ॥ ३६ ॥

तत्र देहमुदाहरति। योनिजादीति। योनिजमयोनिजञ्चेत्यर्थः । योनिजमपि जरायुजमण्डजञ्च। जरायुजं मानुषादीनां । अण्डजं सर्पादीनां । अयोनिजं स्वेदजोद्भिदादिकं । स्वेदजाः क्रिमिदंशाद्याः । उद्भिदस्तरुगुल्माद्याः। नारकिणां शरीरमपि अयोनिजं। न च मानुषादिशरीराणां पार्थिवत्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यं। गन्धादिमत्त्वस्यैव प्रमाणत्वात्। न च क्लेदउष्मादेरुपलम्भादाप्यत्वादिकमपि स्यादिति वाच्यं । तथा सति जलत्वपृथिवी-

भाषा० विषयो द्व्यणुकादिश्च ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहृतः ॥ ३७ ॥

सिद्धा० त्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्। न च तर्हि जलत्वादिकमेवास्तु न तु पार्थिवत्वमिति वाच्यं। क्लेदादीनां विनाशेऽपि शरीरत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। गन्धाद्युपलब्धेश्च पृथिवीत्वसिद्धेः। एतेन पार्थिवादिशरीरे जलादीनां निमित्तत्वमात्रं बोध्यं। शरीरत्वन्तु न जातिः पृथिवीत्वादिना साङ्कर्यात् किन्तु चेष्टाश्रयत्वं। वृक्षादीनामपि चेष्टासत्त्वान्नाव्याप्तिः। न च वृक्षादीनां शरीरत्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यं। आध्यात्मिकवायुसम्बन्धस्य प्रमाणत्वात्। तत्रैव किं मानमिति चेत्। भग्नक्षतसंरोहणादिना तदनुमानात्। यदि हस्तादौ शरीरव्यवहारो न भवति तदान्त्यावयवित्वेन विशेषणीयं। न च यत्र शरीरे चेष्टा न जाता तत्राव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं। एतादृशे प्रमाणाभावात्। अथवा चेष्टावदन्त्यावयविमात्रवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं तत्* मानुषत्वचैत्रत्वजातिमादाय लक्षणसमन्वयः। न च नृसिंहशरीरे कथं लक्षणसमन्वयः। तत्र सिंहत्वस्यैकव्यक्तिवृत्तितया जातित्वाभावात्। जलीयतैजसशरीरवृत्तितया देवत्वस्यापि जातित्वाभावादिति वाच्यं। कल्पभेदेन नृसिंहशरीरस्य नानात्वेन नृसिंहत्वजात्या लक्षणसमन्वयात्। इन्द्रियमिति। घ्रा-

* अन्त्यावयविमात्रचेष्टावद्वृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं बोध्यं॥

भाषा॰ वर्णः शुक्लो रसस्पर्शौ जले मधुरशीतलौ।

सिद्धा॰ र्णेन्द्रियं पार्थिवमित्यर्थः। पार्थिवत्वं कथमिति चेत् इत्थं घ्राणेन्द्रियं पार्थिवं रूपादिषु मध्ये गन्धस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्जकघृतवत्। न च दृष्टान्ते स्वकीयरूपादिव्यञ्जकत्वादसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं। परकीयरूपाद्यव्यञ्जकत्वस्य तदर्थत्वात्। न च नवशरावगन्धव्यञ्जकजलेनानैकान्तमिति वाच्यं। तस्य शक्तुरसाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्। यद्वा परकीयेति न देयं वायूपनीतसुरभिभागस्य दृष्टान्तत्वसम्भवात्। न च घ्राणेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षस्य गन्धमात्रव्यञ्जकत्वात्तत्र व्यभिचार इति वाच्यं। द्रव्यत्वे सति इति विशेषणात्॥ विषय इति। उपभोगसाधनं विषयः। सर्व्वमेव हि कार्य्यजातं अदृष्टाधीनं। यत् कार्य्यं यददृष्टाधीनं तत्तदुपभोगं साक्षात् परम्परया वा जनयत्येव। न हि वीजप्रयोजनाभ्यां विना कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिरस्ति। तेन द्व्यणुकादिब्रह्माण्डं सर्व्वमेव विषयो भवति। शरीरेन्द्रिययोर्विषयत्वेऽपि प्रकारान्तरोपन्यासः शिष्यबुद्धिवैशद्यार्थः॥ ३७॥

जलं निरूपयति। वर्णः शुक्ल इति। स्नेहसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया जलत्वं जातिः सिध्यति। यद्यपि स्नेहत्वं नित्यानित्यवृत्तितया न कार्य्यतावच्छेदकं तथापि जन्यस्नेहत्वं तथा बोध्यं। अथ परमाणौ जलत्वं

भाषा॰ स्नेहस्तत्र द्रवत्वन्तु सांसिद्धिकमुदाहृतं ॥ ३८ ॥

सिद्धा॰ न स्यात्। तत्र जन्यस्नेहाभावात्। नित्यस्य स्वरूपयोग्यत्वे फलावश्यम्भावनियमादिति चेत्। न। जन्यस्नेहजनकतावच्छेदकतया जन्यजलत्वजातेः सिद्धौ तदवच्छिन्नजनकतावच्छेदकतया जलत्वजातिसिद्धेः॥ शुक्लरूपवत्त्वमेव दर्शयितुमुक्तं। वर्णः शुक्ल इति। वस्तुस्थितिमात्रं न तु शुक्लरूपवत्त्वं लक्षणं। अथवा नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववदवृत्ति-रूपवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं अभास्वरशुक्लेतररूपासमानाधिकरणरूपवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं तदर्थः॥ रसस्पर्शाविति। जलस्य मधुर एव रसः। शीत एव स्पर्शः। तिक्तावृत्तिमधुरवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं॥ ननु शुक्लरूपवत्त्वमेवेति कुतः कालिन्दीजलादौ नीलोपलब्धेरिति चेत्। न। नीलजनकतावच्छेदिकायाः पृथिवीत्वजातेरभावात् जले नीलरूपासम्भवात्। कालिन्दीजले नीलप्रतीतिः स्वाश्रयौपाधिकी। अत एव वियति विक्षेपे धवलिमोपलब्धेः। अथ जलमाधुर्य्ये किं मानं। न हि प्रत्यक्षेण कोऽपि रसस्तत्रानुभूयते। न च नारिकेलजलादौ माधुर्य्यमुपलभ्यत एवेति वाच्यं। तस्याश्रयोपाधिकत्वात्। अन्यथा जम्बीररसादावम्लाद्युपलब्धेरम्लादिमत्त्वमपि स्यादिति चेत्। न। हरीतक्यादिभक्षणस्य जलरसव्यञ्जकत्वात्।

भाषा॰ नित्यतादि प्रथमवत् किन्तु देहमयोनिजं।

सिद्धा॰ न च हरीतक्यामेव जलोष्णसंयोगाद्रसान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यं। कल्पनागौरवात्। पृथिवीत्वस्याम्लादिजनकतावच्छेदकत्वाच्च। जले नाम्लादिकं जम्बीररसादौ तु आश्रयौपाधिकी तथा प्रतीतिः। एवं जन्यशीतस्पर्शजनकतावच्छेदकं जलत्वं जन्यजलत्वं वा बोध्यं। घृष्टचन्दनादौ तु शैत्योपलब्धिश्चन्दनान्तर्व्वर्त्तिशीततरसलिलस्य तेजःसंयोगाज्जले औष्ण्यप्रतीतिरौपाधिकी स्फुटैव। तत्र पाकासम्भवात्॥ स्नेहस्तत्रेति। घृतादावपि तदन्तर्व्वर्त्तिजलस्यैव स्नेहः। जलस्य स्नेहसमवायिकारणत्वात्। तेन जल एव स्नेह इति मन्तव्यं॥ द्रवत्वमिति। सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वत्वं जातिविशेषः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः। तदवच्छिन्नजनकतावच्छेदकमपि तदेवेति भावः। तैलादावपि जलस्य द्रवत्वं स्नेहप्रकर्षेण च दहनानुकूल्यमिति वक्ष्यति॥ ३८॥

प्रथमवदिति। पृथिव्या इवेत्यर्थः। तथाहि जलत्वं द्विविधं नित्यमनित्यञ्च। परमाणुरूपं नित्यं। द्व्यणुकादिकं सर्व्वमनित्यं अवयवसमवेतञ्च। अनित्यमपि त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात्। किन्तु पृथिवीतो यो विशेषस्तमाह। किन्त्विति। अयोनिजमिति अयोनिजमेवेत्यर्थः। जलीयं शरीरमयोनिजं वरुणलोके

भाषा॰ इन्द्रियं रसनं सिन्धुहिमादिर्विषयो मतः ॥ ३९ ॥
स्पर्श उष्णस्तेजसस्तु स्याद्रूपं शुक्लभास्वरं ।

सिद्धा॰ प्रसिद्धमिति । इन्द्रियं रसनं जलीयमित्यर्थः । तथाहि रसनं जलीयं गन्धाद्यव्यञ्जकत्वे सति रसव्यञ्जकत्वात् । शक्तुरसाभिव्यञ्जकोदकवत् रसनसन्निकर्षे व्यभिचारवारणाय द्रव्यत्वं देयं ॥ विषयं दर्शयति । सिन्धुहिमादिरिति । सिन्धुः समुद्रः । हिमं तुषारः । आदिपदात् सरित् कासारकरकादिः सर्व्वो ग्राह्यः । न च हिमकरकयोः कठिनत्वात् पार्थिवत्वमिति वाच्यं । उष्मणा विलीनस्य तस्य जलत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । यद्द्रव्यं यद्द्रव्यध्वंसजन्यमिति व्याप्तेर्जलोपादानेनोपादेयत्वसिद्धेः । अदृष्टविशेषेणैवाद्रवत्वविरोधात् करकादीनां काठिन्यप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

तेजो निरूपयति । स्पर्श उष्ण इत्यादिना । उष्णत्वं स्पर्शनिष्ठो जातिविशेषः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं । इत्यञ्च जन्योष्णस्पर्शसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकं तेजस्त्वं जातिविशेषः । तस्य परमाणुवृत्तित्वं तु जलत्वस्येवानुसन्धेयं । न चोष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वं चन्द्रकिरणादावव्याप्तमिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि शैाष्णस्य सत्त्वात् । किन्तु तदन्तःपातिजलस्पर्शेनाभिभवादग्रहः । एवं रत्नकिरणादौ पार्थिवस्पर्शेनाभिभवाच्चक्षुरादौ चानुद्भूतत्वादग्रहः ॥ रूपमित्यादि ।

भाषा॰ नैमित्तिकं द्रवत्वन्तु नित्यतादि च पूर्ववत् ॥ ४० ॥
इन्द्रियं नयनं वह्निस्वर्णादिर्विषयो मतः ।

सिद्धा॰ वैश्वानरे मरकतकिरणादा च पार्थिवरूपेणाभिभवात् शुक्लत्वाग्रहः ॥ ननु तद्रूपाग्रहे धर्म्मिणोऽपि चाक्षुषत्वं न स्यादिति चेत् । न । अन्यदीयरूपेणापि धर्म्मिणो ग्रहसम्भवात् शङ्खस्येव पित्तपीतिम्ना । वह्नेस्तु शुक्लं नाभिभूतं किन्तु तदीयं शुक्लत्वमभिभूतमित्यन्ये । नैमित्तिकमिति । सुवर्णादिरूपे तेजसि तत्सत्वात् । न च नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववत्त्वं न लक्षणं दहनादावव्याप्तेर्घृतादावतिव्याप्तेश्चेति वाच्यं । पृथिव्यवृत्तिनैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववद्वृत्तिजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ॥ पूर्ववदिति । जलस्येवेत्यर्थः । तथा हि तद्द्विविधं नित्यमनित्यञ्च । नित्यं परमाणुरूपं । तदन्यदनित्यं अवयवि । तच्च त्रिधा शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमयोनिजमेवेत्यर्थः । तच्च सूर्य्यलोकादौ प्रसिद्धं ॥ ४० ॥

अत्र यो विशेषस्तमाह इन्द्रियमिति । चक्षुस्तैजसं परकीयस्पर्शाद्यव्यञ्जकत्वे सति परकीयरूपव्यञ्जकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् । प्रदीपस्य स्वीयस्पर्शव्यञ्जकत्वादाद्यं परकीयेति । घटादेः स्वीयरूपव्यञ्जकत्वात् व्यभिचारावारणाय द्वितीयं परकीयेति । अथवा प्रभाया दृष्टान्तत्वसम्भवात् परकीयद्वयं न देयं । चक्षुःसन्निकर्षे व्यभि-

भाषा० अपाकजोऽनुष्णाशीतः स्पर्शस्तु पवने मतः ॥ ४१ ॥

सिद्धा० चारवारणाय द्रव्यत्वं देयं ॥ विषयं दर्शयति। वक्रीति।
ननु सुवर्णस्य तैजसत्वे किं मानमिति चेत् । न ।
सुवर्णं तैजसं असति प्रतिबन्धके अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे
ऽप्यनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पृथिवी । न
चाप्रयोजकं पृथिवीद्रवत्वस्य जन्यजलद्रवत्वस्य चाग्निसं-
योगनाश्यत्वात् ॥ ननु पीतिमगुरुत्वाश्रयस्य पार्थिवस्यापि
तदानीं द्रुतत्वात्तेन व्यभिचार इति चेत्।न। जलमध्यस्थ-
मसीचोदवत् तस्याद्रवत्वात् । अपरे तु पीतिमगुरुत्वा-
श्रयस्य अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेऽपि रूपापरावृत्तिदर्शनात् त-
त्प्रतिबन्धकविजातीयं द्रवद्रव्यं कल्प्यते । तथाहि अग्नि-
संयोगे पीतिमगुरुत्वाश्रयः विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धक-
द्रवद्रव्यसंयुक्तः । अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेऽपि पूर्व्वरूपविजा-
तीयरूपानधिकरणपार्थिवत्वात् जलमध्यस्थपीतपटवत्
तस्य च पृथिवीजलभिन्नस्य तेजस्त्वनियमात् ॥ वायुं
निरूपयति । अपाकज इति । अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शस्य
पृथिव्यामपि सत्त्वादुक्तं अपाकज इति । अपाकजस्प-
र्शस्य जलादावपि सत्त्वादुक्तं अनुष्णाशीत इति । तेन
वायवीयो विजातीयस्पर्शो दर्शितः। तज्जनकतावच्छेदकं
वायुत्वमिति भावः ॥ ४१ ॥

भाषा० तिर्य्यग्गमनवानेष ज्ञेयः स्पर्शादिलिङ्गकः ।
पूर्व्ववन्नित्यताद्युक्तं देहव्यापि त्वगिन्द्रियं ॥ ४२ ॥
प्राणादिस्तु महावायुपर्य्यन्तो विषयो मतः ।

सिद्धा० एष वायुः स्पर्शादिलिङ्गकः । वायुर्हि स्पर्शशब्द-धृतिकम्पैरनुमीयते । विजातीयस्पर्शेन विलक्षणशब्देन तृणादीनां धृत्या शाखादीनां कम्पेन च वायोरनुमानात् । यथा च वायोर्न प्रत्यक्षं तथाग्रे वक्ष्यते ॥ पूर्व्ववदिति ॥ वायुर्द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । परमाणुरूपो नित्यस्तदन्योऽनित्यः समवेतश्च । सोऽपि त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । तत्र शरीरमयोनिजं पिशाचादीनां । परन्तु जलीयतैजसवायवीयशरीराणां पार्थिवभागोपष्टम्भादुपभोगसाधनत्वं जलादीनां प्राधान्याज्जलीयत्वमिति ॥ अत्र यो विशेषस्तमाह । देहव्यापीति । शरीरव्यापकं स्पर्शग्राहकमिन्द्रियं त्वक् तच्च वायवीयं । रूपादिषु मध्ये स्पर्शस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वात् ॥ ४२ ॥

अङ्गसङ्गिसलिलशैत्यव्यञ्जकव्यजनवातवद् विषयं दर्शयति । प्राणादिरिति । यद्यपि अनित्यो वायुश्चतुर्व्विधः तस्य चतुर्थी विधा प्राणादिरित्युक्तमाकरे तथापि सङ्क्षेपादत्र त्रैविध्यमुक्तं । प्राणस्त्वेक एव हृदादिनानास्थानवशान्मुखनिर्गमादिनानाक्रियावशाच्च नानासञ्ज्ञां लभत इति ॥

भाषा० आकाशस्य तु विज्ञेयः शब्दो वैशेषिको गुणः ॥ ४३ ॥
इन्द्रियन्तु भवेत् श्रोत्रमेकः सन्नप्युपाधितः ।

सिद्धा० आकाशं निरूपयति । आकाशस्येति । आकाशकालदिशामेकैकव्यक्तित्वाद् आकाशत्वादिकं न जातिः किन्तु आकाशत्वं शब्दाश्रयत्वं । वैशेषिक इतिकथनन्तु विशेषगुणान्तरव्यवच्छेदाय । एतेन प्रमाणमपि दर्शितं । तथा हि । शब्दो गुणश्चक्षुर्ग्रहणायोग्यबहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वात् स्पर्शवत् । शब्दो द्रव्यसमवेतो गुणत्वात् संयोगवद् इत्यनुमाने शब्दस्य द्रव्यसमवेतत्वे सिद्धे शब्दो न स्पर्शवद्विशेषगुणः । अग्निसंयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वाभावे सति अकारणगुणपूर्व्वकप्रत्यक्षत्वात् सुखवत् । पाकजरूपादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय सत्यन्तं पटरूपादौ व्यभिचारवारणायकारणगुणपूर्व्वकेति । जलपरमाणुरूपादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय प्रत्यक्षेति । शब्दो न दिक्कालमनोगुणो विशेषगुणत्वात् । नात्मविशेषगुणः । बहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद् रूपवत् । इत्यञ्च शब्दाधिकरणं नवमद्रव्यं गगणनामकं सिध्यतीति । न च वाय्ववयवेषु सूक्ष्मशब्दक्रमेण वायौ कारणगुणपूर्व्वकः शब्द उत्पाद्यतामिति वाच्यं । अयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वेन वायुविशेषगुणत्वाभावात् । तत्र शरीरस्य विषयस्य चाभावात् ॥ ४३ ॥

इन्द्रियं दर्शयति । इन्द्रियमिति ॥ नन्वाकाशं लाघवा-

भाषा० जन्यानां जनकः कालो जगतमाश्रयो मतः ॥ ४४ ॥
परापरत्वधीहेतुः चणादिः स्यादुपाधितः ।

सिद्धा० देकं सिद्धं श्रोत्रं पुरुषभेदेन भिन्नं कथमाकाशं स्यादत आह । एकः सन्नपीत्यादि । आकाश एक एव सन्नपि उपाधेः कर्णशष्कुल्यादेर्भेदाद्भिन्नं श्रोत्रात्मकं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

कालं निरूपयति । जन्यानामिति ॥ तत्र प्रमाणं दर्शयितुमाह । जगतामिति । तथाहि इदानीं घट इत्यादिप्रतीतिः सूर्य्यपरिस्पन्दादिकं यदि विषयीकरोति तदा सूर्य्यपरिस्पन्दादिना घटादेः सम्बन्धो वाच्यः स च संयोगादिर्न संभवतीति काल एव तत्सम्बन्धघटकः कल्प्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

इत्थञ्च तस्याश्रयत्वमपि सम्यक् प्रमाणान्तरं दर्शयति । परापरत्वेति । परत्वापरत्वबुद्धेरसाधारणं निमित्तं काल एव । परत्वापरत्वयोरसमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयो लाघवादतिरिक्तः कल्प्यत इति भावः ॥ नन्वेकस्य कालस्य सिद्धौ चणदिनमासवर्षादिसमयभेदो न स्यादत आह । चणादिरिति । कालस्त्वेकोऽपि उपाधिभेदात् चणादिव्यवहारविषयः । उपाधिस्तु स्वजन्यविभागप्रागभावावच्छिन्नं कर्म्म पूर्व्वसंयोगानवच्छिन्नविभागो वा पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशावच्छिन्न उत्तरसंयोगप्रागभावो वा उत्तरसंयोगावच्छिन्नं कर्म्म वा । न चोत्तर-

भाषा० दूरान्तिकादिधीहेतुरेका नित्या दिगुच्यते ॥ ४५ ॥
उपाधिभेदादेकापि प्राच्यादिव्यपदेशभाक् ।

सिद्धा० संयोगानन्तरं क्षणव्यवहारो न स्यादिति वाच्यं। कर्म्मान्तरसत्त्वादिति । महाप्रलये क्षणादिव्यवहारो यद्यपि तदनायत्या ध्वंसेनोपपादनीयः। दिनादिव्यवहारस्तु तत्तत्क्षणकूटैरेवेति ॥

दिशं निरूपयति । दूरान्तिकेति । दूरत्वं अन्तिकत्वञ्च दैशिकं परत्वमपरत्वं बोध्यं । तद्बुद्धेरसाधारणं वीजं दिगेव । दैशिकपरत्वापरत्वयोरसमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयतया दिक् सिध्यतीति भावः ॥ ४५ ॥

नन्वेकैव दिग् यदि तदा प्राचीप्रतीच्यादिव्यवहारः कथमुपपद्यतामित्यत आह । उपाधीति । यत्पुरुषस्य उदयगिरिसन्निहिता या दिक् सा तस्य प्राची उदयगिरिव्यवहिता च प्रतीची । एवं तत्पुरुषीयसुमेरुसन्निहिता दिगुदीची तद्व्यवहिता त्ववाची। सर्व्वेषामेव वर्षाणां मेरुरुत्तरतः स्थित इति नियमात् ॥

आत्मानं निरूपयति । आत्मेन्द्रियेति । आत्मत्वजातिस्तु सुखदुःखादिसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया सिध्यति । ईश्वरेऽपि सा जातिरस्त्येव । अदृष्टादिरूपकारणाभावाच्च न सुखदुःखाद्युत्पत्तिः । नित्यस्य स्वरूपयोग्यस्य फलावश्यम्भाव इति नियमस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् ॥ परे त्वीश्वरे सा जातिर्नास्त्येव प्रमाणाभावात् । न च

भाषा० आत्मेन्द्रियाद्यधिष्ठाता करणं हि सकर्त्तृकं ॥ ४६ ॥
शरीरस्य न चैतन्यं मृतेषु व्यभिचारतः ।

सिद्धा० दशमद्रव्यत्वापत्तिर्ज्ञानवत्त्वेन विभजनादिति वदन्ति ॥ इन्द्रियादीति । इन्द्रियाणां शरीरस्य च परम्परया चैतन्यसम्पादकः ॥ यद्यप्यात्मनि अहं जाने अहं सुखी-त्यादिप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वमस्त्येव तथापि विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति प्रथमत एव शरीरादिभिन्नस्तत्प्रतीतिगोचर इति प्रतिपादयितुं न शक्यत इत्यतः प्रमाणं दर्शयति । करणमिति । कुठारादीनां छिदादिकरणानां कर्त्ता-रमन्तरेण फलानुपधानं दृष्टं। एवं चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञान-करणानां फलोपधानमपि कर्त्तारमन्तरेण नोपपद्यत इत्यतिरिक्तः कर्त्ता कल्प्यते ॥ ४६ ॥

ननु शरीरस्यैव कर्त्तृत्वमस्तु अत आह। शरीर-स्येति ॥ ननु चैतन्यं ज्ञानादिकमेव। मुक्तात्मनां त्वन्मत इव मृतशरीराणामपि तदभावे का क्षतिः प्राणा-भावेन ज्ञानाभावस्य सिद्धेरिति चेत् । न । शरी-रस्य चैतन्ये बाल्ये विलोकितस्य स्थाविरे स्मरणानुप-पत्तेः । शरीराणामवयवोपचयापचयैरुत्पादविनाश-शालित्वात् ॥ न च पूर्व्वशरीरोत्पन्नसंस्कारेण द्विती-यशरीरे संस्कार उपपद्यत इति वाच्यं । अनन्तसं-स्कारकल्पने गौरवात् । एवं शरीरस्य चैतन्ये बालकस्य

भाषा० तथात्वञ्चेदिन्द्रियाणामुपघाते कथं स्मृतिः ॥ ४७ ॥
मनोऽपि न तथा ज्ञानाद्यनध्यक्षं तदा भवेत् ।

सिद्धा० स्तनपानादौ प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । इष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य तद्धेतुत्वात् । तदानीमिष्टसाधनतास्मारकाभावात् । मन्मते जन्मान्तरानुभूतेष्टसाधनत्वस्य तदानीं स्मरणादेव प्रवृत्तिः ॥ न च जन्मान्तरानुभूतमन्यदपि स्मर्य्यतामिति वाच्यं । उद्बोधकाभावात् । अत्र त्वनायत्या जीवनादृष्टमेवोद्बोधकं कल्प्यते । इत्यञ्च संसारस्यानादितया आत्मनोऽपि अनादित्वसिद्धौ अनादिभावस्य नाशासम्भवात् नित्यत्वं सिद्ध्यतीति बोध्यं ॥ ननु चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञानादौ करणत्वं कर्त्तृत्वञ्चास्तु विरोधे साधकाभावादत आह । तथात्वमिति । चैतन्यमित्यर्थः । उपघाते नाशे सति अर्थाच्चक्षुरादीनामेव । कथमिति । पूर्व्वं चक्षुषा साक्षात् कृतानां चक्षुषोऽभावे स्मरणं न स्यात् । अनुभवितुरभावात् । अन्यदृष्टस्य अन्येन स्मरणासम्भवात् । अनुभवस्मरणयोः सामानाधिकरण्येन कार्य्यकारणभावादिति भावः ॥ ४७ ॥

ननु चक्षुरादीनां चैतन्यं माऽस्तु मनसस्तु नित्यस्य चैतन्यं स्यादत आह । मनो ऽपीति ॥ न तथा । न चेतनं । ज्ञानादीति । मनसोऽणुत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षे च महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् । मनसि ज्ञानसुखादिमत्त्वे तत्-

भाषा॰ धर्म्माधर्म्माश्रयोऽध्यक्षो विशेषगुणयोगतः ॥ ४८ ॥

सिद्धा॰ प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेरित्यर्थः । यथा मनसोऽणुत्वं तथा वक्ष्यते ॥ नन्वस्तु विज्ञानमेव आत्मा तस्य स्वतः प्रकाशरूपत्वात् चेतनत्वं ज्ञानसुखादिकन्तु तस्यैवाकारविशेषः । तस्यापि भावत्वादेव क्षणिकत्वं पूर्व्वपूर्व्वविज्ञानस्योत्तरविज्ञाने हेतुत्वात् । सुषुप्तावपि आलयविज्ञानधारा निराबाधैव मृगमदवासनाया वसन इव पूर्व्वपूर्व्वविज्ञानजनितसंस्काराणामुत्तरोत्तरविज्ञाने सङ्क्रान्तत्वान्नानुपपत्तिः स्मरणादेरिति चेत् । न । तस्य जगद्विषयत्वे सार्व्वज्ञापत्तेः । यत्किञ्चिद्विषयत्वे विनिगमनाभावः ॥ सुषुप्तावपि विषयावभासप्रसङ्गः । तदानीं निराकारा चित्सन्ततिरनुवर्त्तत इति चेत् । न । तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । अन्यथा घटादीनामपि ज्ञानत्वापत्तिः ॥ न चेष्टापत्तिर्विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुनोऽभावादिति वाच्यं । घटादेरनुभूयमानस्यापलपितुमशक्यत्वात् ॥ आकारविशेष एवायं विज्ञानस्येति चेत् । किमयमाकारोऽतिरिच्यते विज्ञानात् । तर्हि समायातं विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तेन । नातिरिच्यते चेत् तर्हि समूहालम्बने नीलाकारोऽपि पीताकारः स्यात् । स्वरूपतो विज्ञानस्याविशेषात् ॥ अपोहरूपो नीलत्वादिर्व्विज्ञानधर्म्म इति चेत् । न । नीलत्वादीनां विरुद्धानामेकस्मिन्नऽसमा-

सिद्धा॰ वेशात्। इतरथा विरोधस्यैव दुरुपपन्नत्वात्॥ न च वासनासङ्क्रमः सम्भवति। मातृपुत्रयोरपि वासनासङ्क्रमप्रसङ्गात्॥ न च उपादानोपादेयभावो नियामक इति वाच्यं। वासनायाः सङ्क्रमासम्भवात्॥ उत्तरस्मिन्नुत्पत्तिरेव सङ्क्रम इति चेत्। न। तदुत्पादकाभावात्। उत्तरविज्ञानस्यैवोत्पादकत्वे तदानन्त्यप्रसङ्गः॥ क्षणिकविज्ञानेऽतिशयविशेषः कल्प्यत इति चेत्। न। मानाभावात्। कल्पनागौरवाच्च। एतेन क्षणिकशरीरस्यैव चैतन्यमपि प्रत्युक्तं। गौरवादतिशये मानाभावाच्च। वीजादावपि सहकारिसमवधानादेवोपपत्तेः। कुर्व्वद्रूपत्वाकल्पनाच्च॥ अस्तु तर्हि क्षणिकविज्ञाने गौरवान्नित्यविज्ञानमेवात्मा-विनाशी वा। अरे अयमात्मा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेत्या-अदिश्रुतेरिति चेत्। न। तस्य सविषयत्वासम्भवस्य दर्शितत्वात्। निर्व्विषयस्य ज्ञानत्वे मानाभावात्। सविषयत्वस्याप्यनुभवात्। अतो ज्ञानभिन्नो नित्य आत्मेति सिद्धं॥ सत्यं ज्ञानमिति ब्रह्मपरं जीवेषु नोपयुज्यते ज्ञानाज्ञानसुखित्वदुःखित्वादिभिर्जीवानां भेदसिद्धौ सुतरामीश्वराभेदः। अन्यथा बन्धमोक्षानुपपत्तेः। योऽपीश्वरभेदबोधको वेदः सोऽपि तदभेदेन तदीयत्वं प्रतिपादयन् स्तौति। अभेदभावने च यतितव्यमिति वदति। अत एव सर्व्वे एव आत्मनि समर्पिताः श्रूयन्ते। मोक्षदशायामज्ञाननिवृत्तौ अभेदो जायत इत्यपि न।

सिद्धा० भेदस्य नित्यत्वेन नाशायोगात्। भेदनाशेऽपि व्यक्तिद्वयं स्यास्त्येव॥ न च द्वित्वमपि नश्यतीति वाच्यं। तत्र निर्धर्म्मके ब्रह्मणि सत्यत्वाभावेऽपि सत्यस्वरूपं तदितिवद् द्वित्वाभावेऽपि द्वयात्मकौ ताविति। सुवचत्वात् मिथ्यात्वाभावोऽधिकरणात्मकः॥ तत्र सत्यत्वमिति चेद् एकत्वाभावो व्यक्तिद्वयात्मको द्वित्वमप्युच्यतां प्रत्येकमेकत्वेऽपि पृथिवीजलयोर्न्न गन्ध इतिवदुभयं नैकमित्यस्य सर्व्वजनसिद्धत्वात्। योऽपि तदानीमभेदप्रतिपादक आगमः सोऽपि निर्दुःखत्वादिना साम्यं प्रतिपादयति। सम्पदाधिक्ये पुरोहितोऽयं राजा संवृत्त इतिवत्। अत एव निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैतीति श्रूयते॥ ईश्वरो न ज्ञानसुखात्मा किन्तु ज्ञानाद्याश्रयः। नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इत्यादौ विज्ञानपदेन ज्ञानाश्रय एवोक्तः। यः सर्व्वज्ञ इत्यनुरोधात्। आनन्द इत्यस्यापि आनन्दवदित्यर्थः। अर्श्आदित्वान्मत्वर्थीयाच्प्रत्ययात्। अन्यथा पुंल्लिङ्गत्वापत्तेः। आनन्दोऽपि दुःखाभावे उपचर्य्यते। भाराद्यपगमे सुखी संवृत्तोऽहमितिवद् दुःखाभावेन सुखित्वप्रत्ययात्। अस्तु वा तस्मिन्नानन्दो न त्वसावानन्दमित्यत्र मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययविरोधात्। आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न बिभेति कदाचनेत्यत्र भेदस्य स्पष्टत्वाचेति सङ्क्षेपः॥

एतेन प्रकृतिः कर्त्री पुरुषः पुष्करपलाशवन्नि-

सिद्धा॰ लेपः किन्तु चेतनः। कार्य्यकारणयोरभेदात् कार्य्यनाशे कार्य्यरूपतया नाशः स्यादित्यकारणत्वं तस्य। बुद्धिगतचैतन्याभिमानान्यथाऽनुपपत्त्या तत्कल्पनं। बुद्धिश्च प्रकृतेः प्रथमः परिणामः। सैव महत्तत्त्वमन्तःकरणमप्युच्यते। तत्सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां पुरुषस्य संसारापवर्गौ। तस्या एवेन्द्रियप्रणालिकया परिणतिर्ज्ञानरूपा। घटादिना सम्बन्धः पुरुषे कर्तृत्वाभिमानो बुद्धौ चैतन्याभिमानश्च। भेदाग्रहात्। ममेदं कर्त्तव्यमिति मदंशः पुरुषोपरागो बुद्धेः स्वच्छतया चेतनप्रतिबिम्बादतात्त्विको दर्पणस्येव मुखोपरागः। इदमिति विषयोपराग इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया परिणतिभेदस्तात्त्विको निश्वासाभिहतदर्पणस्येव मलिनिमा। कर्त्तव्यमिति व्यापारावेशः। तेनांशत्रयवती बुद्धिः। तत्परिणामेन ज्ञानेन पुरुषस्यातात्त्विकः सम्बन्धो दर्पणमलिनस्येव मुखस्योपलब्धिरुच्यते। ज्ञानादिवत् सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्म्माधर्म्मा अपि बुद्धेरेव। कृतिसामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीतेः। न च बुद्धिश्चेतना परिणामित्वादिति साङ्ख्यमतमपास्तं॥

इत्यदृष्टभोगानामिव चैतन्यस्यापि सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतेस्तद्भिन्ने मानाभावात्। चेतनोऽहं करोमीति प्रतीतेर्बुद्धिपरिणामित्वात्॥ चैतन्यांशे भ्रम इति चेत् कृत्यांशे किं नेष्यते। अन्यथा बुद्धेर्नित्यत्वे मोक्षाभावोऽनि-

भाषा॰ प्रवृत्त्याद्यनुमेयोऽयं रथगत्येव सारथिः ।

सिद्धा॰ त्यत्वे तत्पूर्व्वमसंसारापत्तिः ॥ अचेतनायाः प्रकृतेः कार्य्यत्वाद् बुद्धेरचैतन्यं कार्य्यकारणयोस्तादात्म्यादिति चेत् । न । असिद्धेः । कर्त्तुर्जन्यत्वे मानाभावात् । वीतरागजन्मादर्शनादनादित्वं । अनादेर्नाशासम्भवान्नित्यत्वं । तत् किं प्रकृत्यादिकल्पनेन ॥ न च

प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैःकर्म्माणि सर्व्वशः ।
अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्त्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥

इत्यनेन विरोध इति वाच्यं । प्रकृतेरदृष्टस्य । गुणैरदृष्टजन्यैर्गुणैः इच्छादिभिः । कर्त्ताहं कर्त्ताहमेव । इत्यस्य तदर्थत्वात् ॥

तत्रैवं सति कर्त्तारमात्मानं केवलन्तु यः ।

इत्यादि वदता भगवता प्रकटीकृतोऽयमुपरिष्टादाशय इति सङ्क्षेपः ॥

धर्म्माधर्म्माश्रय इति । आत्मेत्यनुषज्यते । शरीरस्य तदाश्रयत्वे देहान्तरकृतकर्म्मणां देहान्तरेण भोगानुपपत्तेः ॥ विशेषगुणयोगत इति । योग्यविशेषगुणसम्बन्धेनात्मनः प्रत्यक्षं भवति न त्वन्यथा । अहं जाने अहङ्करोमि इत्यादिप्रतीतेः ॥ ४८ ॥

प्रवृत्तीति । अयमात्मा परदेहादौ प्रवृत्त्यादिना ऽनुमीयते । प्रवृत्तिरत्र चेष्टा । ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नादीनां

भाषा० अहङ्कारस्याश्रयोऽयं मनोमात्रस्य गोचरः ॥ ४९ ॥
विभुर्बुद्ध्यादिगुणवान् बुद्धिस्तु द्विविधा मता ।
अनुभूतिः स्मृतिश्च स्यादनुभूतिश्चतुर्व्विधा ॥ ५० ॥
प्रत्यक्षमप्यनुमितिस्तथोपमितिशब्दजे ।

सिद्धा० देहे अभावस्योक्तप्रायत्वात् । चेष्टायाश्च यत्नसाध्यत्वात् । चेष्टया प्रयत्नवानात्माप्यनुमीयत इति भावः ॥ तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह । रथेति । यद्यपि रथकर्म्मचेष्टा न भवति तथापि तेन कर्म्मणा सारथिर्यथाऽनुमीयते तथा चेष्टात्मकेन कर्म्मणा परात्मापीति भावः ॥ अहङ्कारस्येति । अहङ्कारोऽहमिति प्रत्ययः तस्याश्रयो विषय आत्मनि शरीरादिरिति ॥ मन इति । मनोभिन्नेन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षाविषयो मानसप्रत्यक्षविषयस्येत्यर्थः । रूपाद्यभावेनेन्द्रियान्तरायोग्यत्वात् ॥ ४९ ॥

विभुरिति । विभुत्वं परममहत्त्वं तच्च पूर्व्वोक्तमपि स्पष्टार्थमुक्तं । बुद्ध्यादीति । बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादिचतुर्दशगुणाः पूर्व्वोक्ता वेदितव्या । अत्रैव प्रसङ्गाद्बुद्धेः कतिपयप्रपञ्चं दर्शयति । बुद्धिस्त्विति ॥ द्वैविध्यं व्युत्पादयति । अनुभूतिरिति । अनुभूतिश्चतुर्विधेति । एतासाञ्चतसृणां करणानि प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति सूत्रोक्तानि वेदितव्यानि ॥ ५० ॥

प्रत्यक्षमिति । इन्द्रियजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं । यद्यपि

भाषा० घ्राणजादिप्रभेदेन प्रत्यक्षं षड्विधं मतं ॥ ५१ ॥

सिद्धा० मनोरूपेन्द्रियजन्यं सर्व्वमेव ज्ञानं तथापि इन्द्रियत्वेन रूपेण इन्द्रियाणां यत्र ज्ञाने कारणत्वं तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति विवक्षितं । ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षन्तु न लक्ष्यं इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षमिति सूत्रे तथैवोक्तत्वात् । अथ वा ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं । इदं लक्षणं ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षसाधारणं इत्यनुमितौ व्याप्तिज्ञानस्य उपमितौ सादृश्यज्ञानस्य शाब्दबोधे पदज्ञानस्य स्मरणेऽनुभवस्य च हेतुत्वान्न तत्र तत्रातिव्याप्तिः ॥ परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । यद्यपि परामर्शप्रत्यक्षादिकं परामर्शजन्यं तथापि परामर्शजन्यं हेत्वविषयकं यज्ज्ञानं तदेवानुमितिः ॥ न च कादाचित्कहेतुविषयकानुमितावव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं । तादृशज्ञानवृत्त्यनुभवत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । अथ वा व्याप्तिज्ञानकरणकं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । एवं सादृश्यज्ञानकरणकं ज्ञानमुपमितिः । पदज्ञानकरणकं ज्ञानं शाब्दबोधः । वस्तुतो यत्किञ्चिदनुमितिव्यक्तिमादाय तद्व्यक्तिवृत्तित्वे सति यत्किञ्चित्प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तिमादाय तदवृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं अनुमितित्वं । एवं यत्किञ्चित्प्रत्यक्षादिमादाय तद्व्यक्तिवृत्तित्वे सति यत्किञ्चिदनुमितिव्यक्तिमादाय तदवृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वादिकं वाच्यमिति ॥

भाषा० घ्राणस्य गोचरो गन्धो गन्धत्वादिरपि स्मृतः ।
तथा रसो रसज्ञायास्तथा शब्दोऽपि च श्रुतेः ॥ ५२ ॥
उद्भूतरूपं नयनस्य गोचरो द्रव्याणि तद्वन्ति पृथक्त्वसङ्ख्ये।
विभागसंयोगपरापरत्वस्नेहद्रवत्वपरिमाणयुक्तं॥५३॥
क्रियां जातिं योग्यवृत्तिं समवायञ्च तादृशं ।

सिद्धा० घ्राणजादीति । घ्राणजं रासनं चाक्षुषं स्पार्शनं श्रौत्रं मानसमिति षड्विधं प्रत्यक्षं । न चेश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्याविभजनान्न्यूनत्वं । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव निरूपणीयत्वात् उक्तसूत्रानुसारात् ॥ ५१ ॥

घ्राणस्येति । गोचर इति ग्राह्य इत्यर्थः । गन्धत्वादिरिति । आदिपदात् सुरभित्वासुरभित्वपरिग्रहः । गन्धस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात्तद्वृत्तिजातिरपि प्रत्यक्षा । गन्धाश्रयग्रहणे तु घ्राणस्य न सामर्थ्यमिति बोध्यं ॥ तथा रस इति । रसत्वादिसहित इत्यर्थः । गन्धो रसश्च उद्भूतो बोध्यः । तथा शब्दत्वादिसहितः ॥ ५२ ॥

उद्भूतरूपमिति । ग्रीष्मोष्मादावनुद्भूतरूपमिति न चाक्षुषं प्रत्यक्षं । तद्वन्ति उद्भूतरूपवन्ति ॥ ५३ ॥

योग्येति । पृथक्त्वादिकमपि योग्यवृत्तितया ग्राह्यं । तादृशं योग्यवृत्तिमित्यर्थः ॥ चक्षुर्योग्यत्वमेव कथं तदाह । गृह्णातीति । आलोकसंयोग उद्भूतरूपञ्च चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षं प्रति कारणं । तत्र द्रव्यचाक्षुषं प्रति तयोः

भाषा० गृह्णाति चक्षुः संयोगादालोकोद्भूतरूपयोः ॥ ५४ ॥
उद्भूतस्पर्शवद् द्रव्यं गोचरः सोऽपि च त्वचः ।

सिद्धा० समवायसम्बन्धेन कारणत्वं । द्रव्यसमवेतप्रत्यक्षं प्रति स्वाश्रयसमवायसम्बन्धेन द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतस्य रूपत्वादेः प्रत्यक्षे स्वाश्रयसमवेतसमवायसम्बन्धेनेति ॥ ५४ ॥

उद्भूतस्पर्शवद् द्रव्यं। गोचरस्त्वचो गोचरः। सोऽपि उद्भूतस्पर्शोऽपि स्पर्शत्वादिसहितः ॥ रूपान्यदिति। रूपभिन्नं रूपत्वादिभिन्नञ्च चक्षुषो यद् योग्यं तत् त्वगिन्द्रियस्यापि ग्राह्यं। तथा च पृथक्त्वादिसङ्ख्यादयो ये चक्षुर्ग्राह्या गुणा उक्ता एवं क्रिया एवं जातयो योग्यवृत्तयश्च ते त्वचो ग्राह्या इति। अत्रापि त्वगिन्द्रियजन्येऽपि रूपं द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे कारणं। तथा च वहिरिन्द्रियजन्यद्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे रूपं कारणमिति ॥ नवीनास्तु वहिर्द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे रूपं न कारणं प्रमाणाभावात् किन्तु चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षे रूपं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे स्पर्शःकारणं अन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ वहिरिन्द्रियजन्यद्रव्यप्रत्यक्षमात्रे किं कारणमिति चेत्। न। किञ्चिदात्मावृत्तिशब्दभिन्नविशेषगुणवत्त्वं वा प्रयोजकमस्तु ॥ रूपस्य कारणत्वे लाघवमिति चेत्। न। वायोस्त्वगिन्द्रियेणाग्रहणप्रसङ्गात् ॥ इष्टापत्तिरिति चेत्। स्पर्श एव लाघवात् कारणमस्तु। प्रभाया अप्रत्यक्षत्वे त्विष्टापत्तिरित्येव किं न स्यात्। तस्मात् प्रभां पश्यामीतिवद् वायुं

भाषा० रूपान्यच्चक्षुषो योग्यं रूपमत्रापि कारणं ॥ ५५ ॥
द्रव्याध्यक्षे त्वचो योगो मनसा ज्ञानकारणं ।

सिद्धा० स्पृशामीति प्रत्ययस्य सत्त्वाद् वायोरपि प्रत्यक्षं भवत्येव। बहिर्द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षमात्रे तु न रूपस्य न वा स्पर्शस्य हेतुत्वं वायुप्रभयोरेकत्वं गृह्यत एव क्वचित् द्वित्वादिकमपि क्वचित् सङ्ख्यापरिमाणाद्यग्रहो दोषादित्याहुः ॥ ५५ ॥

त्वचो योगो मनसा ज्ञानकारणमिति। त्वङ्मनःसंयोगो ज्ञानसामान्ये कारणमित्यर्थः॥ किं तत्र प्रमाणं सुषुप्तिकाले त्वचं त्यक्त्वा पुरीततिवर्त्तमानेन मनसा ज्ञानाजननमिति॥ ननु सुषुप्तिकाले किं ज्ञानं भविष्यति अनुभवरूपं स्मरणरूपं वा। नाद्यः। अनुभवसामग्र्यभावात्। तथा हि। चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षे चक्षुरादिना सह मनःसंयोगस्य हेतुत्वात्। तदभावादेव न चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानादेरभावादेव न मानसप्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानाद्यभावेनात्मनोऽपि प्रत्यक्षमिति व्याप्तिज्ञानाभावान् नानुमितिः। सादृश्यज्ञानाभावात् नोपमितिः। पदज्ञानाभावात् न शाब्दबोध इति। अनुभवसामग्र्यभावान् नानुभवः। उद्बोधकाभावाच्च न स्मरणं। मैवं सुषुप्तिप्राक्कालोत्पन्नेच्छादिव्यक्तेस्तत्सम्बन्धेनात्मनश्च प्रत्यक्षप्रसङ्गाद् तदतीन्द्रियत्वे मानाभावात् सुषुप्तिप्राक्काले निर्व्विकल्पकमेव जायत इत्यत्रापि प्रमाणाभावात्। अथ ज्ञानमात्रे त्वङ्मनःसंयो-

भाषा० मनोग्राह्यं सुखं दुःखमिच्छा द्वेषो मतिः कृतिः ॥ ५६ ॥
ज्ञानं यन्निर्व्विकल्पाख्यं तदतीन्द्रियमिष्यते ।

सिद्धा० गस्य यदि कारणत्वं तदा रासनचाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षकाले स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षं स्यात् । विषयत्वक्संयोगस्य त्वङ्मनःसंयोगस्य च सत्त्वात् । परस्परप्रतिबन्धादेकमपि वा न स्यादिति । अत्र केचित् पूर्व्वोक्तयुक्त्या त्वङ्मनोयोगस्य हेतुत्वे सिद्धे चाक्षुषादिसामग्र्याः स्पार्शनादिप्रतिबन्धकत्वमनुभवानुरोधात् कल्प्यत इति । अन्ये तु सुषुप्त्यनुरोधात् चर्म्ममनःसंयोगस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वं कल्प्यं चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षकाले त्वङ्मनःसंयोगाभावान्न स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षमिति वदन्ति॥ मनोग्राह्यं सुखं दुःखमिच्छाद्वेषो मतिः कृतिरिति । मनोजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषय इत्यर्थः । मतिर्ज्ञानं । कृतिः प्रयत्नः । एवं सुखत्वादिकमपि मनोग्राह्यं । एवमात्मापि मनोग्राह्यः । किन्तु मनोमात्रस्य गोचर इत्यनेन पूर्व्वमुक्तत्वाद् अत्र नोक्तः ॥ ५६ ॥

ज्ञानं यन्निर्व्विकल्पाख्यं तदतीन्द्रियमिष्यत इति । चक्षुःसंयोगाद्यनन्तरं घट इत्याकारं घटत्वादिविशिष्टं ज्ञानं न सम्भवति । पूर्व्वं विशेषणस्य घटत्वादेर्ज्ञानाभावात् । विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणज्ञानस्य कारणत्वात् । तथा च प्रथमतो घटघटत्वयोर्वैशिष्ट्यानवगाहि ज्ञानं जायते तदेव निर्व्विकल्पकात्मकं तच्च न प्रत्यक्षं । तथा

भाषा० महत्त्वं षड्विधे हेतुरिन्द्रियं करणं मतं ॥ ५७ ॥

सिद्धा० हि विषयानवगाहिज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षं न भवति। घटमहं जानामीति प्रत्यक्षात्। तत्रात्मनि ज्ञानं प्रकारीभूय भासते। ज्ञाने घटस्तत्र घटत्वं यः प्रकारः स एव विशेषणमित्युच्यते। विशेषणे यद्विशेषणं तद्विशेषणतावच्छेदकमित्युच्यते। विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं ज्ञानं विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानकारणं। निर्व्विकल्पके च घटत्वादिकं न प्रकारः। तेन घटत्वादिविशिष्टघटादिवैशिष्ट्यभानं ज्ञाने न सम्भवति। *जात्यतिरिक्तपदार्थज्ञानस्य किञ्चिद्धर्म्मप्रकारकत्वनियमात् ॥

महत्त्वं षड्विधे हेतुरिति। द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे महत्त्वं समवायसम्बन्धेन कारणं। द्रव्यसमवेतानां जातिगुणकर्म्मणां प्रत्यक्षे स्वाश्रयसमवायसम्बन्धेन कारणं। द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतानां गुणत्वकर्म्मत्वरूपत्वादीनां प्रत्यक्षे स्वाश्रयसमवेतसमवायसम्बन्धेन कारणमिति ॥ इन्द्रियमिति। अत्रापि षड्विध इत्यनुषज्यते। इन्द्रियत्वन्तु न जातिः। पृथिवीत्वादिना साङ्कर्य्यप्रसङ्गात्। किन्तु शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वं आत्मादिवारणाय सत्यन्तं। उद्भूतविशेषगुणस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्रे सत्त्वात्। शब्देतरेति विशेषणस्य

* घटत्वाद्यप्रकारकं घटादिविशिष्टज्ञानं न सम्भवति। इति पूर्व्वमुद्रितः पाठोऽनाकरः ॥

भाषा० विषयेन्द्रियसम्बन्धो व्यापारः सोऽपि षड्विधः।

सिद्धा० रूपादेश्चक्षुषि सत्वात्। उद्भूतेति उद्भूतत्वं न जातिः शुक्लत्वादिना सङ्करात्॥ न च शुक्लत्वादिव्याप्यं नानैवोद्भूतत्वमिति वाच्यं उद्भूतरूपत्वादिना चाक्षुषादौ जनकतानुपपत्तेः। किन्तु शुक्लत्वादिव्याप्यमनुद्भूतत्वं नाना तदभावकूटश्चोद्भूतत्वं। तच्च संयोगादावपि। तथा च शब्देतरोद्भूतगुणः संयोगादिश्चक्षुरादेरस्त्यतो विशेषेति। कालादिवारणाय विशेष्यदलं। इन्द्रियावयवविषयसंयोगस्यापि प्राचां मते प्रत्यक्षजनकत्वात्। इन्द्रियावयववारणाय कालादौ रूपाभावप्रत्यक्षे सन्निकर्षघटकतया कारणीभूतश्चक्षुःसंयोगाद्याश्रयस्य कालादेश्च वारणाय मनःपदं ज्ञानकरणमित्यपि तद्वारणाय कारणमिति। असाधारणं कारणं करणं। असाधारणत्वं व्यापारवत्त्वं ॥ ५७ ॥

विषयेन्द्रियसम्बन्धो व्यापारः सोऽपि षड्विध इति। व्यापारः सन्निकर्षः॥ षड्विधं सन्निकर्षमुदाहरणद्वारा दर्शयति। द्रव्यग्रह इति। द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियसंयोगजन्यं। द्रव्यसमवेतप्रत्यक्षं इन्द्रियसंयुक्तसमवायजन्यं। एवमग्रेऽपि॥ वस्तुतस्तु द्रव्यचाक्षुषं प्रति चक्षुःसंयोगः कारणं। द्रव्यसमवेतचाक्षुषं प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवायः। द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतचाक्षुषं प्रति संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः। एवम-

भाषा० द्रव्यग्रहस्तु संयोगात् संयुक्तसमवायतः ॥ ५८ ॥

सिद्धा० न्यत्रापि विशिष्यैव कार्य्यकारणभावः । परन्तु परमाणुनीले नीलत्वं पृथिवीपरमाणौ पृथिवीत्वञ्च चक्षुषा कथं न गृह्यते । तत्र परम्परया उद्भूतरूपसम्बन्धस्य महत्त्वसम्बन्धस्य च विद्यमानत्वात् । तथा हि नीलत्वं जातिरेकैव घटनीले परमाणुनीले च वर्त्तते । तथा च महत्त्वसम्बन्धो घटनीलमादाय वर्त्तते । रूपसम्बन्धस्तूभयमादायैव वर्त्तते । एवं पृथिवीत्वे घटादिकमादाय महत्त्वसम्बन्धो बोध्यः । एवं वायौ तदीयस्पर्शादौ च सत्तायाश्चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षं स्यात् । तस्मादुद्भूतरूपावच्छिन्नमहत्त्वावच्छिन्नचक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवायस्य द्रव्यसमवेतचाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षे तादृशचक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतचाक्षुषे कारणत्वं वाच्यं । इत्यञ्च परमाणुनीलादौ न नीलत्वादिग्रहः । परमाणुचक्षुःसंयोगस्य महत्त्वावच्छिन्नत्वाभावात् ॥ एवं वाय्वादौ न सत्त्वादिचाक्षुषं । तत्र चक्षुःसंयोगस्य रूपावच्छिन्नत्वाभावात् । एवं यत्र घटस्य मध्यावच्छेदेनालोकसंयोगश्चक्षुःसंयोगस्तु वाह्यावच्छेदेन तत्र घटप्रत्यक्षाभावादालोकसंयोगावच्छिन्नत्वं चक्षुःसंयोगे विशेषणं देयं ॥ एवं द्रव्यस्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे त्वक्संयोगः कारणं । द्रव्यसमवेतस्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे त्वक्संयुक्तसमवायः । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतस्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे

भाषा० द्रव्येषु समवेतानां शब्दस्य समवायतः ॥ ५९ ॥
तद्वृत्तीनां समवेतसमवायेन तु ग्रहः ।

सिद्धा० त्वक्संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणं । अत्रापि महत्त्वावच्छिन्नत्वं उद्भूतस्पर्शावच्छिन्नत्वञ्च पूर्व्ववदेव बोध्यं ॥ एवं गन्धप्रत्यक्षे घ्राणसंयुक्तसमवायः । गन्धसमवेतस्य घ्राणजन्यप्रत्यक्षे घ्राणसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणं ॥ एवं रसप्रत्यक्षे रसनासंयुक्तसमवायः । रससमवेतस्य रासनप्रत्यक्षे रसनासंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणं। शब्दप्रत्यक्षे श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नसमवायः । शब्दसमवेतश्रावणप्रत्यक्षे श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नसमवेतसमवायः कारणं ॥ अत्र सर्व्वत्र प्रत्यक्षं लौकिकं बोध्यं । वक्ष्यमाणमलौकिकं प्रत्यक्षं इन्द्रियसंयोगादिकं विनापि भवति ॥ एवमात्मनः प्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयोगः । आत्मसमवेतमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयुक्तसमवायः । आत्मसमवेतसमवेतमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः कारणं । अभावप्रत्यक्षे समवायप्रत्यक्षे च इन्द्रियसम्बन्धविशेषणता हेतुः ॥

वैशेषिकमते तु न समवायः प्रत्यक्षः । अत्र यद्यपि विशेषणता नानाविधा तथा हि भूतलादौ घटाभावः संयुक्तविशेषणतया गृह्यते । सङ्ख्यादौ रूपाद्यभावः संयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणतया । संख्यात्वादौ रूपाद्यभावः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणतया । शब्दाभावः केवल-

भाषा० विशेषणतया तत्तदभावानां ग्रहो भवेत् ॥ ६० ॥
यदि स्यादुपलभ्येतेत्येवं यत्र प्रसज्यते ।

सिद्धा० श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नविशेषणतया । कादौ खत्वाद्यभावः श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नसमवेतविशेषणतया । एवं कत्वावच्छिन्नाभावे खत्वाभावादिकं विशेषणविशेषणतया । एवं घटाभावादौ पटाद्यभावः संयुक्तविशेषणविशेषणतया । एवमन्यदप्यूह्यं। तथापि विशेषणतात्वरूपेणैकैव सा गण्यते अन्यथा षोढा सन्निकर्ष इति प्राचां प्रवादो व्याहन्येतेति॥ ५८ ॥ ५९ ॥ ६० ॥

यदि स्यादुपलभ्येतेति । अभावप्रत्यक्षे योग्यानुपलब्धिः कारणं । तथाहि भूतलादौ घटादिज्ञाने जाते घटाभावादिकं न ज्ञायते तेनाभावोपलम्भे प्रतियोग्युपलम्भाभावः कारणं। तत्रापि योग्यताप्यपेक्षिता। सा च प्रतियोगिसत्त्वप्रसञ्जनप्रसञ्जितप्रतियोगिकत्वरूपा। तदर्थस्तु प्रतियोगिनो घटादेः सत्त्वप्रसक्त्या प्रसञ्जित उपलम्भरूपः प्रतियोगी यस्य स उपलम्भाभावोऽभावप्रत्यक्षे हेतुः ।तथा हि। यत्रालोकसंयोगादिकं वर्त्तते तत्र यद्यत्र घटः स्यात् तर्हि उपलभ्येत इत्यापादयितुं शक्यते। तत्र घटाभावादिप्रत्यक्षं भवति अन्धकारे तु नापादयितुं शक्यत इति । तेन घटाभावादेरन्धकारे चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षं न स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षन्तु भवत्येव।

भाषा० प्रत्यक्षं समवायस्य विशेषणतया भवेत् ॥ ६१ ॥
अलौकिकः सन्निकर्षस्त्रिविधः परिकीर्त्तितः ।

सिद्धा० आलोकसंयोगं विनापि स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षस्यापादयितुं शक्यत्वात्। गुरुत्वादिकं यदयोग्यं तदभावस्तु न प्रत्यक्षः। तत्र गुरुत्वादिप्रत्यक्षस्यापादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । वायौ रूपाभावः । पाषाणे सौरभाभावः । गुडे तिक्ताभावः । श्रोत्रे शब्दाभावः । आत्मनि सुखाभावः । एवमादय-स्तत्तदिन्द्रियैर्गृह्यन्ते । तत्तत्प्रत्यक्षस्यापादयितुं शक्य-त्वात् । संसर्गाभावप्रत्यक्षे प्रतियोगिनो योग्यता। अन्यो-न्याभावप्रत्यक्षे त्वधिकरणयोग्यताऽपेक्षिता । अतस्त-म्भादौ पिशाचादिभेदोऽपि चक्षुषा गृह्यत एव ॥६१॥

प्रत्यक्षं लौकिकालौकिकभेदेन द्विविधं । तत्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षे षोढा सन्निकर्षा वर्णिताः । अलौकिक सन्निकर्षानिदानीं वदति । अलौकिक इति । व्यापारः सन्निकर्षः । सामान्यलक्षणेति । सामान्यं लक्षणं यस्या इत्यर्थः । तत्र लक्षणपदेन यदि स्वरूपमुच्यते तदा सामान्यस्वरूपं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थी लभ्यते । तच्चेन्द्रि-यसम्बद्धविशेष्यकज्ञाने प्रकारीभूतं बोध्यं । तथा हि यत्र इन्द्रियसंयुक्तो धूमादिस्तद्विशेष्यकं धूम इति ज्ञानं जातं । तत्र ज्ञाने धूमत्वं प्रकारः । धूमत्वेन सन्निकर्षेण धूम इत्येवं रूपं सकलधूमविषयकं ज्ञानं जायते ।

भाषा० सामान्यलक्षणा ज्ञानलक्षणा योगजस्तथा ॥ ६२ ॥
आसत्तिराश्रयाणान्तु सामान्यज्ञानमिष्यते ।

सिद्धा० अत्र यदि इन्द्रियसम्बद्धमित्येवोच्यते तदा धूलीपटले धूमत्वभ्रमानन्तरं सकलधूमविषयकं ज्ञानं न स्यात् । तत्र धूमत्वेन सह इन्द्रियसम्बन्धाभावात् । मन्मते तु इन्द्रियसम्बद्धं धूलीपटलं तद्विशेष्यकधूम इति ज्ञानं। तत्र प्रकारीभूतं धूमत्वं प्रत्यासत्तिः ॥ इन्द्रियसम्बन्धो लौकिको ग्राह्यः । इदञ्च वहिरिन्द्रियस्थले। मानसस्थले तु ज्ञानप्रकारीभूतसामान्यमात्रं प्रत्यासत्तिः । अतः शब्दादिना यत्किञ्चित् पिशाचाद्युपस्थितौ मानसः सकलपिशाचादिबोध उपपद्यते ॥ परन्तु समानानां भावः सामान्यं । तच्च क्वचिन्नित्यं धूमत्वादि क्वचिच्चानित्यं घटादि । यत्रैको घटः संयोगेन भूतले समवायेन कपाले ज्ञातस्तदनन्तरं सर्व्वेषामेव तद्घटवतां भूतलादीनां कपालादीनां वा ज्ञानं भवति ॥ अत्रेदं बोध्यं सामान्यं येन सम्बन्धेन ज्ञायते तेन सम्बन्धेन अधिकरणानां प्रत्यासत्तिः । किन्तु यत्र तद्घटनाशानन्तरं तद्घटवतः स्मरणं जातं तत्र सामान्यलक्षणया सर्व्वेषां तद्घटवतां भानं न स्यात् । सामान्यस्य तदानीमभावात् ॥ ६२ ॥

किञ्च इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेष्यकं घट इति ज्ञानं । तत्र परदिने इन्द्रियसम्बन्धं विनापि तादृशज्ञान-

भाषा॰ तदिन्द्रियजतद्धर्म्मबोधसामग्र्यपेच्यते ॥ ६२ ॥

सिद्धा॰ प्रकारीभूतसामान्यस्य सत्त्वात् तादृशज्ञानं कुतो न जायते। तस्मात् सामान्यज्ञानं प्रत्यासत्तिर्न तु सामान्यमित्याह। आसत्तिरित्यादि॥ आसत्तिः प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थः। तथा च सामान्यलक्षणेत्यत्र लक्षणशब्दस्य विषयोऽर्थः। तेन सामान्यविषयकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थो लभ्यते॥ ननु चक्षुःसंयोगादिकं विनापि सामान्यज्ञानं यत्र वर्त्तते तत्र सकलघटादीनां चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षं स्यादत आह। तदिन्द्रियज इति॥ अस्यार्थः यदा वह्निरिन्द्रियेण सामान्यलक्षणया ज्ञानं जननीयं तदा यत्किञ्चिद्धर्म्मिणि तत्सामान्यस्य तदिन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानसामग्री अपेक्षिता। सा च सामग्री चक्षुःसंयोगालोकसंयोगादिकं। तेनान्धकारादौ चक्षुरादिना तादृशज्ञानं न जायते॥ ६२॥

ननु ज्ञानलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिर्यदि ज्ञानरूपा सामान्यलक्षणापि ज्ञानरूपा तदा तयोर्भेदो न स्यादत आह। विषयी यस्य तस्यैव व्यापारो ज्ञानलक्षणा इति। सामान्यलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिर्हि तदाश्रयस्य ज्ञानं जनयति। ज्ञानलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिस्तु यद्विषयकं ज्ञानं तस्यैव प्रत्यासत्तिरिति। अत्रायमर्थः। प्रत्यक्षे सन्निकर्षं विना भानं न सम्भवति। तथा च सामान्यलक्षणां विना धूमत्वेन सकलधूमानां वह्नित्वेन सकलवह्नीनाञ्च भानं

भाषा० विषयी यस्य तस्यैव व्यापारो ज्ञानलक्षणा ।
योगजो द्विविधः प्रोक्तो युक्तयुञ्जानभेदतः ॥ ६४ ॥

सिद्धा० कथं भवतु तदर्थं सामान्यलक्षणा स्वीक्रियेत॥ न च सकलवह्निधूमभानाभावे का क्षतिरिति वाच्यं प्रत्यक्षधूमे वह्निसम्बन्धस्य गृहीतत्वात् । अन्यधूमस्य चानुपस्थितत्वाद्धूमो वह्निव्याप्यो न वेति संशयानुपपत्तिः। मन्मते तु सामान्यलक्षणया सकलधूमोपस्थितौ कालान्तरीयदेशान्तरीयधूमे वह्निव्याप्यत्वसन्देहः सम्भवति ॥ न च सामान्यलक्षणास्वीकारे प्रमेयत्वेन सकलप्रमेये ज्ञाते सार्व्वज्ञापत्तिरिति वाच्यं । प्रमेयत्वेन सकलप्रमेये ज्ञातेऽपि विशिष्य सकलपदार्थानामज्ञातत्वेन सार्व्वज्ञाभावात् ॥ एवं ज्ञानलक्षणाया अस्वीकारे सुरभिचन्दनमिति ज्ञाने सौरभस्य भानं कथं स्यात् । यद्यपि सामान्यलक्षणयापि सौरभभानं सम्भवति तथापि सौरभत्वस्य भानं ज्ञानलक्षणया। एवं यत्र धूमत्वेन धूलीपटलं ज्ञातं तत्र धूलीपटलस्यानुव्यवसाये भानं ज्ञानलक्षणया ॥

योगजो द्विविध इति । योगाभ्यासजनितो धर्म्मविशेषः श्रुतिपुराणादिप्रमाणक इत्यर्थः । युक्तयुञ्जानभेदत इति । युक्तयुञ्जानरूपयोगिद्वैविध्याद्धर्म्मस्यापि द्वैविध्यमिति भावः ॥ ६४ ॥

भाषा० युक्तस्य सर्व्वदा भानं चिन्तासहकृतोऽपरः।
व्यापारस्तु परामर्शः करणं व्याप्तिधीर्भवेत्॥ ६५॥
अनुमायां ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गन्तु करणं न हि।

सिद्धा० युक्तस्य सर्व्वदा भानमिति। योगाभ्यासवशीकृतमानसः समाधिसमासादितविविधसिद्धियुक्तइत्युच्यते। अयमेव विशिष्टयोगवत्त्वाद् वियुक्तइत्यप्युच्यते। सर्व्वदेति। चिन्तासहकारिणं विनेत्यर्थः। भानं सर्व्वविषयाणां प्रत्यक्षं। अपरो युञ्जानो विषयव्यावृत्तमानसः। चिन्ता ध्यानं मनसस्तदेकाग्रीकरणं। तत् सहकारात् स्थूलसूक्ष्माव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टानर्थान् प्रत्यक्षीकरोतीत्यर्थः॥

अनुमितिं व्युत्पादयति॥ व्यापारस्त्विति। अनुमायां अनुमितौ व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणं। परामर्शो व्यापारः। तथाहि येन पुरुषेण महानसादौ धूमे वह्नेर्व्याप्तिर्गृहीता पश्चात् स एव पुरुषः क्वचित् पर्व्वतादौ अविच्छिन्नधूमां धूमलेखां पश्यति तदनन्तरं धूमो वह्निव्याप्य इत्येवंरूपं व्याप्तिस्मरणं भवति। तस्माच्च वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति ज्ञानं भवति स एव परामर्श इत्युच्यते। तदनन्तरं पर्व्वतोऽयं वह्निमानिति ज्ञानं जायते। तदेवानुमितिः। अत्र प्राचीनास्तु व्याप्यत्वेन ज्ञायमानं धूमादिकमनुमितिकरणं। तद्दूषयति ज्ञायमानमिति॥

भाषा० अनागतादिलिङ्गेन न स्यादनुमितिस्तदा ॥ ६६ ॥
व्याप्तस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वधीः परामर्श उच्यते ।

सिद्धा० लिङ्गस्यानुमित्यकरणत्वे युक्तिमाह ॥ अनागतादीति । यद्यनुमितौ लिङ्गं करणं स्यात् तदा अनागतेन विनष्टेन वा लिङ्गेन अनुमितिर्न स्यात् । अनुमितिकरणस्य लिङ्गस्य तदानीमभावात् ॥ ६५ ॥ ६६ ॥

व्याप्तस्य पक्षधर्मत्वधीरिति । व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य पक्षेण सह वैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानमनुमितिजनकं । तच्च व्याप्यः पक्षे इति ज्ञानं । पक्षो व्याप्यवानिति ज्ञानं वा । अनुमितिस्तु पक्षे व्याप्य इति ज्ञानात् पक्षे साध्यं इत्याकारिका । पक्षो व्याप्यवानिति ज्ञानात् पक्षः साध्यवानित्याकारिका ॥ द्विविधादपि परामर्शात् पक्षः साध्यवानित्येवानुमितिरित्यन्ये । ननु वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्व्वत इति ज्ञानं विनापि यत्र पर्व्वतो धूमवानिति प्रत्यक्षं ततो धूमो वह्निव्याप्य इति स्मरणं भवति । तत्र ज्ञानद्वयादनुमितिदर्शनात् । व्याप्तिविशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानं सर्व्वत्र न कारणं किन्तु व्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानत्वेन कारणत्वं आवश्यकत्वात् । विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानकल्पने गौरवाच्चेति चेन्न । व्याप्यतावच्छेदकाज्ञानेऽपि वह्निव्याप्यवानिति ज्ञानादनुमित्युत्पत्तेः । लाघवाच्च व्याप्तिप्रकारकपक्षधर्मता-

भाषा० व्याप्तिः साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्नसम्बन्ध उदाहृतः ॥ ६७ ॥

सिद्धा० ज्ञानत्वेनैव कारणत्वं । किञ्च धूमवान् पर्व्वत इति ज्ञानादनुमित्यापत्तिः । व्याप्यतावच्छेदकीभूतधूमत्वप्रकारकपक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानस्य सत्त्वात् ॥ न च तदानीं गृह्यमाणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वमिति वाच्यं । चैत्रस्य व्याप्तिग्रहे मैत्रस्य पक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानादनुमितिः स्यादिति । यदि तु तत्पुरुषीयगृह्यमाणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकतत्पुरुषीयपक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानं तत्पुरुषीयानुमितौ हेतुरुच्यते तदा अनन्तकार्य्यकारणभावः ॥ मन्मते तु समवायेन व्याप्तिप्रकारकपक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानं समवायेनानुमितिं जनयतीत्यर्थे नानन्तकार्य्यकारणभावः । यदि तु व्याप्तिप्रकारकं ज्ञानं पक्षधर्म्मताज्ञानञ्च स्वतन्त्रं कारणमित्युच्यते तदा कार्य्यकारणभावद्वयं वह्निव्याप्यो धूम आलोकवान् पर्व्वत इति ज्ञानादप्यनुमितिः स्यादिति । इत्यञ्च यत्र ज्ञानद्वयं तत्रापि विशिष्टज्ञानं कल्पनीयं । फलमुखगौरवस्यादोषत्वात् इति ॥

व्याप्यो नाम व्याप्त्याश्रयः तत्र का व्याप्तिरित्यत आह ॥ व्याप्तिरिति । साध्यवदन्येति । वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ साध्यो वह्निः । साध्यवान् महानसादिः । तदन्यो जलह्रदादिः । तदवृत्तित्वं धूमस्येति लक्षणसमन्वयः

भाषा० अथवा हेतुमन्निष्ठविरहाप्रतियोगिना ।

सिद्धा० धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादौ साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्नयःपिण्डादौ वह्निसत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । अत्र येन सम्बन्धेन साध्यं तेनैव सम्बन्धेन साध्यवान् बोध्यः । अन्यथा समवायसम्बन्धेन वह्निमान् वह्नेरवयवस्तदन्यो महानसादिः । तत्र धूमस्य विद्यमानत्वादव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । साध्यवदन्यश्च साध्यवत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदवान् बोध्यः । तेन यत्किञ्चिद्वह्निमान् महानसादिः तद्भिन्ने पर्व्वतादौ धूमस्य सत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । येन सम्बन्धेन हेतुस्तेन सम्बन्धेन साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वं बोध्यं । तेन साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् धूमावयवे धूमस्य समवायसम्बन्धेन सत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वं साध्यवदन्यवृत्तित्वत्वावच्छिन्नाभावः । तेन धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यत्र साध्यवदन्यह्रदादिवृत्तित्वाभावेऽपि नातिव्याप्तिः । अत्र यद्यपि द्रव्यं गुणकर्म्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वादित्यादौ विशिष्टसत्तायाः सत्तायास्चैक्यात् साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् गुणादाववृत्तित्वं नास्तीति तथापि हेतुतावच्छेदकरूपेणावृत्तित्वं वाच्यं । हेतुतावच्छेदकं तादृशवृत्तितानवच्छेदकमिति फलितार्थः । ननु केवलान्वयिज्ञेयत्वादौ साध्ये साध्यवदन्याप्रसिद्धत्वादव्याप्तिः ॥ ६७ ॥

किञ्च सत्तावान् जातेरित्यादौ साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्

भाषा० साध्येन हेतोरैकाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरुच्यते ॥ ६८ ॥

सिद्धा० सामान्यादौ हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन समवायेन वृत्ते-रप्रसिद्धत्वादव्याप्तिस्तात आह ॥ अथवा हेतुमन्निष्ठेति । हेतुमति निष्ठा वृत्तिर्यस्य स तथा । विरहोऽभावः । तथा च हेत्वधिकरणवृत्तिर्योऽभावः तदप्रतियोगिना साध्येन सह हेतोः सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः । यद्यपि वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ हेत्वधिकरणपर्व्वतादिवृत्त्य-भावप्रतियोगित्वं तत्तद्वह्न्यादेरस्तीत्यव्याप्तिः ॥ न च समानाधिकरणवह्निधूमयोरेव व्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं । तद्वह्नेरुभयाभावसत्त्वादेकसत्त्वेऽपि द्वयं नास्तीति प्र-तीतेः । गुणवान् द्रव्यत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तेश्च । तथापि साध्यतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकं तदवच्छिन्न-सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं ॥ ननु रूपत्वव्या-प्यजातिमान् पृथिवीत्वादित्यादौ साध्यतावच्छेदक-रूपत्वव्याप्यजातयस्तासां शुक्लत्वादिस्वरूपाणां नीलघ-टादिवृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमस्तीत्यव्याप्तिरि-ति चेन्न । तत्र परम्परया रूपत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वस्यैव साध्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् । न हि तादृशधर्म्मावच्छिन्नाभावः क्वापि पृथिव्यामस्ति । रूपत्वव्याप्यजातिमान् नास्तीति बुद्ध्यापत्तेः । साध्यादिभेदेन व्याप्तेर्भेदात् । तादृशस्थले साध्यतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकता-

सिद्धा० नवच्छेदकमित्येव लक्षणघटकमित्यपिवदन्ति। एवं दण्डादौ साध्ये परम्परासम्बद्धं दण्डत्वादिकमेव साध्यतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकमिति वाच्यं। हेत्वधिकरणञ्च हेतुतावच्छेदकविशिष्टाधिकरणं वाच्यं। तेन द्रव्यं गुणकर्म्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वादित्यादौ शुद्धसत्त्वाधिकरणगुणादिनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि द्रव्यत्वस्य नाव्याप्तिः। हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन हेत्वधिकरणं बोध्यं। तेन समवायेन धूमाधिकरणतदवयवनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि वह्नेर्नाव्याप्तिः। अभावश्च प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणो बोध्यः। तेन कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यादौ मूलावच्छेदेनैव एतद्वृक्षवृत्तिकपिसंयोगाभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि संयोगस्य नाव्याप्तिः॥ न च प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वं प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणवृत्तित्वं। तदा तथैवाव्याप्तिः। प्रतियोगिनः कपिसंयोगस्यानधिकरणगुणादौ वर्त्तते योऽभावस्तस्यैव मूलावच्छेदेन सत्त्वात्। यदि प्रतियोग्यधिकरणावृत्तित्वं तदा संयोगिसत्त्वादित्यादावतिव्याप्तिः। सत्त्वाधिकरणे गुणादौ यः संयोगाभावस्तस्य प्रतियोग्यधिकरणद्रव्यवृत्तित्वादिति वाच्यं। हेत्वधिकरणे प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। स्वप्रतियोग्यनधिकरणीभूतहेत्वधिकरणवृत्त्यभाव इति निष्कर्षः। प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणं स्वप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानधिकरणं

सिद्धा॰ वाच्यं। तेन विशिष्टसत्तावान् जातेरित्यादौ जात्यधिकरणगुणादौ विशिष्टसत्ताभावप्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। एवं साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वं बोध्यं। तेन ज्ञानवान् द्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ द्रव्यत्वाधिकरणघटादेर्विषयतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञानाधिकरणत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। इत्थञ्च वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ धूमाधिकरणे समवायेन वह्निविरहसत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः॥ ननु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्य यस्य कस्यचित् तत्सामान्यस्य वा अनधिकरणत्वं। यत् किञ्चित्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्य वानधिकरणत्वमुक्तं। आद्ये कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिः। कपिसंयोगाभावस्य हि प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नो वृक्षावृत्तिरपि कपिसंयोगो भवति तदनधिकरणञ्च वृक्ष इति। द्वितीये प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धिः। सर्व्वस्यैवाभावस्य पूर्व्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वभावात्मकप्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वात्॥ न च वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ घटाभावादेः पूर्व्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वभावात्मकप्रतियोग्यधिकरणत्वं यद्यपि पर्व्वतादेस्तथापि साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन तत्प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणवृत्तित्वमस्त्येवेति कथमप्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं। घटाभावे यो वह्न्यभावस्तस्य घटाभावात्मकतया घटाभावस्य वह्निरपि प्रतियोगी तदधिकरणञ्च पर्व्वतादीति क्रमेण

सिद्धा॰ प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्। यदि च घटाभावादौ वह्न्यभावादिर्भिन्न इत्युच्यते तथापि धूमाभाववान् वह्न्यभावादित्यादावव्याप्तिः। तत्र साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धः स्वरूपसम्बन्धः। तेन सम्बन्धेन सर्व्वस्यैवाभावस्य च पूर्व्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वभावात्मकप्रतियोग्यधिकरणत्वं हेत्वधिकरणस्येति। तृतीये तु कपिसंयोगाभाववान् आत्मत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिः। तत्रात्मवृत्तिकपिसंयोगाभावाभावः कपिसंयोगस्तस्य च गुणत्वात् तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं गुणसामान्याभावत्वमपि तदवच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं हेत्वधिकरणस्यात्मन इति। मैवं। यादृशप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं हेतुमतस्तादृशप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्॥ ननु कालो घटवान् कालपरिमाणाद् इत्यत्राव्याप्तिः। प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धेर्हेत्वधिकरणस्य महाकालस्य जगदाधारतया सर्व्वेषामभावानां साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन कालिकविशेषणतया प्रतियोग्यधिकरणत्वात्॥ अत्र केचित् महाकालभेदविशिष्टघटाभावस्तत्र प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणमहाकालस्य घटाधारत्वेऽपि महाकालभेदविशिष्टघटानाधारत्वात्। महाकाले महाकालभेदाभावात्॥ वस्तुतस्तु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणीभूतहेत्वधिकरणवृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगितासामान्ये यत्-

सिद्धा॰ सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वयद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नत्वोभयाभावस्तेन सम्बन्धेन तद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नस्य तत्र हेतुव्यापकत्वं बोध्यं। व्यापकसामानाधिकरण्यञ्च व्याप्तिः। यत्सम्बन्धः साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धः। यद्धर्म्मः साध्यतावच्छेदकः। तत्र यदि यद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नत्वाभावमात्रमित्युच्यते तदा समवायेन यो वह्न्यभावस्तस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धः समवायस्तेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणपर्व्वतादिवृत्तिः स एव तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकञ्च वह्नित्वमित्यव्याप्तिः स्यात्। यदि च यत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वाभावमात्रमुच्यते तदा तादृशस्य संयोगेन घटाभावस्य प्रतियोगितायां संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वसत्त्वादव्याप्तिः स्यादत उभयमुपात्तं। इत्यञ्च कालो घटवान् कालपरिमाणादित्यादौ संयोगसम्बन्धेन यो घटाभावस्तत्प्रतियोगिनो घटस्यानधिकरणे महाकाले वर्त्तमानः स एव संयोगेन घटाभावस्तस्य प्रतियोगितायां कालिकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वघटत्वावच्छिन्नत्वोभयाभावसत्त्वान्नाव्याप्तिः। धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सामान्यपदमुपात्तं। ननु प्रमेयवह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ प्रमेयवह्नित्वावच्छिन्नत्वमप्रसिद्धं। गुरुधर्म्मस्यानवच्छेदकत्वादिति चेत्। न। कम्बुग्रीवादिमान् नास्तीति प्रतीत्या कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताविषयीकरणेन गुरुधर्म्मस्याप्यवच्छेदकत्वस्वीकारादिति सङ्क्षेपः॥ ६८॥

भाषा० सिषाधयिषया शून्यसिद्धिर्यत्र न विद्यते।

सिद्धा० पक्षष्टत्त्वमित्यत्र पक्षत्वं किं तदाह। सिषाधयिषया शून्या सिद्धिरित्यादि। सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टायाः सिद्धेरभावः पक्षता तद्वान् पक्ष इत्यर्थः। सिषाधयिषामात्रं न पक्षता। विनापि सिषाधयिषां घनगर्जितेन मेघानुमानात् सिद्धौ सत्यामपि सिषाधयिषासत्त्वेऽनुमितिर्भवत्येव। अतः सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वं सिद्धौ विशेषणं। तथा च यत्र सिद्धिर्नास्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता। यत्र च सिषाधयिषाऽस्ति तत्र सिद्धौ सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता। यत्र च सिद्धिरस्ति सिषाधयिषा च नास्ति तत्र न पक्षता। सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धेः सत्त्वात्॥ ननु यत्र परामर्शानन्तरं सिद्धिस्ततः सिषाधयिषा तत्र सिषाधयिषाकाले परामर्शनाशान्नानुमितिः। यत्र सिद्धिपरामर्शसिषाधयिषाः क्रमेण भवन्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषाकाले सिद्धेर्नाशात् प्रतिबन्धकाभावादेवानुमितिः। यत्र सिषाधयिषासिद्धिपरामर्शाः सन्ति तत्र परामर्शकाले सिषाधयिषैव नास्ति। एवमन्यत्रापि सिद्धिकाले परामर्शकालेन सिषाधयिषा॥ योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां यौगपद्यनिषेधात् कथं सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वं सिद्धेर्विशेषणमिति चेत्। न। यत्र वह्निव्याप्यधूम-

भाषा० स पक्षस्तत्र वृत्तित्वज्ञानादनुमितिर्भवेत् ॥ ६९ ॥

सिद्धा० वान् पर्व्वतो वह्निमानित्यनुमितिः। सुखसाधनमिति प्रत्यक्षं स्मरणं वा। ततः सिषाधयिषा। तत्र पक्षतासम्पत्तये सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वविशेषणस्यावश्यकत्वादिति। अत्रेदं बोध्यं यादृशयादृशसिषाधयिषासत्त्वे सिद्धिसत्त्वे यल्लिङ्गकानुमितिस्तादृशसिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावस्तल्लिङ्गकानुमितौ पक्षता। तेन सिद्धिपरामर्शसत्त्वेऽपि यत्किञ्चिज्ज्ञानं जायतामितीच्छायामपि नानुमितिः। वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्व्वतो वह्निमानिति प्रत्यक्षसत्त्वे प्रत्यक्षादिभिन्नं वह्निज्ञानं जायतामितीच्छायान्तु भवत्येव। एवं धूमपरामर्शसत्त्वे आलोकेन वह्निमनुमिनोमीतीच्छायामपि नानुमितिः। सिषाधयिषाविरहकाले यादृशसिद्धिसत्त्वे नानुमितिस्तादृशी सिद्धिर्विशिष्य तत्तदनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका वक्तव्या। तेन पर्व्वतस्तेजस्वी पाषाणमयो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमितेर्न विरोधः परन्तु पक्षतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येन साध्यसिद्धावपि तदवच्छेदेनानुमितिदर्शनात्। पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनानुमितिं प्रति पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन सिद्धिरेव प्रतिबन्धिका। पक्षतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येनानुमितिं प्रति तु सिद्धिमात्रं विरोधि। इदन्तु बोध्यं। अयं पुरुषो न वेति संशयानन्तरं यत्र पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयं इति ज्ञानं

भाषा० अनैकान्तो विरुद्धश्चाप्यसिद्धः प्रतिपादितः ।

सिद्धा० तत्रासत्यामनुमित्सायां पुरुषत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षं भवति न त्वनुमितिरतोऽनुमित्साविरहविशिष्टसमानविषयकप्रत्यक्षसामग्री कामिनीजिज्ञासादिवत् स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतिबन्धिका । एवं परामर्शानन्तरं विनापि प्रत्यक्षेच्छां पक्षादिप्रत्यक्षानुत्पत्तेः । प्रत्यक्षेच्छाविरहविशिष्टानुमितिसामग्री भिन्नविषयकप्रत्यक्षे प्रतिबन्धिका ॥ ६८॥

प्रसङ्गसङ्गत्या हेत्वाभासान् विभजते। अनैकान्तइत्यादि। तल्लक्षणन्तु यद्विषयत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वं तत्त्वं। तथाहि व्यभिचारादिविषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वात् ते दोषाः । यद्विषयकत्वञ्च यादृशविशिष्टविषयकत्वं बोध्यं। तेन बाधभ्रमस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वेऽपि तत्र पर्व्वतो वह्न्यभाववानिति विशिष्टस्याप्रसिद्धत्वान्न हेतुदोषाः। न च वह्न्यभावव्याप्यपाषाणमयत्ववान् पर्व्वत इति परामर्शकाले वह्निव्याप्यधूमस्याभासत्वं न स्यात् तत्र वह्न्यभावव्याप्यवान् पक्ष इति विशिष्टस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यं । इष्टापत्तेः । अन्यथा बाधभ्रमस्याप्यनित्यदोषत्वापत्तेः। तस्मात् तत्र वह्न्यभावव्याप्यपाषाणमयत्ववान् इति परामर्शकाले वह्निव्याप्यधूमस्य नाभासत्वं भ्रमादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धमात्रं। हेतुस्तु न दुष्ट इति। इत्यञ्च साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिहेत्वादिकं दोषः तद्वत्ता च हेतौ येन केनापि सम्बन्धेनेति नव्याः। परे तु

भाषा० कालात्ययोपदिष्टश्च हेत्वाभासास्तु पञ्चधा॥ ७०॥
आद्यः साधारणस्तु स्यात् स्यादसाधारणो मतः।

सिद्धा० यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वं तद्वत्त्वं हेत्वाभासत्वं सत्प्रतिपक्षे विरोधिव्याप्त्यादिकमेव तथा तद्वत्त्वं हेतोर्ज्ञानरूपसम्बन्धेन॥ न चैवं वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ वाधभ्रमे पक्षे साध्याभावविषयकत्वेनानुमितिविरोधित्वाज्ज्ञानरूपसम्बन्धेन तद्वत्त्वस्यापि सत्त्वात् सद्धेतोरपि वाधितत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यं। तत्र ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धत्वाकल्पनात्। अत्र सत्प्रतिपक्षित इति व्यवहारेण तत्कल्पनात्। तत्र वाधितव्यवहाराभावादित्याहुः। अनुमितिविरोधित्वञ्च अनुमितितत्कारणान्यतरविरोधित्वं। तेन एकहेतौ व्यभिचारग्रहे हेत्वन्तरेणानुमित्युत्पत्तेस्तदभावाद्यनवगाहित्वाच्च व्यभिचारज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वाभावेऽपि न क्षतिरिति सङ्क्षेपः॥ यादृशपक्षसाध्यहेतौ यावन्तो दोषास्तावदन्यान्यत्वं तत्र हेत्वाभासत्वं। पञ्चकथनन्तु तत्सम्भवस्थलाभिप्रायेण। एवं साधारण्याद्यन्यतमत्वं अनैकान्तिकत्वं॥ ७०॥

आद्यः साधारण इत्यादि। साधारणः साध्यवदन्यवृत्तिर्हेतुः। तेन च व्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते। असाधारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणो हेतुः। तेन साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यग्रहः प्रतिबध्यते। यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादित्यादौ चासाधारण्यं। शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वा-

भाषा० तथैवानुपसंहारी त्रिधानैकान्तिको भवेत् ॥ ७१ ॥

सिद्धा० दित्यादौ असाधारणभ्रमः। अन्ये तु सपक्षावृत्तिरसाधारणः। सपक्षश्च निश्चितसाध्यवान्। इत्यश्च शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वादित्यादौ पक्षे यदा साध्यनिश्चयस्तदा नासाधारण्यं तत्र हेतुनिश्चयादिति वदन्ति ॥ अनुपसंहारी च अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकादिः। तेन च व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते ॥ विरुद्धस्तु साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगी। अयञ्च साध्याभावग्रहसामग्रीत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकः॥ सत्प्रतिपक्षे तु प्रतिहेतुसाध्याभावसाधकः। अत्र तु हेतुरेवेति विशेषः। साध्याभावसाधक एव साध्यसाधकत्वेन उपन्यस्त इत्यशक्तिविशेषोपस्थापकत्वाच्च विशेषः॥ सत्प्रतिपक्षः साध्याभावव्याप्यवान् पक्षः। अगृहीताप्रामाण्यकसाध्यव्याप्यवत्त्वेनोपस्थितिकालीनसाध्याभावव्याप्यवत्त्वेनोपस्थितिविषयस्तथा इत्यन्ये। अत्र च परस्पराभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानात् परस्परानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलं॥ अत्र केचित् यथा घटाभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञाने विद्यमानेऽपि घटचक्षुःसंयोगे सति घटवत्ताज्ञानं जायते। यथा च सत्यपि पीतत्वाभावव्याप्यशङ्खत्ववत्ताज्ञाने पित्तादिदोषे पीतः शङ्ख इति धीर्जायते एवं कोटिद्वयव्याप्यवत्तादर्शने कोटिद्वयप्रत्यक्षरूपः संशयो भवति तथा सत्प्रतिपक्षस्थले संशयरूपानुमितिर्भवत्येव यत्र। चैककोटिव्याप्यदर्शनं

सिद्धा॰ तत्राधिकबलतया द्वितीयकोटिभानप्रतिबन्धान्न संशयः। फलबलेन साधिकसमबलभावः कल्प्यत इति वदन्ति। तन्न। तदभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञाने सति तदुपनीतभानविशेषशाब्दबोधादेरनुदयात्। लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्यज्ञानमात्रे तस्य प्रतिबन्धकता। लाघवात्। न तूपनीतभानविशेषे शाब्दबोधे च पृथक् प्रतिबन्धकता। गौरवात्। तथाच प्रतिबन्धकसत्त्वात् कथमनुमितिः। न हि लौकिकसन्निकर्षस्थले प्रत्यक्षमिव सत्प्रतिपक्षस्थले संशयानुमितिः प्रामाणिकी येनानुमितिभिन्नत्वेनापि विशेषणीयं। यत्र कोटिद्वयव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानं तत्रोभयत्राप्रामाण्यज्ञानात् संशयो नान्यथा ऽगृहीताप्रामाण्यकस्यैव विरोधिज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति॥

आश्रयासिद्ध्याद्यन्यतमत्वमसिद्धत्वं। आश्रयासिद्धिः पक्षे पक्षतावच्छेदकस्याभावः। यत्र च काञ्चनमयः पर्व्वतो वह्निमानिति साध्यते तत्र पर्व्वतो न काञ्चनमय इति ज्ञाने विद्यमाने काञ्चनमयपर्व्वते परामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलं॥

स्वरूपासिद्धिस्तु पक्षे व्याप्यत्वाभिमतस्याभावः। अत्र च ह्रदो द्रव्यं धूमादित्यादौ पक्षे व्याप्यत्वाभिमतस्य हेतोरभावे ज्ञाते पक्षे साध्यव्याप्यहेतुमत्ताज्ञानरूपपरामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलं॥

सिद्धा॰ साध्यासिद्धिरपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः । सा च साध्ये साध्यतावच्छेदकाभावः। तथा च काञ्चनमयवह्निमानित्यादौ साध्ये साध्यतावच्छेदकाभावे ज्ञाते साध्यतावच्छेदकविशिष्टसाध्यव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानरूपपरामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलं ॥

एवं हेतौ हेतुतावच्छेदकाभावः साधनाप्रसिद्धिः। यथा च काञ्चनमयधूमादित्यादौ हेतुतावच्छेदकविशिष्टहेतोर्ज्ञानाभावात् तत्तद्धेतुकव्याप्तिज्ञानादेरभावः फलं। एवं वह्निमान् नीलधूमादित्यादौ गुरुतया नीलधूमत्वं हेतुतानवच्छेदकमिति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यपि वदन्ति ॥

वाधस्तु पक्षे साध्याभावादिः । एतस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलं। तद्धर्म्मिकतदभावनिश्चयो लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्यतद्धर्म्मिकतज्ज्ञानमात्रे विरोधीति न तु तत्र संशयसाधारणं पक्षे साध्यसंसृष्टत्वज्ञानमनुमितिकारणं। तद्विरोधितया वाधसत्प्रतिपक्षयोर्हेत्वाभासत्वमिति युक्तं। पृथिव्यामितरभेद एतादृशानुमित्यनापत्तेः । पूर्व्वं पक्षे साध्यसंसृष्टत्वज्ञानाभावात् । अप्रसिद्धसाध्यकानुमित्यपलापापत्तेः । साध्यसंशयं विनानुमित्युत्पत्तेश्च ॥ एवं साध्याभावज्ञाने प्रमात्वज्ञानमपि न प्रतिबन्धकं। प्रमाणाभावाद् गौरवाच्च। अन्यथा सत्प्रतिपक्षादावपि तदभावव्याप्यव-

भाषा० यः सपक्षे विपक्षे च भवेत् साधारणस्तु सः ।

सिद्धा० न्ताज्ञाने प्रमात्वविषयकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकतापत्तेः । किन्तु भ्रमत्वज्ञानानास्कन्दिता वाधादिबुद्धेः प्रतिबन्धकता । तत्र भ्रमत्वशङ्काविघटने प्रामाण्यज्ञानं क्वचिदुपयुज्यते॥ न च वाधस्थले पक्षे हेतुसत्त्वे व्यभिचारः पक्षे हेत्वभावे स्वरूपासिद्धिरेव दोष इति वाच्यं । वाधज्ञानव्यभिचारज्ञानादेर्भेदात् । किञ्च यदा परामर्शानन्तरं वाधबुद्धिस्तत्र व्यभिचारज्ञानादेरकिञ्चित्करत्वाद् वाधस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं वाच्यं । एवं यत्रोत्पत्तिक्षणावच्छिन्ने घटादौ गन्धव्याप्यपृथिवीत्वज्ञानं तत्र वाधस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वं वाच्यं ॥ न च घटे गन्धवत्त्वात् कथं वाध इति वाच्यं । पक्षतावच्छेदकदेशकालावच्छेदेनानुमितेरनुभवसिद्धत्वात् ।* इति वाधतद्व्याप्यभिन्ना ये ये हेत्वाभासास्तद्व्याप्या अपि तन्मध्य एवान्तर्भवन्ति । अन्यथा हेत्वाभासाधिक्यप्रसङ्गाद् वाधव्याप्यसत्प्रतिपक्षो भिन्न एव । स्वतन्त्रेच्छेन मुनिना पृथगुपादानात् । सत्प्रतिपक्षव्याप्यस्तु न प्रतिबन्धक इति प्रकटितोऽर्थः ॥ ७१ ॥

यः सपक्षे विपक्षे च भवेत् साधारणस्तु स इति । सपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः साधारण इत्यर्थः । सपक्षः साध्यवान् । विपक्षः साध्याभाववान् विरुद्धवारणाय सपक्षवृत्तित्व-

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* इति दिनकरीसम्मतः पाठः ॥ सत्प्रतिपक्षतद्व्याप्यभिन्नो यो यो हेत्वाभासव्याप्यः स तन्मध्य एवान्तर्भवति । इत्ययं पूर्व्वपाठोऽपरीकृतः ॥

भाषा० यस्तूभयस्माद् व्यावृत्तः स चासाधरणो मतः ॥ ७२॥
तथैवानुपसंहारी केवलान्वयिपक्षकः ।
यः साध्यवति नैवास्ति स विरुद्ध उदाहृतः ॥ ७३ ॥

सिद्धा० मुक्तं । वस्तुतो विपक्षवृत्तित्वमेव वाच्यं । विरुद्धस्य साधारणत्वेऽपि दूषकतावीजस्य भिन्नतया तस्य पार्थक्यात् ॥

यस्तूभयस्माद् व्यावृत्तः स चासाधारणो मत इति। सपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्त इत्यर्थः। सपक्षः साध्यवत्तया निश्चितः। विपक्षः साध्यशून्यतया निश्चितः। शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादित्यादौ यदा शब्देऽनित्यत्वसन्देहस्तदा सपक्षत्वं विपक्षत्वञ्च घटत्वादीनामेव तद्व्यावृत्तञ्च शब्दत्वमिति तदा तदसाधारणं। यदा तु शब्दे नित्यत्वनिश्चयस्तदा नासाधारणः। इदञ्च प्राचां मतेन। नवीनमतं पूर्व्वमुक्तं ॥७२॥

केवलान्वयिपक्षक इति। केवलान्वयिधर्म्मावच्छिन्नपक्षक इत्यर्थः। सर्व्वमभिधेयं प्रमेयत्वादित्यादौ सर्व्वस्यैव पक्षत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यग्रहस्थलान्तराभावान्नानुमितिः। इदन्तु न सम्यक्। पक्षैकदेशे घटसहचारग्रहेऽपि क्षतेरभावात्। अस्तु वा सहचाराग्रहस्तावतापि अज्ञानरूपासिद्धिरेव न तु हेत्वाभासत्वं तस्य तथापि केवलान्वयिसाध्यकत्वं तत्त्वमित्युक्तं ॥ यः साध्यवतीति। एवकारेण साध्यवत्त्वावच्छेदेन हेत्वभावो बोधितः। तथा च साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तदर्थः ॥ ७३ ॥

भाषा० आश्रयासिद्धिराद्या स्यात् स्वरूपासिद्धिरप्यथ ।
व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा स्यादसिद्धिरतस्त्रिधा ॥ ७४ ॥
पक्षासिद्धिर्यत्र पक्षो भवेन्मणिमयो गिरिः ।
ह्रदो द्रव्यं धूमवत्त्वादत्रासिद्धिरथापरा ॥ ७५ ॥
व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा नीलधूमादिके भवेत् ।
विरुद्धयोः परामर्शो हेत्वोः सत्प्रतिपक्षिता ॥ ७६ ॥
साध्यशून्यो यत्र पक्षस्त्वसौ बाध उदाहृतः ।
उत्पत्तिकालीनघटे गन्धादिर्यत्र साध्यते ॥ ७७ ॥

सिद्धा० असिद्धिं विभजते । आश्रयासिद्धिरित्यादि ॥ ७४ ॥

पक्षासिद्धिरिति । आश्रयासिद्धिरित्यर्थः । नील-धूमादिक इति । नीलधूमत्वं गुरुतया न हेतुतावच्छे-दकं । समानाधिकरणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकधर्मान्तराघ-टितस्यैव व्याप्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् । धूमप्रागभावत्वमङ्ग्र-हाय समानाधिकरणेति ॥ ७५ ॥

विरुद्धयोरिति । कपिसंयोगतदभावव्याप्यवत्त्वपरा-मर्शेऽपि न सत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वमत उक्तं । विरुद्धयोरिति । तथा च स्वसाध्यविरुद्धसाध्याभावव्याप्यवत्तापरामर्श-कालीनसाध्यव्याप्यवत्तापरामर्शविषय इत्यर्थः ॥ ७६ ॥

साध्यशून्य इति । पक्षः पक्षतावच्छेदकविशिष्ट इत्यर्थः । तेन घटे गन्धसत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । एवं मूलाव-च्छिन्नो वृक्षः कपिसंयोगीत्यत्रापि बोध्यं ॥ ७७ ॥

भाषा० ग्रामीणस्य प्रथमतः पश्यतो गवयादिकं ।
सादृश्यधीर्गवादीनां या स्यात् सा करणं मतं ॥७८॥
वाक्यार्थस्यातिदेशस्य स्मृतिर्व्यापार उच्यते ।
गवयादिपदानान्तु शक्तिधीरुपमाफलं ॥ ७९ ॥
पदज्ञानन्तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः ।

सिद्धा० उपमितिं व्युत्पादयति । ग्रामीणस्येति । यत्रावश्यकेन केनचिद् ग्रामीणं प्रत्युक्तं गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इति पश्चाच्च ग्रामीणेन क्वचिदरण्ये गवयो दृष्टः तत्र गोसादृश्यज्ञानं यत् तद् उपमितिकरणं ॥ ७८ ॥

तदनन्तरं गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं जायते तदेव व्यापारः । तदनन्तरं तत्र गवयो गवयपदवाच्य इति ज्ञानं जायते तदुपमितिः । न त्वयं गवयपदवाच्य इत्युपमितिः । गवयान्तरे शक्तिग्रहाभावप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ७९ ॥

शाब्दबोधप्रकारं दर्शयति । पदज्ञानन्त्विति । न तु ज्ञायमानं पदं करणं । पदाभावेऽपि मौनिश्लोकादौ शाब्दबोधात् । पदार्थधीरिति । पदजन्यपदार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः। अन्यथा पदज्ञानवतः प्रत्यक्षादिना पदार्थोपस्थितावपि शाब्दबोधापत्तेः। तत्रापि *वृत्त्या पदजन्यत्वं बोध्यं। अन्यथा घटादिपदात् समवायसम्बन्धेन आका-

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* पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितावपीति दिनकरीव्याख्या ॥

भाषा० शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥ ८० ॥

सिद्धा० शस्मरणं जायते। आकाशस्यापि शाब्दबोधापत्तेः। वृत्तिः शक्तिलक्षणान्यतरः सम्बन्धः । अत्रैव शक्तिज्ञानस्योपयोगः । पूर्वं शक्तिग्रहाभावे पदज्ञानेऽपि तत्सम्बन्धेन स्मरणानुपपत्तेः । पदज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धिज्ञानविधयाऽर्थस्मारकत्वं। शक्तिश्च पदेन सह पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः। सा चास्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरेच्छारूपा । आधुनिके नाम्नि शक्तिरस्त्येव । एकादशेऽहनि पिता नाम कुर्य्याद् इतीश्वरेच्छायाः सत्त्वात्। आधुनिके तु सङ्केते न शक्तिरिति सम्प्रदायः ॥ नव्यास्तु ईश्वरेच्छा न शक्तिः किन्त्विच्छैव । तेन आधुनिकसङ्केतेऽपि शक्तिरस्तीति वदन्ति ॥ शक्तिग्रहश्च व्याकरणादितः । तथा हि ।

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोषाप्तवाक्याद्व्यवहारतश्च ।
वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः॥

धातुप्रकृतिप्रत्ययादीनां शक्तिग्रहो व्याकरणाद्भवति। क्वचित् तु सति बाधके त्यज्यतेऽपि । यथा वैयाकरणैराख्यातस्य कर्त्तरि शक्तिरुच्यते। चैत्रः पचतीत्यादौ कर्त्तुश्चैत्रस्याभेदान्वयः । तत्र गौरवान्न जन्यते किन्तु कृतौ शक्तिग्रहो लाघवात्। कृतिश्चैत्रादौ प्रकारीभूय भासते ॥ न च कर्त्तुरनभिधानाच् चैत्रादिपदानन्तरं तृतीया स्यादिति वाच्यं। कर्तृसङ्ख्यानभिधानस्य तत्र तन्त्रत्वात् । सङ्ख्याभिधानयोगश्च कर्म्मत्वाद्यनवरुद्धः

सिद्धा० प्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्यः कर्मत्वादीत्यस्य विशेषणत्वतात्पर्य्याविषयत्वमर्थः । तेन चैत्र इव गच्छतीत्यादौ न चैत्रे सज्ञ्ज्ञान्वयः । यत्र कर्म्मादौ न विशेषणत्वतात्पर्य्यं तद्वारणाय प्रथमान्तेति । यद्वा धात्वर्थातिरिक्ताविशेषणत्वं प्रथमदलार्थः । तेन चैत्र इव गच्छतीत्यत्र चैत्रादेर्वारणं । स्तोकं पचतीत्यादौ स्तोकादेर्वारणाय च द्वितीयदलं । तस्य द्वितीयान्तोपस्थाप्यत्वादारणं । एवं व्यापारेऽपि न शक्तिः । गौरवात् ॥ रथो गच्छतीत्यादौ स्वव्यापारे आश्रयत्वे वा लक्षणा ॥ जानातीत्यादौ तु आश्रयत्वे नश्यतीत्यादौ प्रतियोगित्वे निरूढलक्षणा ॥ उपमानाद्यथा शक्तिग्रहस्तथोक्तं ॥

एवं कोषादपि शक्तिग्रहः । सति बाधके क्वचित् त्यज्यते । यथा नीलादिपदानां नीलरूपादौ नीलादिविशिष्टे च शक्तिः कोषे व्युत्पादिता तथापि लाघवान् नीलादौ शक्तिः नीलादिविशिष्टे लक्षणेति ॥

एवमाप्तवाक्यादपि । यथा कोकिलः पिकपदवाच्य इत्यादिशब्दात् पिकादिशक्तिग्रहः ॥

एवं व्यवहारादपि । यथा प्रयोजकवृद्धेन घटमानयेत्युक्तं । तच्छ्रुत्वा प्रयोज्यवृद्धेन घट आनीतः । तदवधार्य्य पार्श्वस्थो बालो घटानयनरूपं कार्य्यं घटमानयेतिशब्दप्रयोज्यमवधारयति । ततश्च घटमपसारय गामानय इत्यादौ आवापोद्वापाभ्यां घटादिपदानां कार्य्यान्वित-

सिद्धा० घटादौ शक्तिं गृह्णाति। इत्थञ्च भूतले नीलो घट इत्यादिशब्दान्न शाब्दबोधः। घटादिपदानां कार्य्यान्वितघटादिबोधे सामर्थ्यावधारणात्। कार्य्यताबोधं प्रति च लिङादीनां सामर्थ्यात् तदभावान्न शाब्दबोध इत्यपि केचित्। तन्न। प्रथमतः कार्य्यान्वितघटादौ शक्त्यवधारणेऽपि लाघवेन पश्चात् तस्य परित्यागौचित्यात्। अत एव चैत्र पुत्रस्ते जातः कन्या ते गर्भिणी जाता इत्यादौ मुखप्रसादमुखमालिन्याभ्यां सुखदुःखेऽनुमाय तत्कारणत्वेन परिशेषाच्छाब्दबोधं निर्णीय तद्धेतुतया तं शब्दमवधारयति। तथा च व्यभिचारात् कार्य्यान्विते न शक्तिः। न च तत्र ते पश्येत्यादिशब्दान्तरमध्याहार्य्यं। मानाभावात्। चैत्र पुत्रस्ते जातो मृतश्चेत्यादौ तदभावाच्च। इत्थञ्च लाघवादन्वितघटेऽपि शक्तिं त्यक्त्वा घटपदस्य घटमात्रे शक्तिमवधारयति॥

एवं वाक्यशेषादपि शक्तिग्रहः। यथा यवमयश्चरुर्भवतीत्यत्र यवपदस्य दीर्घशूकविशिष्टे आर्य्याणां प्रयोगः कङ्गौ च म्लेच्छानां। तत्र हि यत्राऽन्या ओषधयो म्लायन्ते अथैते मोदमाना इवोत्तिष्ठन्ति॥

वसन्ते सर्व्वसस्यानां जायते पत्रशातनं।

मोदमानाश्च तिष्ठन्ति यवाः कणिशशालिनः॥

इति वाक्यशेषाद् दीर्घशूके शक्तिर्निर्णीयते। कङ्गौ तु शक्तिभ्रमात् प्रयोगः। नानाशक्तिकल्पने गौरवात्।

सिद्धा० हरिपदादौ तु विनिगमकाभावान्नानाशक्तिकल्पनं ॥

एवं विवरणादपि शक्तिग्रहः। विवरणन्तु तत्समानार्थपदान्तरेण तदर्थकथनं। यथा घटोऽस्तीत्यस्य कलशोऽस्तीत्यनेन विवरणाद् घटपदस्य कलशे शक्तिग्रहः। एवं पचतीत्यस्य पाकं करोतीत्यनेन विवरणादाख्यातस्य यत्नार्थकत्वं कल्प्यते ॥

एवं प्रसिद्धपदसान्निध्यादपि शक्तिग्रहः। यथा इह सहकारतरौ मधुरं पिको रौतीत्यादौ पिकपदस्य शक्तिग्रह इति ॥

तत्र जातावेव शक्तिर्न तु व्यक्तौ व्यभिचारादानन्त्याच्च। व्यक्तिं विना च जातिभानस्यासम्भवाद्व्यक्तेरपि भानमिति केचित्। तन्न। शक्तिं विना व्यक्तिभानानुपपत्तेः। न च व्यक्तौ लक्षणा। अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं विनापि व्यक्तिबोधात्। न च व्यक्तिशक्तावानन्त्यं। सकलव्यक्तावेकस्या एव शक्तेः स्वीकारात्। न चाननुगमः। गोत्वादेरेवानुगमकत्वात् ॥ किञ्च गौः शक्येति शक्तिग्रहो यदि तदा व्यक्तौ शक्तिः। यदि तु गोत्वं शक्यमिति शक्तिग्रहस्तदा गोत्वप्रकारकपदार्थस्मरणं शाब्दबोधश्च न स्यात्। समानप्रकारत्वेन शक्तिज्ञानस्य पदार्थस्मरणं शाब्दबोधं प्रति च हेतुत्वात् ॥ किञ्च गोत्वे यदि शक्तिस्तदा गोत्वत्वं शक्यतावच्छेदकं वाच्यं। गोत्वन्तु गवेतरासमवेतत्वे सति सकलगोसमवेतत्वं। तथा च

सिद्धा० गोव्यक्तीनां शक्यतावच्छेदकेऽनुप्रवेशात् तत्रैव गौरवं। तस्मात् तत्तज्जात्याकृतिविशिष्टतत्तद्व्यक्तिबोधानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यमाना शक्तिर्जात्याकृतिविशिष्टव्यक्तौ विश्राम्यतीति॥

शक्तं पदन्तु क्वचिद्यौगिकं क्वचिद्रूढं क्वचिद्योगरूढं क्वचिद्यौगिकरूढं। यत्रावयवार्थ एव बुध्यते तद्यौगिकं। यथा पाचकादिपदं॥

यत्रावयवशक्तिनैरपेक्ष्येण समुदायशक्तिमात्रेण बुध्यते तद्रूढं। यथा गोपदघटादिपदं।

यत्र तु अवयवशक्तिविषये समुदायशक्तिरप्यस्ति तद्योगरूढं। यथा पङ्कजादिपदं। तथा हि पङ्कजपदमवयवशक्त्या पङ्कजनिकर्तृरूपमर्थं बोधयति। समुदायशक्त्या च पद्मत्वेन रूपेण पद्मं बोधयति॥ न च केवलावयवशक्त्या कुमुदे प्रयोगः स्यादिति वाच्यं। रूढिज्ञानस्य केवलयौगिकार्थज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति प्राञ्चः॥

वस्तुतस्तु समुदायशक्त्योपस्थितपद्मेऽवयवार्थपङ्कजनिकर्तुरन्वयो भवति। सान्निध्यात्॥ यत्र रूढ्यर्थस्य वाधः प्रतिसन्धीयते तत्र लक्षणया कुमुदादेर्बोधः। यत्र तु कुमुदत्वेन रूपेण बोधे न तात्पर्य्यज्ञानं पद्मत्वस्य च वाधस्तत्रावयवशक्तिमात्रेण निर्व्वाह इत्यप्याहुः॥

यत्र तु स्थलपद्मादाववयवार्थवाधस्तत्र समुदायशक्त्या च पद्मत्वेन रूपेण बोधः। यदि तु स्थलपङ्कजं विजातीयमेव तदा लक्षणैव॥

भाषा॰ लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धस्तात्पर्य्यानुपपत्तितः।

सिद्धा॰ यत्रावयवार्थरूढ्यर्थयोः स्वातन्त्र्येण बोधस्तद्यौगिकरूढं। यथोद्भिदादिपदं। तत्र हि ऊर्द्ध्वभेदनकर्त्ता तरुगुल्मादिरपि बुध्यते यागविशेषोऽपीति॥ ८०॥

लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्ध इत्यादि। गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ गङ्गापदस्य शक्यार्थे प्रवाहरूपे घोषस्यान्वयानुपपत्तिस्तात्पर्य्यानुपपत्तिर्वा यत्र प्रतिसन्धीयते तत्र लक्षणया तीरस्य बोधः। सा च शक्यसम्बन्धः। तथा हि प्रवाहरूपशक्यार्थसम्बन्धस्य तीरे गृहीतत्वात् तीरस्य स्मरणं। ततः शाब्दबोधः। परन्तु यद्यन्वयानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजं स्यात्तदा यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यत्र लक्षणा न स्यात्। यष्टिषु प्रवेशान्वयस्यानुपपत्तेरभावात्। तेन यष्टिप्रवेशे भोजनतात्पर्य्यानुपपत्त्या यष्टिधरे लक्षणा। एवं काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यादौ काकपदस्य दध्युपघातके लक्षणा। सर्व्वतो दधिरक्षायास्तात्पर्य्यविषयत्वात्॥ एवं छत्रिणो यान्तीत्यादौ छत्रिपदस्यैकसार्थवाहित्वेन लक्षणा। इयमेवाजहत्स्वार्था लक्षणेत्युच्यते। एकसार्थवाहित्वेन रूपेण छत्रितदन्ययोर्बोधात्॥ यदि चानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजं स्यात् तदा क्वचिद्गङ्गापदस्य तीरे क्वचिद्घोषपदस्य मत्स्यादौ लक्षणेति नियमो न स्यात्। इदन्तु बोध्यं शक्यार्थसम्बन्धो यदि तीरत्वेन रूपेण गृहीतस्तदा तीरत्वेन तीरबोधः। यदि तु गङ्गातीर-

सिद्धा० त्वेन रूपेण गृहीतस्तदा तेनैव रूपेण स्मरणं। अत एव लक्ष्यतावच्छेदके न लक्षणा। तत्प्रकारकबोधस्य तत्र लक्षणां विनाप्युपपत्तेः। परन्तु एवंक्रमेण शक्यतावच्छेदकेऽपि शक्तिर्न स्यात्। तत्प्रकारकशब्दार्थस्मरणं प्रति तत्पदस्य सामर्थ्यमित्यस्य सुवचत्वादिति विभावनीयं॥

यत्र तु शक्यार्थस्य स्वाश्रयपदवाच्यत्वरूपा लक्षणा सा लक्षितलक्षणेत्युच्यते। यथा द्विरेफादिपदे रेफद्वयसम्बन्धो भ्रमरपदे ज्ञायते। भ्रमरपदस्य च सम्बन्धो भ्रमरे ज्ञायते। तत्र लक्षितलक्षणा। किन्तु लाक्षणिकं पदं नानुभावकं। लाक्षणिकार्थस्य शाब्दबोधे तु पदान्तरं कारणं। शक्तिलक्षणान्यतरसम्बन्धेनेतरपदार्थान्वितस्वशक्यार्थशाब्दबोधं प्रति पदानां सामर्थ्यावधारणादिति प्राञ्चः॥ नवीनास्तु तदप्यनुभावकमेव। पदार्थोपस्थितिस्तु द्वारं। अन्यथा तुल्ययुक्त्या शक्तस्यापि पदस्याननुभावकत्वापत्तेरित्याहुः। *वाक्ये तु शक्तेरभावाच्छक्यसम्बन्धरूपा लक्षणाऽपि नास्ति। यत्र गभीरायां नद्यां घोष इत्युक्तं तत्र नदीपदस्य नदीतीरे लक्षणा। गभीरापदार्थस्य नद्या सहाभेदेनान्वयः। क्वचिदेकदेशान्वयस्य स्वीकृतत्वात्। यदि तत्रैकदेशान्वयोऽपि न स्वीक्रियते तदा नदीपदस्य गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा गभीरापदं तात्पर्य्यग्राहकं॥

* नवीनमतोल्लेखनं विद्वत्सम्मततयाऽस्माद्दतपूर्व्वमप्यनाद्दतं॥

सिद्धा० बहुव्रीहावप्येवं। तत्र हि चित्रगुपदादौ यद्येक-देशान्वयः स्वीक्रियते तदा गोपदस्य गोस्वामिनि लक्षणा। गवि चित्राभेदान्वयः। यदि लेकदेशान्वयो न स्वीक्रियते तदा गोपदस्य चित्रगोस्वामिनि लक्षणा। चित्रापदं तात्पर्य्यग्राहकं॥

एवमारूढवानरो वृक्ष इत्यत्र वानरपदे वानरा-रोहणकर्म्मणि लक्षणा। आरूढपदञ्च तात्पर्य्यग्राहकं। एवमन्यत्रापि॥

तत्पुरुषे तु पूर्व्वपदे लक्षणा। तथाहि राजपुरुषा-दिपदे राजपदार्थेन पुरुषादिपदार्थस्य साक्षान्नान्व-यः। निपातातिरिक्तनामार्थयोर्भेदेनान्वयबोधस्याव्यु-त्पन्नत्वात्। अन्यथा राजा पुरुष इत्यत्रापि तथान्वय-बोधः स्यात्। पटो न घट इत्यादौ घटपटाभ्यां नञः साक्षादेवान्वयान् निपातातिरिक्तेति। नीलो घट इत्यादौ नामार्थयोरभेदसम्बन्धेनान्वयाद्भेदेनेति॥ न च राजपुरुष इत्यादौ लुप्तविभक्तेः स्मरणं कल्प्यमिति वाच्यं। अस्मृतविभक्तेरपि ततो बोधोदयात्। तस्माद् राजपदादौ राजसम्बन्धिनि लक्षणा। तस्य च पुरुषेण सहाभेदान्वयः॥

द्वन्द्वे तु धवखदिरौ छिन्धीत्यादौ धवः खदिरश्च विभक्त्यर्थद्वित्वप्रकारेण बुध्यते तत्र लक्षणा॥ न च साहित्ये लक्षणेति वाच्यं। साहित्यशून्ययोरपि द्वन्द्व-

सिद्धा० दर्शनात् ॥ न च एकक्रियान्वयित्वरूपं साहित्यमस्तीति वाच्यं । क्रियाभेदे धवखदिरौ छिन्धीत्यादिदर्शनात्। साहित्यस्याननुभवाच्च। तस्मात् साहित्यादिकं नार्थः। अत एव राजपुरोहितौ सायुज्यकामौ यजेयातामित्यत्र लक्षणाभावाद् द्वन्द्व आश्रीयते। किन्तु वास्तवो भेदो यत्र तत्र द्वन्द्वः। न च नीलघटयोरभेद इत्यादौ कथमिति वाच्यं। तत्र नीलपदस्य नीलत्वं घटपदस्य घटत्वमर्थः। अभेद इत्यस्याश्रयाभेद इत्यर्थात् ॥

समाहारद्वन्द्वे तु यदि समाहारोऽप्यनुभूयत इत्युच्यते तदाऽहिनकुलमित्यादौ परपदेऽहिनकुलसमाहारे लक्षणा। पूर्व्वपदं तात्पर्य्यग्राहकं ॥ न च भेरीमृदङ्गं वादयेत्यत्र कथं समाहारस्यान्वयोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिविशेषरूपस्य वादनासम्भवादिति वाच्यं। स्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वरूपसम्बन्धेन तदन्वयात्। एवं पञ्चपूलीत्यादावपि॥ परे तु अहिनकुलमित्यादौ अहिर्नकुलश्च बुध्यते। प्रत्येकमेकत्वान्वयः समाहारसञ्ज्ञा च। यत्रैकत्वं नपुंसकत्वं प्राणितूर्य्येत्यादिसूत्रेणोक्तं तत्रैव। अन्यत्रैकवचनमसाध्विति वदन्ति ॥

कर्म्मधारयस्थले तु नीलोत्पलमित्यादौ अभेदसम्बन्धेन नीलपदार्थ उत्पलपदार्थे प्रकारः। न च तत्र लक्षणा। अत एव निषादस्थपतिं याजयेदित्यत्र न

भाषा० आसत्तियोग्यताकाङ्क्षातात्पर्य्यज्ञानमिष्यते ॥ ८१ ॥
कारणं सन्निधानन्तु पदस्यासत्तिरुच्यते ।

सिद्धा० तत्पुरुषः । लक्षणापत्तेः । किन्तु कर्म्मधारयो लक्षणाभावात् ॥ न च निषादस्य सङ्करजातिविशेषस्य वेदानधिकाराद् याजनासम्भव इति वाच्यं । निषादस्य विद्याप्रयुक्तेस्तत एव कल्पनात् । लाघवेन मुख्यार्थस्यान्वये तदनुपपत्त्या कल्पनायाः फलमुखगौरवतयाऽदोषत्वादिति ॥ उपकुम्भं अर्द्धपिप्पलीत्यादौ परपदे तत्सम्बन्धिनि लक्षणा पूर्व्वपदार्थप्रधानतया चान्वयबोध इति । इत्यञ्च समासे न क्वापि शक्तिः । पदशक्त्यैव निर्व्वाहादिति ॥ पितरौ श्वशुरौ इत्यादौ पितृपदे जनकदम्पत्योः श्वशुरपदे स्त्रीजनकदम्पत्योर्लक्षणा । एवमन्यत्रापि । घटा इत्यादौ न लक्षणा । घटत्वेन रूपेण नानाघटस्थितिसम्भवात् ॥

आसत्तियोग्यतेत्यादि । आसत्तिज्ञानं योग्यताज्ञानं आकाङ्क्षाज्ञानं तात्पर्य्यज्ञानञ्च शाब्दबोधे कारणं ॥ ८१ ॥

तत्रासत्तिपदार्थमाह । सन्निधानन्त्विति । यत्पदार्थस्य यत्पदार्थेनान्वयोऽपेक्षितस्तयोरव्यवधानेनोपस्थितिः कारणं । तेन गिरिर्भुक्तमग्निमान् देवदत्तेनेत्यादौ न शाब्दबोधः । नीलो घटो द्रव्यं पट इत्या

सिद्धा॰ दावासत्तिभ्रमाच्छाब्दबोधः* । आसत्तिभ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमाभावेऽपि न क्षतिः ॥ ननु यत्र छत्री कुण्डली वासस्वी देवदत्त इत्युक्तं तत्रोत्तरपदस्मरणेन पूर्व्वपदस्मरणस्य नाशात्। अव्यवधाने तु उत्तरपदस्मरणासम्भव इति चेत्। न। प्रत्येकपदसंस्कारैश्चरमं तावद्विषयकस्मरणस्याव्यवधानेनोत्पत्तेः। नानासन्निकर्षैरेकप्रत्यक्षस्येव नानासंस्कारैरेकस्मरणोत्पत्तेरपि सम्भवात्। तावत्पदसंस्कारसहितचरमवर्णज्ञानस्योद्बोधकत्वात्। कथमन्यथा नानावर्णकपदस्मरणं। परन्तु तावत्पदार्थानां स्मरणादेकदैव खले कपोतन्यायात् तावत्पदार्थानां क्रियाकर्मभावेनान्वयबोधरूपः शाब्दबोधो भवतीति केचित् ॥ अपरे तु।

यद्यदाकाङ्क्षितं योग्यं सन्निधानं प्रपद्यते।
तेन तेनान्वितः स्वार्थः पदैरेवावगम्यते ॥

तथा च खण्डवाक्यार्थबोधानन्तरं तथैव पदार्थस्मृत्या महावाक्यार्थबोध इत्यप्याहुः। एतेन तावद्वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्यः पदस्फोटोऽपि निरस्तः। तत्तद्वर्णसंस्कारसहितचरमवर्णोपलम्भेन तद्व्यञ्जकेनैवोपपत्तेरिति ॥ इदन्तु बोध्यं। यत्र द्वारमित्युक्तं तत्र पिधेहीति पदस्य ज्ञानादेव बोधः। न तु पिधानादिरूपार्थज्ञानात्। पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेश्शाब्दबोधे हेतुत्वात्। किञ्च

* नील इत्यादिकपाठो दिनकरीसम्मततया विद्वद्भिः समादृतः ॥

भाषा॰ पदार्थे तत्र तद्वत्ता योग्यता परिकीर्त्तिता ॥ ८२ ॥
यत्पदेन विना यस्याननुभावकता भवेत् ।

सिद्धा॰ क्रियाकर्मपदानां तेन तेनैव सह साकाङ्क्षत्वं । तेन क्रियापदं विना कथं शाब्दबोधः स्यात् । तथा पुष्पेभ्य इत्यादौ स्पृहयतीतिपदाध्याहारं विना चतुर्थ्यनुपपत्तेः पदाध्याहार आवश्यकः ॥

योग्यतां निर्व्वक्ति । पदार्थ इत्यादिना । एकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थसम्बन्धो योग्यतेत्यर्थः । तज्ज्ञानाभावाच्च वह्निना सिञ्चतीत्यादौ न शाब्दबोधः ॥ नन्वेतस्या योग्यताया ज्ञानं शाब्दबोधात् प्राक् सर्व्वत्र न सम्भवति वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्व्वत्वादिति चेत् । न । तत्तत्पदार्थस्मरणे सति क्वचित् संशयरूपस्य क्वचिन्निश्चयरूपस्यापि योग्यताया ज्ञानस्य सम्भवात् ॥

नव्यास्तु योग्यताया ज्ञानं न शाब्दज्ञाने कारणं । वह्निना सिञ्चतीत्यादौ सेके वह्निकरणत्वाभावरूपाऽयोग्यतानिश्चयेन प्रतिबन्धान् न शाब्दबोधः । तदभाववनिश्चयस्य लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्यज्ञानमात्रे प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् शाब्दबोधं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकत्वं सिद्धं । योग्यताज्ञानविलम्बाच्च शाब्दबोधविलम्बोऽसिद्ध इति वदन्ति ॥ ८२ ॥

आकाङ्क्षां निर्व्वक्ति । यत्पदेनेत्यादि । येन पदेन विना यत्पदस्यान्वयाननुभावकत्वं तेन सह तस्याका-

सिद्धा० ङ्क्षा इत्यर्थः। क्रियापदं विना कारकपदं नान्वयबोधं जनयतीति तेन तस्याकाङ्क्षा। वस्तुतस्तु क्रियाकारकपदानां सन्निधानमासत्त्या चरितार्थं। परन्तु घटकर्म्मताबोधं प्रति घटपदोत्तरद्वितीयाकाङ्क्षाज्ञानं कारणं। तेन घटः कर्म्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यादौ न शाब्दबोधः। अयमेति पुत्रो राज्ञः पुरुषोऽपसार्य्यतामित्यादौ तु पुरुषेण सह राजपदस्य तात्पर्य्यग्रहाभावान् न तेन सहान्वयः॥

तात्पर्य्यं निर्व्वक्ति। वक्तुरिच्छेति। यदि तात्पर्य्यज्ञानं कारणं न स्यात् तदा सैन्धवमानयेत्यादौ क्वचिदश्वस्य क्वचिल्लवणस्य बोधो न स्यात्॥ न च तात्पर्य्यग्राहकप्रकरणादीनामेव शाब्दबोधे कारणत्वमस्त्विति वाच्यं। तेषामननुगमात्। तात्पर्य्यज्ञानजनकत्वेन तेषामनुगमे तु तात्पर्य्यज्ञानमेव लाघवात् कारणमस्तु। इत्थञ्च वेदस्थलेऽपि तात्पर्य्यज्ञानार्थमीश्वरः कल्प्यते॥ न च तत्राध्यापकतात्पर्य्यज्ञानं कारणमिति वाच्यं। सर्गादावध्यापकाभावात्॥ न च प्रलय एव नास्तीति कुतः सर्गादिरिति वाच्यं। प्रलयस्यागमप्रतिपाद्यत्वात्। इत्थञ्च शुकवाक्येऽपि ईश्वरीयतात्पर्य्यज्ञानं कारणं। विसम्वादिशुकवाक्ये तु शिक्षयितुरेव तात्पर्य्यस्य ज्ञानं कारणं॥ अन्ये तु नानार्थादौ क्वचिदेव तात्पर्य्यज्ञानं

सिद्धा॰ कारणं। तथाच शुकवाक्ये विनैव तात्पर्य्यज्ञानं शाब्दबोधः। वेदे तु अनादिमीमांसापरिशोधिततर्कैरर्थावधारणमित्याहुः ॥

पूर्व्वमनुभवस्मरणभेदाद्बुद्धेर्द्वैविध्यमुक्तं। तत्रानुभवप्रकारा दर्शिताः सुगमतया स्मरणं न दर्शितं। तत्र हि पूर्व्वानुभवः कारणं ॥ अत्र केचिद् अनुभवत्वेन न कारणत्वं किन्तु ज्ञानत्वेन। अन्यथा स्मरणानन्तरं स्मरणं न स्यात्। समानप्रकारकस्मरणेन पूर्व्वसंस्कारस्य विनष्टत्वात्। मन्मते तु तेनैव स्मरणेन संस्कारान्तरद्वारा स्मरणान्तरं जन्यत इत्याहुस्तन्न। यत्र समूहालम्बनोत्तरं घटपटादीनां क्रमेण स्मरणमजनिष्ट सकलविषयकस्मरणन्तु माभूत् तत्र फलस्य संस्कारनाशकत्वाभावात् कालस्य रोगस्य चरमफलस्य वा संस्कारनाशकत्वं वाच्यं। तथा च न क्रमिकस्मरणानुपपत्तिः। न च पुनः पुनः स्मरणाद् दृढतरसंस्कारानुपपत्तिः। झटित्युद्बोधकसमवधानस्य दार्ढ्यपदार्थत्वात् ॥ न च विनिगमनाविरहादेव ज्ञानत्वेनापि जनकत्वं स्यादिति वाच्यं। विशेषधर्म्मेणाव्यभिचाराज् ज्ञाने सामान्यधर्म्मेणान्यथासिद्धत्वात्। कथमन्यथा दण्डस्य भ्रमिद्वारा द्रव्यत्वेन रूपेण न कारणत्वं॥ न चान्तरालिकस्मरणानां संस्कारनाशकत्वसंशयाद् व्यभिचारसंशय इति वाच्यं। अनन्तसंस्कारतन्नाशकल्पनापत्त्या चरमस्मरण-

भाषा० साक्षात्कारे सुखादीनां करणं मन उच्यते।
अयौगपद्याज् ज्ञानानां तस्याणुत्वमिहेष्यते॥ ८४॥

सिद्धा० स्यैव संस्कारनाशकत्वकल्पनेन व्यभिचारसंशयाभावात्॥ ८३॥

इदानीं क्रमप्राप्तं मनो निरूपयति। साक्षात्कार इति। एतेन मनसि प्रमाणं दर्शितं। तथाहि सुखसाक्षात्कारः सकरणको जन्यसाक्षात्कारत्वाच्चाक्षुषवद् इत्यनुमानेन करणस्य मनसः सिद्धेः॥ न चैवं दुःखादिसाक्षात्काराणामपि करणान्तराणि स्युरिति वाच्यं। लाघवादेकस्यैव तादृशसकलसाक्षात्कारकरणतया सिद्धेः। एवं दुःखादीनामसमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयतया मनःसिद्धिर्बोद्धव्या॥

मनसोऽणुत्वे प्रमाणमाह। अयौगपद्यादिति। ज्ञानानां चाक्षुषरासनादीनां यौगपद्यमेककालोत्पत्तिर्नास्तीत्यनुभवसिद्धं। तत्र नानेन्द्रियाणां सत्यपि विषयसन्निकर्षे यत्सम्बन्धादेकेन्द्रियेण ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदसम्बन्धादपि त्वगादिभिः परैर्ज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते। तन्मनोविभुत्वे चासन्निधानं न सम्भवतीति न विभु मनः॥ न च तदानीमदृष्टविशेषोद्बोधविलम्बादेव तज्ज्ञानविलम्ब इति वाच्यं। तथा सति चक्षुरादीनामपि कल्पनाऽनापत्तेः॥ न च दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणादौ

भाषा० अथ द्रव्याश्रिता ज्ञेया निर्गुणा निष्क्रिया गुणाः ।

सिद्धा० नानावधानभाजाञ्च कथमेकदा नानेन्द्रियज्ञानमिति वाच्यं । मनसोऽतिलाघवात् त्वरया नानेन्द्रियसम्बन्धात् नानाज्ञानोत्पत्तेः । उत्पलशतपत्रभेदादिवत् । यौगपद्यप्रत्ययस्य तु भ्रान्तत्वात् ॥ न च मनसः सङ्कोचविकाशशालित्वादुभयोपपत्तिरस्त्विति वाच्यं । नानावयवतन्नाशादिकल्पने गौरवात् । लाघवात् निरवयवस्यैव मनसः कल्पनादिति सङ्क्षेपः ॥ इति सिद्धान्तमुक्तावल्यां द्रव्यपदार्थव्याख्या समाप्ता ॥ ८४ ॥ * ॥

द्रव्यं निरूप्य गुणं निरूपयति । अथेत्यादिना । गुणत्वजातौ किं मानमिति चेत् । इदं । द्रव्यकर्म्मभिन्नसामान्यवति या कारणता सा किञ्चिद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्ना । निरवच्छिन्नकारणताया असम्भवात् । न हि रूपत्वादिकं सत्ता वा तत्रावच्छेदिका । न्यूनातिरिक्तदेशवृत्तित्वात् । अतश्चतुर्विंशत्यनुगतं वाच्यं तदेव गुणत्वमिति सिद्धं ॥ द्रव्याश्रिता इति । यद्यपि द्रव्याश्रितत्वं न लक्षणं कर्म्मादावतिव्याप्तेस्तथापि द्रव्यत्वव्यापकतावच्छेदकसत्तान्यजातिमत्त्वं तदर्थः । भवति हि गुणत्वं द्रव्यत्वव्यापकतावच्छेदकं तद्वत्ता च गुणानामिति कर्म्मत्वं द्रव्यत्वं वा न द्रव्यत्वव्यापकतावच्छेदकं । गगणादौ द्रव्यकर्म्मणोरभावात् । द्रव्यत्वत्वं सामान्यत्वादिकं न जातिरिति तद्व्यु-

भाषा० रूपं रसः स्पर्शगन्धौ परत्वमपरत्वकं ॥ ८५ ॥
द्रवो गुरुत्वं स्नेहश्च वेगो मूर्त्तगुणा अमी।
धर्म्माधर्म्मौ भावना च शब्दो बुद्ध्यादयोऽपि च ॥८६॥
एतेऽमूर्त्तगुणाः सर्व्वे विद्वद्भिः परिकीर्त्तिताः।
सङ्ख्यादिश्च विभागान्त उभयेषां गुणो मतः॥ ८७ ॥
संयोगश्च विभागश्च सङ्ख्या द्वित्वादिकास्तथा।
द्विपृथक्त्वादयस्तद्वदेतेऽनेकाश्रिता गुणाः ॥ ८८ ॥
अतः शेषा गुणाः सर्व्वे मता एकैकवृत्तयः।

सिद्धा० दासः ॥ निर्गुणा इति। यद्यपि निर्गुणत्वं कर्म्मादावपि तथापि सामान्यवत्त्वे कर्म्मान्यत्वे च सति निर्गुणत्वं बोध्यं। जात्यादीनां न सामान्यवत्त्वं कर्म्मणो न कर्म्मान्यत्वं द्रव्यस्य न निर्गुणत्वमिति तत्र नातिव्याप्तिः। निष्क्रियेति स्वरूपकथनं न तु लक्षणं। गगनादावतिव्याप्तेः ॥८५॥

मूर्त्तगुणा इति। वेगेन स्थितिस्थापकोऽप्युपलक्षणीयः। अमूर्त्तेषु न वर्त्तन्त इत्यर्थः। लक्षणन्तु तावदन्यान्यत्वं। एवमग्रेऽपि ॥ ८६ ॥

उभयेषामिति। मूर्त्तामूर्त्तगुणा इत्यर्थः ॥ ८७ ॥

अनेकाश्रिता इति। संयोगद्वित्वादीनि द्विवृत्तीनि। त्रित्वचतुष्ट्वादिकं त्रिचतुरादिवृत्तीति बोध्यं॥ ८८॥

अतः शेषा इति। रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शैकत्वपरिमाणैकपृथक्त्वपरत्वापरत्वबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नगुरुत्वद्र-

भाषा० बुद्ध्यादिषट्कं स्पर्शान्ताः स्नेहः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः ॥ ८९ ॥
अदृष्टभावना शब्दा अमी वैशेषिका गुणाः ।
सङ्ख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवः सांसिद्धिकस्तथा ॥ ९० ॥
गुरुत्ववेगौ सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्त्तिताः ।
सङ्ख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवत्वं स्नेह एव च ॥ ९१ ॥
एते तु द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्या अथ स्पर्शान्तशब्दकाः ।
बाह्यैकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्या गुरुत्वादृष्टभावनाः ॥ ९२ ॥
अतीन्द्रिया विभूनान्तु ये स्युर्वैशेषिका गुणाः ।
अकारणगुणोत्पन्ना एते तु परिकीर्त्तिताः ॥ ९३ ॥
अपाकजास्तु स्पर्शान्ता द्रवत्वञ्च तथाविधं ।
स्नेहवेगगुरुत्वैकपृथक्त्वपरिमाणकं ॥ ९४ ॥

सिद्धा० त्वक्स्नेहसंस्काराद्दृष्टशब्दा इत्यर्थः । द्रवो द्रव्यत्वं ॥ ८९ ॥

वैशेषिका इति । विशेषा एव वैशेषिकाः स्वार्थे ठक् विशेषगुणा इत्यर्थः ॥ सङ्ख्यादिरिति । सङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वानीत्यर्थः ॥ ९० ॥ ९१ ॥

द्वीन्द्रियेति । चक्षुषा त्वचाऽपि ग्रहणयोग्यत्वात् ॥ बाह्येति । रूपादीनां चक्षुरादिग्राह्यत्वात् ॥ ९२ ॥

विभूनामिति । बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मभावनाशब्दा इत्यर्थः ॥ अकारणेति । कारणगुणपूर्व्वका रूपादयो वक्ष्यन्ते । बुद्ध्यादयस्तु न तादृशाः । आत्मादेः कारणाभावात् । पाकजरूपादीनां कार-

भाषा० स्थितिस्थापक इत्येते स्युः कारणगुणोद्भवाः ।
संयोगश्च विभागश्च वेगश्चैते तु कर्म्मजाः ॥ ९५ ॥
स्पर्शान्तपरिमाणैकपृथक्त्वस्नेहशब्दके ।
भवेदसमवायित्वमथ वैशेषिके गुणे ॥ ९६ ॥
आत्मनः स्यान्निमित्तत्वमुष्णस्पर्शगुरुत्वयोः ।
वेगेऽपि च द्रवत्वे च संयोगादिद्वये तथा * ॥ ९७ ॥
द्विधैव कारणत्वं स्यादथ प्रादेशिको भवेत् ।

सिद्धा० णगुणपूर्व्वकत्वाभावाद् अपाकज इत्युक्तं ॥ ९३ ॥ ९४ ॥ ९५ ॥

स्पर्शान्तेति । स्पर्शोऽत्रानुष्णो ग्राह्यः । एकपृथक्त्वेत्यत्र त्वप्रत्ययस्य प्रत्येकमन्वयाद् एकत्वं पृथक्त्वञ्च ग्राह्यं । पृथक्त्वपदेन चैकपृथक्त्वं विवक्षितं ॥

भवेदसमवायित्वमिति । घटादिरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः कपालादिरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शेभ्यो भवन्ति । एवं कपालादिपरिमाणादीनां घटादिपरिमाणाद्यसमवायिकारणत्वं ॥ एवं शब्दस्यापि द्वितीयशब्दं प्रति ॥ ९६ ॥

निमित्तत्वमिति । बुद्ध्यादीनां इच्छादिनिमित्तत्वादिति भावः ॥ ९७ ॥

द्विधैव कारणत्वमिति । असमवायिकारणत्वं निमित्तकारणत्वञ्च । तथा हि उष्णस्पर्श उष्णस्पर्शस्यासम-

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* परापरत्वद्वित्वादिद्विपृथक्त्वादिके पुनः ॥ इत्यन्याकरोऽयं पाठः ॥

भाषा० वैशेषिको विभुगुणः संयोगादिर्द्वयं तथा ॥ ९८ ॥
चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं भवेद्रूपं द्रव्यादेरुपलम्भकं ।

सिद्धा० वायी पाकजे निमित्तं । गुरुत्वं गुरुत्वपतनयोरसमवायि प्रतिघाते निमित्तं । वेगो वेगस्पन्दनयोरसमवायी अभिघाते निमित्तं । द्रवत्वं द्रवत्वस्पन्दनयोरसमवायि सङ्ग्रहे निमित्तं । भेरीदण्डयोगः शब्दे निमित्तं । भेर्य्याकाशसंयोगो ऽसमवायी वंशदलद्वयविभागः शब्दे निमित्तं । वंशदलाकाशविभागोऽसमवायीति । * प्रादेशिकोऽव्याप्यवृत्तिः ॥ ९८ ॥

चक्षुरिति । रूपत्वजातिः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा । रूपशब्दोल्लेखिनी प्रतीतिर्नास्तीति चेत् । मास्तु रूपशब्दप्रयोगस्तथापि नीलपीतादिष्वनुगतजातिविशेषोऽनुभवसिद्ध एव । रूपशब्दाप्रयोगेऽपि नीलो वर्णः पीतो वर्ण इति वर्णशब्दोल्लेखिनी प्रतीतिरस्त्येव । एवं नीलत्वादिकमपि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं ॥ न चैकैका एव नीलरूपादिव्यक्तय इत्येकव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वान् नीलत्वादिर्न जातिरिति वाच्यं । नीलो नष्टो रक्त उत्पन्न इत्यादिप्रतीतेर्नीलादेरुत्पादविनाशशालितया नानात्वात् । अन्यथा एकनीलनाशे जगदनीलमापद्येत ॥ न च नी-

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* न द्विधेति परत्वादीनां नासमवायिकारणत्वं न निमित्तकारणत्वञ्चेत्यर्थः । इदञ्च ज्ञानातिरिक्तभावं प्रति बोध्यं । द्वित्वादिपदेन च विशेषा ग्राह्याः । तेन परमाणुद्वित्वादेर्द्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणहेतुत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । इत्ययमनादृतः पाठः ॥

भाषा० चक्षुषः सहकारि स्यात् शुक्लादिकमनेकधा ॥ ९९ ॥

सिद्धा० लरक्तादिसमवाययोरेव विनाशोत्पादविषयकोऽसौ प्रत्यय इति वाच्यं। प्रतीत्या समवायानुल्लेखात् ॥ न च स एवायं नील इति प्रत्ययाल्लाघवाच्चैक्यमिति वाच्यं। प्रत्ययस्य तज्जातीयविषयकत्वात् । सैवेयं गुर्ज्जरीतिवल्लाघवं प्रत्यक्षवाधितं। अन्यथा घटादीनामप्यैक्यप्रसङ्गात्। उत्पादविनाशशब्दबुद्धेः समवायावलम्बनत्वापत्तेरिति। एतेन रसादिकं व्याख्यातं॥ चक्षुर्ग्राह्यमिति। चक्षुर्ग्राह्यविशेषगुण इत्यर्थः। एवमग्रेऽपि। द्रव्यादेरिति। उपलम्भकं उपलब्धिकारणं॥

इदमेव विवृणोति। चक्षुष इति। द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसामान्यानां चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षं प्रति उद्भूतरूपं कारणं॥ शुक्लादिकमनेकधेति। तद्रूपं शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तकर्व्वुरादिभेदादनेकप्रकारकं भवति ॥ ननु कर्व्वुरं कथमतिरिक्तरूपं भवति। इत्थं नीलपीताद्यारब्धोऽवयवी न तावन्नीरूपः। अप्रत्यक्षप्रसङ्गात्। नापि व्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिकमुत्पद्यते। पीतावच्छेदेनापि नीलोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात्। नाप्यव्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिकमुत्पद्यते। व्याप्यवृत्तिजातीयगुणानामव्याप्यवृत्तित्वे विरोधात्। तस्मात् नानाजातीयरूपैरवयविनि विजातीयं चित्रमारभ्यते। अत एवैकं चित्रमित्यनुभवोऽपि। नानारूपकल्पने तु गौरवात्। इत्थञ्च नीलादीनां पीताद्यारब्धे प्रति-

भाषा० जलादिपरमाणौ तन्नित्यमन्यत् सहेतुकं।
रसस्तु रसनाग्राह्यो मधुरादिरनेकधा ॥ १०० ॥

सिद्धा० बन्धकत्वकल्पनाद् अवयविनि न पीताद्युत्पत्तिः। एतेन स्पर्शो व्याख्यातः॥ रसादिकमपि नाव्याप्यवृत्तिः किन्तु नानाजातीयरसवदवयवैरारब्धेऽवयविनि रसाभावेऽपि न क्षतिः। तत्र रसनया अवयवरस एव गृह्यते। रसनेन्द्रियादीनां द्रव्यग्रहसामर्थ्याभावात्। अवयविनो नीरसत्वेऽपि क्षतेरभावात्॥ नव्यास्तु तत्राव्याप्यवृत्त्यैव नानारूपं। नीलादेः पीतादिप्रतिबन्धकत्वकल्पने गौरवात्। अत एव।

लोहितो यस्तु वर्णेन मुखे पुच्छे च पाण्डरः।
श्वेतः खुरविषाणाभ्यां स नीलो वृष उच्यते॥

इत्यादिशास्त्रमप्युपपद्यते। न च व्याप्याव्याप्यवृत्तिजातीययोर्द्वयोर्विरोधः। मानाभावात्। न च लाघवादेकं रूपं। अनुभवविरोधात्। अन्यथा घटादेरपि लाघवादैक्यं स्यादिति। एतेन स्पर्शादिकं व्याख्यातमिति वदन्ति॥ ९९॥

जलादीति। जलपरमाणौ तेजःपरमाणौ च रूपं नित्यं पृथिवीपरमाणुरूपन्तु न नित्यं। पाकेन रूपान्तरोत्पत्तेः। न हि घटस्य पाकानन्तरं तदवयवोऽपक्व उपलभ्यते। न हि रक्तकपालस्य कपालिका नीला-

भाषा० सहकारी रसज्ञाया नित्यतादि च पूर्व्ववत्।
घ्राणग्राह्यो भवेद्गन्धो घ्राणस्यैवोपकारकः॥ १०१ ॥
सौरभश्चासौरभश्च स द्वेधा परिकीर्त्तितः।
स्पर्शस्त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यस्त्वचः स्यादुपकारकः॥ १०२ ॥
अनुष्णाशीतशीतोष्णभेदात् स त्रिविधो मतः।
काठिन्यादिः क्षितावेव नित्यतादि च पूर्व्ववत्॥ १०३ ॥

सिद्धा० वयवा भवति। एवंक्रमेण परमाणावपि पाकसिद्धिः॥ अन्यज्जलतेजःपरमाणुरूपभिन्नरूपं सहेतुकं जन्यं॥ रसं निरूपयति। रसस्त्विति॥ १०० ॥

सहकारीति। रासनज्ञाने रसः कारणमित्यर्थः॥ पूर्व्ववदिति। जलपरमाणौ रसो नित्योऽन्यः सर्व्वोऽपि रसोऽनित्य इत्यर्थः॥ गन्धं निरूपयति। घ्राणग्राह्य इति। उपकारको घ्राणजन्यज्ञाने कारणमित्यर्थः। अन्यो गन्धः सर्व्वोऽनित्य एव॥ १०१ ॥

स्पर्शं निरूपयति। स्पर्श इति। उपकारक इति स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे स्पर्शः कारणमित्यर्थः॥ १०२ ॥

अनुष्णाशीत इति। पृथिव्या वायोश्च स्पर्शोऽनुष्णाशीतः। जलस्य शीतः। तेजस उष्णः॥ काठिन्येति। कठिनसुकुमारस्पर्शः पृथिव्या एवेत्यर्थः। कठिनत्वादिकन्तु न संयोगनिष्ठो जातिविशेषः। चक्षुर्ग्राह्यतापत्तेः॥ पूर्व्ववदिति। जलतेजोवायुपरमाणु-

भाषा० एतेषां पाकजत्वन्तु क्षितौ नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् ।

सिद्धा० स्पर्शा नित्यास्त्वन्निस्पर्शास्त्वनित्या इत्यर्थः ॥ १०३ ॥

एतेषामिति ॥ एतेषां रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शानां । नान्यत्रेति । पृथिव्या हि रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शपरावृत्तिः पावकसंयोगादुपलभ्यते । न हि शतधापि ध्मायमाने जलादौ रूपादिकं परावर्त्तते । नीरे सौरभमौष्ण्यञ्च अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामौपाधिकमेवेति निर्णीयते । पवनपृथिव्योः शीतस्पर्शादिवत् ॥ तत्रापि पृथिवीष्वपि मध्ये परमाणावेव पाक इति वैशिषिका वदन्ति । तेषामयमाशयः । अवयविनाऽवष्टब्धेष्ववयवेषु पाको न सम्भवति । परन्तु वह्निसंयोगेनावयविषु विनष्टेषु स्वतन्त्रेषु परमाणुषु पाकः । पुनश्च पक्वपरमाणुसंयोगाद् द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण पुनर्महावयविपर्य्यन्तमुत्पत्तिः । तेजसामतिशयितवेगवशात् पूर्व्वव्यूहनाशो झटिति व्यूहान्तरोत्पत्तिश्चेति ॥ अथ द्व्यणुकादिविनाशमारभ्य कतिभिः क्षणैः पुनरुत्पत्त्या रूपादिमद्भवतीति शिष्यबुद्धिवैशद्याय प्रक्रिया तत्र स्यात् ॥ संयोगविभागयोरनपेक्षकारणं कर्म्म इति वैशेषिकसूत्रं । स्वोत्तरवृत्तिभावान्तरानपेक्षत्वं तस्यार्थः । अन्यथा कर्म्मणोऽप्युत्तरसंयोगजनने पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशापेक्षणादव्याप्तिः स्यादिति ॥ तत्र विभागजविभागानङ्गीकारे नवक्षणा तदङ्गीकारेऽपि विभागः किञ्चित्सापेक्षो विभागं जनयेत् निरपेक्षस्य

भाषा० तत्रापि परमाणौ स्यात् पाको वैशेषिके नये ॥ १०४ ॥

सिद्धा० तत्त्वे कर्मत्वं स्यात्* । तत्र यदि द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगविनाशविशिष्टं कालमपेक्ष्य विभागजविभागः स्यात् तदा दशक्षणा ॥ अथ द्रव्यनाशविशिष्टं कालमवयवं वापेक्ष्य विभागजविभागः स्यात् तदा एकादशक्षणा । तथा हि वह्निसंयोगात् परमाणौ कर्म्म । ततः परमाण्वन्तरेण विभागः । तत आरम्भकसंयोगनाशः । ततो द्व्यणुकनाशः । ततः परमाणौ श्यामादिनाशः । ततो रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिः । ततो द्रव्यारम्भानुगुणक्रिया । ततो विभागः । ततः पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशः । तत आरम्भकसंयोगः । ततो द्व्यणुकोत्पत्तिः । ततो रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिः ॥ ननु श्यामादिनाशक्षणे रक्तोत्पत्तिक्षणे वा परमाणौ द्रव्यारम्भानुगुणक्रियाऽस्त्विति चेत् । न । अग्निसंयुक्ते परमाणौ यत् कर्म्म तद्विनाशमन्तरेण गुणोत्पत्तिमन्तरेण च तत्र परमाणौ क्रियान्तराभावात् । कर्म्मवति कर्म्मानुत्पत्तेः । निर्गुणे द्रव्ये द्रव्यारम्भानुगुणक्रियानुपपत्तेश्च ॥ तथापि परमाणौ श्यामादिनिवृत्तिसमकालं रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिः स्यादिति चेत् । न । पूर्व्वरूपादिध्वंसस्य रूपान्तरे हेतुत्वात् । इति नवक्षणा ॥ अथ दशक्षणा । सा च आरम्भकसंयोगविनाशविशिष्टं कालमपेक्ष्य विभागेन विभागजनने सति स्यात् । तथा हि वह्नि-

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* स्वतन्त्राः परमाणवः पच्यन्त इति वैशेषिकमतं । इति पुस्तकान्तरेऽध्यधिकः पाठः ॥

सिद्धा० संयोगाद् द्व्यणुकारम्भके परमाणौ क्रिया। ततो विभागः। तत आरम्भकसंयोगनाशः। ततो द्व्यणुकनाशविभागजविभागौ। ततः श्यामनाशपूर्व्वसंयोगनाशौ। ततो रक्तोत्पत्त्युत्तरसंयोगौ। ततो वह्निनोदनजन्यपरमाणुकर्म्मणो नाशः। ततोऽदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगाद् द्रव्यारम्भानुगुणक्रिया। ततो विभागः। ततः पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशः। तत आरम्भकसंयोगः। ततो द्व्यणुकोत्पत्तिः। ततो रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिः॥ अथैकादशक्षणा। वह्निसंयोगात् परमाणौ कर्म्म। ततो विभागः। ततो द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगनाशः। ततो द्व्यणुकनाशः। ततो द्व्यणुकनाशविशिष्टं कालमपेक्ष्य विभागजविभागः। ततः पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशः। तत उत्तरसंयोगः। ततः परमाणुकर्म्मनाशः। ततोऽदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगाद् द्रव्यारम्भानुगुणक्रिया। ततो विभागः। ततः पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशः। ततो द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगः। ततो द्व्यणुकं। ततो रक्तादि। मध्यमशब्दवदेकस्मादग्निसंयोगान्न रूपनाशरक्तोत्पादौ। तावत् कालमेकस्याग्नेरस्थिरत्वात्॥ किञ्च यद्युत्पादको नाशकस्तदा नष्टे रूपादावग्निनाशे नीरूपश्चिरं परमाणुः स्यात्। नाशकश्चेदुत्पादकस्तदा रक्तोत्पत्तौ तदग्निनाशे रक्तता न स्यात्॥ एवं परमाण्वन्तरे कर्म्मचिन्तनात् पञ्चमादिक्षणेऽपि गुणोत्पत्तिः। तथाहि एकत्र परमाणौ कर्म्म। ततो विभागः। तत आरम्भकसंयोगनाशपरमाण्वन्तरकर्म्मणी ततस्तु द्व्यणु-

भाषा० नैयायिकानान्तु नये द्व्यणुकादावपीष्यते ।

सिद्धा० कनाशः परमाण्वन्तरकर्म्मजश्च विभाग इत्येकः कालः । ततः श्यामादिनाशः विभागाच्च पूर्व्वसंयोगनाश इत्येकः कालः । ततो रक्तोत्पत्तिर्द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगश्चेत्येकः कालः । अथ द्व्यणुकोत्पत्तिः । अथ रक्तोत्पत्तिरिति पञ्चक्षणा ॥ द्रव्यनाशसमकालं परमाण्वन्तरे कर्म्मचिन्तनात् षष्ठे गुणोत्पत्तिः । तथाहि परमाणुकर्म्मणा परमाण्वन्तरविभागः । तत आरम्भकसंयोगनाशः । अथ द्व्यणुकनाशपरमाण्वन्तरकर्म्मणी । अथ श्यामनाशः परमाण्वन्तरकर्म्मजश्च विभागः । ततो रक्तोत्पत्तिः परमाण्वन्तरे पूर्व्वसंयोगनाशश्च । ततः परमाण्वन्तरसंयोगः ततो द्व्यणुकोत्पत्तिः अथ रक्तोत्पत्तिरिति ॥ एवं श्यामनाशक्षणे परमाण्वन्तरे कर्म्मचिन्तनात् सप्तक्षणा । रक्तोत्पत्तिसमकालं परमाण्वन्तरे कर्म्मचिन्तनात् अष्टक्षणा इति ॥ १०४ ॥

नैयायिकानामिति । नैयायिकानां मते द्व्यणुकादौ अवयविन्यपि पाको भवति। तेषामयमाशयः। अवयविनां सच्छिद्रत्वाद्वह्नेः सूक्ष्मावयवैरन्तःप्रविष्टैरवयवेष्ववष्टब्धेष्वपि पाको न विरुध्यते। वैशेषिकमते ऽनन्तावयवतन्नाशकल्पने गौरवात्। इत्यञ्च सोऽयं घट इत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञाऽपि सङ्गच्छते। यत्र तु न प्रत्यभिज्ञा तत्रावयविना-

भाषा० गणनव्यवहारे तु हेतुः संख्याऽभिधीयते ॥ १०५ ॥
नित्येषु नित्यमेकत्वमनित्ये नित्यमिष्यते ।
द्वित्वादयः परार्द्धान्ता अपेक्षाबुद्धिजा मताः ॥ १०६ ॥
अनेकाश्रयपर्य्याप्ता एते तु परिकीर्त्तिताः ।

सिद्धा० शोऽपि स्वीक्रियत इति ॥ सङ्ख्यां निरूपयितुमाह । गणनेति। गणनव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं सङ्ख्येत्यर्थः॥१०५॥

नित्येष्विति । नित्येषु परमाण्वादिषु एकत्वं नित्यं अनित्ये घटादौ एकत्वमनित्यमित्यर्थः ॥ द्वित्वादयो व्यासज्यवृत्ति*संख्या अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्याः ॥ १०६ ॥

अनेकेति। यद्यपि द्वित्वादिसमवायः प्रत्येकं घटादावपि वर्त्तते तथाप्येको द्वाविति प्रत्ययाभावाद् एको न द्वाविति प्रत्ययसम्भवाच्च द्वित्वादीनां पर्य्याप्तिलक्षणः कश्चन सम्बन्धोऽनेकाश्रयोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥ अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशादिति । प्रथममपेक्षाबुद्धिस्ततो द्वित्वोत्पत्तिः। ततो विशेषणज्ञानं द्वित्वत्वनिर्विकल्पकरूपं । ततो द्वित्वविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षं । अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशे ततो द्वित्वनाश इति ॥ यद्यपि ज्ञानान्तरं न त्रिक्षणमात्रस्थायि योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां स्वोत्तरवर्त्तिगुणनाश्यत्वात् तथाप्यपेक्षाबुद्धेस्त्रिक्षणस्थायित्वं कल्प्यते । अन्यथा निर्व्विकल्पकाले अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाद् अनन्तरं द्वित्वस्यैव नाशः स्यात्

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* एकत्वानवच्छिन्नपर्य्याप्तिकत्वं व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वं ॥ टी० ॥

भाषा० अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाच्च नाशस्तेषां निरूपितः ॥ १०७ ॥
अनेकैकत्वबुद्धिर्या साऽपेक्षाबुद्धिरुच्यते ।

सिद्धा० न तु द्वित्वप्रत्यचं । तदानीं विषयाभावात् । विद्यमानस्यैव चक्षुरादिना ज्ञानजननोपगमात् । तस्माद् द्वित्वप्रत्यचादिकमपेचाबुद्धेर्नाशकं कल्प्यते ॥ न चापेचाबुद्धिनाशात् कथं द्वित्वनाश इति वाच्यं । कालान्तरे द्वित्वप्रत्यचाभावात् । अपेचाबुद्धिस्तदुत्पादिका तन्नाशस्तन्नाशक इति कल्पनात् । अत एव तत्पुरुषीयापेचाबुद्धिजन्यद्वित्वादिकं तेनैव गृह्यत इति कल्प्यते ॥ न चापेचाबुद्धेर्द्वित्वप्रत्यचकारणत्वमस्त्विति वाच्यं । लाघवेन द्वित्वं प्रति कारणत्वस्यैवोचितत्वात् । अतीन्द्रिये द्व्यणुकादावपेचाबुद्धिर्योगिनां । सर्गादिकालीनपरमाण्वादावीश्वरीयापेचाबुद्धिर्ब्रह्माण्डान्तरवर्त्तियोगिनामपेचाबुद्धिर्व्वा द्वित्वादिकारणमिति ॥ १०७ ॥

अपेचाबुद्धिः केत्यत आह । अनेकेति । अयमेक इत्याकारिका इत्यर्थः । इदन्तु बोध्यं यत्रानियतैकत्वज्ञानं तत्र द्वित्वादिभिन्ना बहुत्वसंख्योत्पद्यते यथा सेनावनादाविति कन्दलीकारः ॥ आचार्य्यास्तु त्रित्वादिकमेव बहुत्वं मन्यन्ते । तथा च त्रित्वत्वादिव्यापिका बहुत्वजातिः । सेनादौ चोत्पन्ने त्रित्वादौ त्रित्वत्वाद्यग्रहो दोषात् । इत्यञ्च इतो बहुकेयं सेनेति प्रती-

भाषा० परिमाणं भवेन्मानव्यवहारस्य कारणं ॥ १०८ ॥
अणु दीर्घं महद्ध्रस्वमिति तद्भेद ईरितः ।
अनित्ये तदनित्यं स्यान्नित्ये नित्यमुदाहृतं ॥ १०९ ॥
सङ्ख्यातः परिमाणाच्च प्रचयादपि जायते ।
अनित्यं द्व्यणुकादौ तु सङ्ख्याजन्यमुदाहृतं ॥ ११० ॥

सिद्धा० तिरूपपद्यते । बहुत्वस्य संख्यान्तरत्वे तत्तारतम्याभावादित्यवधेयं ॥ परिमाणं निरूपयति । परिमाणमिति । परिमितिव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणमित्यर्थः ॥ १०८ ॥

तच्चतुर्विधं अणु महद् दीर्घं ह्रस्वञ्च*। तत् परिमाणं । नित्यमित्यत्र परिमाणमित्यनुषज्यते ॥ १०९ ॥

जायत इत्यत्रापि परिमाणमित्यनुवर्त्तते । अनित्यमिति पूर्व्वेणान्वितं । तथा चानित्यं परिमाणं सङ्ख्याजन्यं परिमाणजन्यं प्रचयजन्यं चेत्यर्थः ॥ तत्र सङ्ख्याजन्यमुदाहरति । द्व्यणुकादाविति । द्व्यणुकस्य त्रसरेणोश्च परिमाणं प्रति परमाणुपरिमाणं द्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणं वा न कारणं । परिमाणस्य स्वसमानजातीयोत्कृष्टपरिमाणजनकत्वात् । द्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणन्तु परमाणुत्वापेक्षया नोत्कृष्टं । त्रसरेणुपरिमाणन्तु न

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* इदञ्चातुर्व्विध्यं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं । तथाणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे महत्त्वदीर्घत्वे च समनियते इति ॥ निष्प्रयोजनतया विद्वन्माहतत्वाद्धरीकृतोऽयं पाठः ।

भाषा॰ परिमाणं घटादौ तु परिमाणजमुच्यते ।
प्रचयः शिथिलाख्यो यः संयोगस्तेन जन्यते ॥१११॥
परिमाणं तूलकादौ नाशस्त्वाश्रयनाशतः ।

सिद्धा॰ सजातीयं । अतः परमाणौ द्वित्वसङ्ख्या द्व्यणुकपरिमाणस्य द्व्यणुके त्रित्वसङ्ख्या च त्रसरेणुपरिमाणस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः ॥ ११० ॥

परिमाणजन्यमुदाहरति । परिमाणं घटादाविति ॥ परिमाणजं कपालादिपरिमाणजन्यं ॥ प्रचयजन्यमुदाहर्त्तुं प्रचयं निर्व्वक्ति । प्रचय इति ॥ १११ ॥

नाश इति । अर्थात् परिमाणस्य । न चावयवनाशः कथं परिमाणनाशकः सत्यप्यवयविनि त्रिचतुरपरमाणुविश्लेषे तदुपचये चावयविनः प्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽपि परिमाणान्तरस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यं । परमाणुविश्लेषे द्व्यणुकस्य नाशोऽवश्यमभ्युपेयस्तन्नाशे च त्रसरेणुकनाशः । एवं क्रमेण महावयविनो नाशस्यावश्यकत्वात् । सति च नाशकेऽनभ्युपगममात्रेण नाशस्यापवदितुमशक्यत्वात् । शरीरादाववयवोपचयेऽसमवायिकारणनाशस्यावश्यकत्वादवयविनाश आवश्यकः ॥ न च पटाविनाशेऽपि तन्त्वन्तरसंयोगात् परिमाणाधिक्यं स्यादिति वाच्यं । तत्रापि वेमाद्यभिघातेन समवायिकारणतन्तुसंयोगनाशात् पटनाशस्यावश्य-

भाषा० सङ्ख्यावत्तु पृथक्त्वं स्यात् पृथक्प्रत्ययकारणं ॥ ११२॥

सिद्धा० कत्वात् ॥ किञ्च तन्त्वन्तरस्य तत्पटावयवत्वे पूर्व्वं तत्पट एव न स्यात् । तत्तन्तुरूपकारणाभावात् । तत्तन्तोरवयवत्वाभावे च न तेन परिमाणाधिक्यं संयुक्तद्रव्यान्तरवत् । तस्मात् तत्र तन्त्वन्तरसंयोगे सति पूर्व्वपटनाशस्ततः पटान्तरोत्पत्तिरित्यवश्यं स्वीकार्य्यं । अवयविनः प्रत्यभिज्ञानन्तु साजात्येन दीपकलिकादिवत् ॥ न च पूर्व्वतन्तव एव तन्त्वन्तरसहकारात् पूर्व्वपटे सत्येव पटान्तरमारभतामिति वाच्यं । मूर्त्तयोः समानदेशताविरोधात् । एकदा नानाद्रव्यस्य तत्रानुपलम्भवाधितत्वाच्च । पूर्व्वद्रव्यस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्य विनाशे द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिरित्यवश्यमभ्युपेयत्वात् ॥

पृथक्त्वं कारणं निरूपयति । सङ्ख्यावदिति । पृथक्प्रत्ययासाधारणं कारणं पृथक्त्वं । तन्नित्यतादिकं सङ्ख्यावत् । यथा हि नित्येषु एकत्वं नित्यं अनित्येऽनित्यं अनित्यमेकत्वं आश्रयद्वितीयक्षणेनोत्पद्यते आश्रयनाशान्नश्यति तथैकपृथक्त्वमपि । द्वित्वादिवद् द्विपृथक्त्वादिकमपीत्यर्थः ॥ नन्वयमस्मात् पृथग् इत्यादावन्योन्याभावो भासते तत् कथं पृथक्त्वं गुणान्तरं स्वीक्रियते न चास्तु पृथक्त्वं न त्वन्योन्याभाव इति वाच्यं । रूपं न घट इति प्रतीत्यनापत्तेः ॥ ११२ ॥

भाषा० अन्योन्याभावतो नास्य चरितार्थत्वमुच्यते ।
अस्मात् पृथगिदं नेति प्रतीतिर्हि विलक्षणा ॥ ११३ ॥
अप्राप्तयोस्तु या प्राप्तिः सैव संयोग ईरितः ।
कीर्त्तितस्त्रिविधस्त्वेष आद्योऽन्यतरकर्म्मजः ॥ ११४ ॥
तथोभयक्रियाजन्यो भवेत् संयोगजोऽपरः ।
आदिमः श्येनशैलादिसंयोगः परिकीर्त्तितः ॥ ११५ ॥
मेषयोः सन्निपातो यः स द्वितीय उदाहृतः ।

सिद्धा० न हि रूपे घटावधिकं पृथक्त्वं गुणान्तरमस्ति न वा घटे घटावधिकपृथक्त्वमस्ति येन परम्परासम्बन्धः कल्प्य इत्यत आह । अन्योन्याभावत इति ॥ विलक्षणेति ॥ ननु शब्दवैलक्षण्यमेव न त्वर्थवैलक्षण्यमिति चेत् । न । विनार्थभेदं घटात् पृथग् इतिवद् घटो नेत्यत्रापि पञ्चमी स्यात् । तस्माद् यदर्थकयोगे पञ्चमी सोऽर्थो नञर्थो ऽन्योन्याभावतो भिन्नो गुणान्तरं कल्प्यत इति ॥ ११३ ॥

संयोगं निरूपयति । अप्राप्तयोरिति । तं विभजते । कीर्त्तित इति । एष संयोगः ॥ ११४ ॥

सन्निपातः संयोगो द्वितीय उभयकर्म्मजः । तृतीय इति संयोगज इत्यर्थः । तृतीयः स्यादिति पूर्व्वेणान्वितं ॥ ११५ ॥

आदिमः अभिघातः । द्वितीयो नोदनाख्यः संयोग इति ॥ विभक्तप्रत्ययकारणं विभागं निरूपयति ।

भाषा॰ कपालतरुसंयोगात् संयोगस्तरुकुम्भयोः ॥ ११६ ॥
तृतीयः स्यात् कर्म्मजोऽपि द्विधैव परिकीर्त्तितः।
अभिघातो नोदनञ्च शब्दहेतुरिहादिमः ॥ ११७ ॥
शब्दाहेतुर्द्दितीयः स्याद्विभागोऽपि त्रिधा भवेत्।
एककर्म्मोद्भवस्त्वाद्यो द्वयकर्म्मोद्भवोऽपरः ॥ ११८ ॥
विभागजस्तृतीयः स्यात् तृतीयोऽपि द्विधा भवेत्।

सिद्धा॰ विभाग इति ॥ एककर्म्मेति। उदाहरणन्तु श्येनशैलविभागादिकं पूर्व्ववद्बोध्यं॥ ११६ ॥ ११७ ॥ ११८ ॥

तृतीयो विभागजः कारणमात्रविभागजन्यः कारणाकारणविभागजन्यश्चेति । आद्यस्तावत् । यत्र कपाले कर्म्म। ततः कपालद्वयविभागः। ततो घटारम्भकसंयोगनाशः। ततो घटनाशः। ततस्तेन कपालविभागेन सकर्म्मणा कपालस्य देशान्तरविभागो जन्यते। ततो देशान्तरसंयोगनाशः। तत उत्तरदेशसंयोगः। ततः कर्म्मनाश इति॥ न च तेन कर्म्मणैव कथं देशान्तरविभागो न जन्यत इति वाच्यं। एकस्य कर्म्मण आरम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनकत्वस्यानारम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनकत्वविरोधात्। अन्यथा विकसत्कमलकुड्मलभङ्गप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद्यदीदमनारम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागं जनयेत् तदा ऽऽरम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागं न जनयेत्। न च कारणविभागे-

भाषा॰ हेतुमात्रविभागोत्थो हेत्वहेतुविभागजः ॥ ११९ ॥
परत्वञ्चापरत्वञ्च द्विविधं परिकीर्त्तितं।
दैशिकं कालिकञ्चापि मूर्त्त एव तु दैशिकं ॥ १२० ॥
परत्वं सूर्य्यसंयोगभूयस्त्वज्ञानतो भवेत्।
अपरत्वं तदल्पत्वबुद्धितः स्यादितीरितं ॥ १२१ ॥

सिद्धा॰ नैव द्रव्यनाशात् पूर्व्वं कुतो देशान्तरविभागो न जन्यत इति वाच्यं। आरम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागवतोऽवयवस्य सति द्रव्ये देशान्तरविभागासम्भवात्। यत्र हस्तक्रियया हस्ततरुविभागः ततः शरीरेऽपि विभक्तप्रत्ययो भवति। तत्र च शरीरतरुविभागे हस्तक्रिया न कारणं। व्यधिकरणत्वाच्छरीरे तु क्रिया नास्ति। अवयविकर्म्मणो यावदवयवकर्म्मनियतत्वात्। अतस्तत्र कारणाकारणविभागेन कार्य्याकार्य्यविभागो जन्यत इति। अत एव विभागो गुणान्तरं। अन्यथा शरीरे विभक्तप्रत्ययो न स्यात्। अतः संयोगनाशेन विभागो नान्यथासिद्धो भवति ॥ ११९ ॥

परापरव्यवहारनिमित्ते परत्वापरत्वे निरूपयति। परत्वञ्चेति। दैशिकमिति ॥ १२० ॥

दैशिकपरत्वं बहुतरसूर्य्यसंयोगान्तरितत्वज्ञानादुत्पद्यते। एवं तदल्पीयस्त्वज्ञानादपरत्वमुत्पद्यते। अत्रावधित्वार्थद्वितीयापेक्षा। यथा पाटलिपुत्रात् काशी-

भाषा० तयोरसमवायी तु दिक्संयोगस्तदाश्रये।
दिवाकरपरिस्पन्दपूर्व्वोत्पन्नत्वबुद्धितः ॥ १२२ ॥
परत्वमपरत्वन्तु तदनन्तरबुद्धितः।
अत्र त्वसमवायी स्यात् संयोगः कालपिण्डयोः॥१२३॥
अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्त्वेषामुदाहृतः।
बुद्धेः प्रकारः प्रागेव प्रायशोऽपि निरूपितः ॥ १२४ ॥
अथावशिष्टोऽप्यपरः प्रकारः परिदर्श्यते।
अप्रमा च प्रमा चेति ज्ञानं द्विविधमुच्यते ॥ १२५ ॥
तच्छून्ये तन्मतिर्य्या स्यादप्रमा सा निरूपिता।

सिद्धा० मपेक्ष्य प्रयागः परः। पाटलिपुत्रात् कुरुक्षेत्रमपेक्ष्य प्रयागोऽपर इति ॥ १२१ ॥

तयोर्दैशिकपरत्वापरत्वयोः। असमवायी असमवायिकारणं। तदाश्रये दैशिकपरत्वापरत्वाश्रये॥ दिवाकरेति॥ १२२ ॥

अत्र परत्वं अपरत्वञ्च कालिकं ग्राह्यं। यस्य सूर्य्यपरिस्पन्दापेक्षया यस्य सूर्य्यपरिस्पन्दोऽधिकः स ज्येष्ठः। यस्य न्यूनः स कनिष्ठः। कालिकपरत्वापरत्वे जन्यद्रव्य एव। अत्र कालिकपरत्वापरत्वयोः ॥ १२३ ॥

एषां कालिकदैशिकपरत्वापरत्वानां॥ क्रमप्राप्तां बुद्धिं निरूपयितुमाह। बुद्धेरिति ॥ १२४ ॥ १२५ ॥

अप्रमां विभजते। तच्छून्य इति। तदभाववति

भाषा० तत्प्रपञ्चो विपर्य्यासः संशयोऽपि प्रकीर्त्तितः ॥ १२६ ॥
आद्यो देहे याऽऽत्मबुद्धिः शङ्खादौ पीततामतिः।
भवेन्निश्चयरूपा या संशयोऽथ प्रदर्श्यते ॥ १२७ ॥
किंस्विन् नरो वा स्थाणुर्व्वेत्यादिबुद्धिस्तु संशयः।
तदभावाप्रकारा धीस्तत्प्रकारा तु निश्चयः ॥ १२८ ॥
स संशयो मतिर्या स्यादेकत्राभावभावयोः।

सिद्धा० तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं भ्रम इत्यर्थः ॥ तत्प्रपञ्चः अप्रमाप्रपञ्चः ॥ १२६ ॥

आद्य इति। विपर्य्यास इत्यर्थः। शरीरादौ यदात्मत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं गौरोऽहमित्याकारकं। एवं शङ्खादौ पीतः शङ्ख इत्याकारकं यज्ज्ञानं निश्चयरूपं तद्भ्रम इति ॥ १२७ ॥

किंस्विदिति ॥ किंस्विदिति वितर्के ॥ निश्चयस्य लक्षणमाह। तदभावेति। तदभावाप्रकारकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निश्चयः ॥ १२८ ॥

संशयं लक्षयति। संशय इति। एकधर्म्मिकविरुद्धभावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशय इत्यर्थः ॥ साधारणेति। उभयसाधारणो यो धर्म्मस्तज्ज्ञानं संशयकारणं। यथा उच्चैस्तरत्वं स्थाणुत्वसाधारणं ज्ञात्वा अयं स्थाणुर्न वेति सन्दिग्धे। एवं असाधारणज्ञानं कारणं। यथा शब्दत्वं नित्यानित्यव्यावृत्तं शब्दे गृहीत्वा शब्दो नित्यो न वेति

भाषा॰ साधारणादिधर्म्मस्य ज्ञानं संशयकारणं ॥ १२९ ॥
दोषोऽप्रमाया जनकः प्रमायास्तु गुणो भवेत् ।

सिद्धा॰ सन्दिग्धे। विप्रतिपत्तिस्तु शब्दो नित्यो न वेत्यादिशब्दात्मिका न संशयकारणं । शब्दव्याप्तिज्ञानादीनां निश्चयमात्रजनकत्वस्वाभाव्यात् । किन्तु तत्र शब्देन कोटिद्वयज्ञानं जन्यते । संशयस्तु मानस एवेति । एवं ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यसंशयाद्विषयसंशय इति । एवं व्याप्यसंशयादपि व्यापकसंशय इत्यादिकं बोध्यं । किन्तु संशये धर्म्मिज्ञानं धर्म्मीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षो वा कारणमिति ॥ १२९ ॥

दोष इति । अप्रमां प्रति दोषः कारणं। प्रमां प्रति गुणः कारणं। तत्रापि पित्तादिरूपा दोषा अननुगताः। तेषां कारणत्वं अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव सिद्धं । गुणस्य प्रमाजनकत्वन्तु अनुमानात् सिद्धं। यथा प्रमा ज्ञानसाधारणकारणभिन्नकारणजन्या जन्यज्ञानत्वाद् अप्रमावत् ॥ न च दोषाभाव एव कारणमस्त्विति वाच्यं। पीतः शङ्ख इतिज्ञानस्थले पित्तदोषसत्त्वाच्छङ्खत्वप्रमानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। विनिगमनाविरहाद् अनन्तदोषाभावस्य कारणत्वमपेक्ष्य गुणकारणताया न्याय्यत्वात् ॥ न च गुणसत्त्वेऽपि पित्तप्रतिबन्धाच्छङ्खे न श्वैत्यज्ञानं अतः पित्तादिदोषाभावानां कारणत्वमवश्यं वाच्यं तथा च किं गुणस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनयेति वाच्यं।

भाषा० पित्तदूरत्वादिरूपो दोषो नानाविधः स्मृतः ॥ १३० ॥
प्रत्यक्षे तु विशेष्येण विशेषणवता समं ।
सन्निकर्षो गुणस्तु स्यादथ त्वनुमितौ गुणः ॥ १३१ ॥
पक्षे साध्यविशिष्टे च परामर्शो गुणो भवेत् ।
शक्ये सादृश्यबुद्धिस्तु भवेदुपमितौ गुणः ॥ १३२ ॥
शाब्दबोधे योग्यतायास्तात्पर्य्यस्याथवा प्रमा ।
गुणः स्याद् भ्रमभिन्नन्तु ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा ॥ १३३ ॥
अथवा तत्प्रकारं यज्ज्ञानं तद्वद्विशेष्यकं ।

सिद्धा० तथाप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणस्यापि हेतुत्वसिद्धेः । एवं भ्रमं प्रति गुणाभावः कारणमित्यस्यापि सुवचत्वाच्च । तत्र दोषाः के इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह । पित्तेति । क्वचित् पित्तादिभ्रमे पित्तं दोषः । क्वचिच्चन्द्रादेः स्वल्पपरिमाणभ्रमे दूरत्वं दोषः । क्वचिच्च वंशोरगभ्रमे मण्डूकवसाञ्जनमित्येवं दोषा भ्रान्तिजनका इत्यर्थः ॥ १३० ॥

अथ के गुणा इत्याकाङ्क्षायां प्रत्यक्षादौ क्रमशो गुणान् दर्शयति । प्रत्यक्षे त्विति । प्रत्यक्षे विशेषणवद्विशेष्यसन्निकर्षो गुणः । अनुमितौ साध्यवति साध्यव्याप्यवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानं गुण इति । एवमग्रेऽप्यूह्यः ॥ १३१ ॥ १३२ ॥

प्रमां निरूपयति । भ्रमभिन्नमिति ॥ १३३ ॥

ननु यत्र शुक्तिरजतयोरिमे रजते इति ज्ञानं जातं तत्र रजतांशेऽपि प्रमा न स्यात् तज्ज्ञानस्य भ्रमभिन्न-

भाषा० तत् प्रमा न प्रमा नापि भ्रमः स्यान्निर्व्विकल्पकं ॥१३४॥
प्रकारतादिशून्यं हि सम्बन्धानवगाहि तत्।

सिद्धा० त्वाभावाद् अत आह। अथवेति। तद्वद्विशेष्यकं तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा इत्यर्थः। इदन्तु बोध्यं। येन सम्बन्धेन तद्वत्ता तेन सम्बन्धेन तद्वद्विशेष्यकं तेन सम्बन्धेन तत्प्रकारकत्वं वाच्यं। तेन कपालादौ संयोगादिना घटादिज्ञाने नातिव्याप्तिः॥ एवं सति निर्व्विकल्पकं प्रमा न स्यात् तस्य सप्रकारकत्वाभावाद् अत आह। न प्रमेति॥ ननु वृक्षे कपिसंयोगज्ञानं भ्रमः स्यात् प्रमा च स्यादिति चेत्। न। प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणसंयोगाभाववति संयोगज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्॥ न च वृक्षे संयोगाभावावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन संयोगज्ञानं भ्रमो न स्यात् तत्र संयोगाभावस्य प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वाभावादिति वाच्यं। तत्र संयोगाभावावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन संयोगज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्। लक्षणस्याननुगमात्। लक्षणाननुगमेऽपि न क्षतिः॥ १३४॥

प्रमात्वमिति। मीमांसका हि प्रमात्वं स्वतो ग्राह्यमिति वदन्ति। तत्र गुरूणां मते ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशरूपत्वात् तज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तेनैव गृह्यते इति॥ भट्टानां मते ज्ञानमतीन्द्रियं। ज्ञानजन्या ज्ञातता प्रत्यक्षा। तया च ज्ञानमनुमीयते॥ मुरारिमिश्राणां मतेऽनुव्यवसायेन ज्ञानं गृह्यते। सर्व्वेषामपि मते तज्ज्ञानवि-

सिद्धा॰ षयकज्ञानेन तज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं गृह्यते। विषयनिरूप्यं हि ज्ञानं*। अतो ज्ञानवित्तिवेद्यो विषयः। तन्मतं दूषयति। न स्वतो ग्राह्यमिति। संशयेति। यदि ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं स्वतो ग्राह्यं स्यात् तदाऽभ्यासदशोत्पन्नज्ञाने तत्संशयो न स्यात्। तत्र हि यदि ज्ञानं ज्ञातं तदा प्रामाण्यं ज्ञातमेवेति कथं संशयः। यदि तु ज्ञानं न ज्ञातं तदाधर्म्मिज्ञानाभावात् कथं संशयः। तस्माज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमनुमेयं। तथा हि इदं ज्ञानं प्रमा सम्वादिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वाद् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथाऽप्रमा। इदं पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा। गन्धवति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकज्ञानत्वात्। एवं इदं जलज्ञानं प्रमा। स्नेहवति जलत्वप्रकारकज्ञानत्वात्॥ न च हेतुज्ञानं कथं जातमिति वाच्यं। पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकत्वस्य स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वात्। तत्र गन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्वस्यापि सुग्रहत्वात्। तत्प्रकारकत्वावच्छिन्नतद्वद्विशेष्यकत्वं परं न गृह्यते। संशयानुरोधात्॥ न च प्रमात्वस्य साध्यस्य प्रसिद्धिः कथमिति वाच्यं। इदंज्ञानप्रमात्वस्य स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वात्॥ न च प्रकारभेदेन प्रामाण्यभेदाद् घटत्ववति घटत्वप्रकारादेः कथं प्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं। घटत्वप्रकारकत्वस्य स्वविशे-

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* विषयविषयताकनियतस्वविषयताकप्रत्यक्षकं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः। अनुमितिप्रकारस्तु ज्ञानं विषयविषयताकप्रत्यक्षकं विषयाविषयकप्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वादित्यनुमानं। ज्ञानप्रत्यक्षस्य विषयविषयत्वे प्रमाणमिति भावः॥

सिद्धा॰ व्यक्तत्वस्य च स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वात्। घटस्य च पूर्व्वमुपस्थितत्वाद् घटविशेष्यकं घटत्वप्रकारकमिति ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यस्य बाधकाभावः। व्यवसायपरन्तु प्रामाण्यं न गृह्यते। तत्र संशयसामग्रीसत्त्वे संशयस्यैवोपपत्तेः। किञ्चाभ्यासदशायां तृतीयानुव्यवसायादिना प्रामाण्यस्य स्वत एव ग्रहसम्भवात् प्रथमानुव्यवसायपरं न तद्ग्राहकत्वमिति कल्प्यते संशयानुरोधात्॥ अथ प्रामाण्यानुमितौ प्रामाण्यग्रहे न तस्य विषयनिश्चयरूपत्वार्थं तत्र प्रामाण्यग्रहो वाच्यः। सोऽप्यनुमित्यन्तरेणेति फलमुखी कारणमुखी वा नानवस्थेति चेन्न। अगृहीतप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्यैव निश्चयरूपत्वात्। यत्र च प्रामाण्यसंशयस्तत्रैव परं प्रामाण्यानुमितेरपेक्षाया यदाशङ्कं प्रामाण्यानुमितिरिष्यत एव सर्व्वत्र तु न संशयः। क्वचित् कोट्यनुपस्थितेः क्वचिद्विशेषदर्शनादितः क्वचिद्विषयान्तरसञ्चारादिति सङ्क्षेपः॥ ननु सर्व्वेषां ज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वात् प्रमालक्षणे तद्विशेष्यकत्वं विशेषणं व्यर्थं॥ न च रङ्गे रजतार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिर्भ्रमजन्या न स्यात् तव मते भ्रमस्याभावादिति वाच्यं। तत्र हि दोषाधीनस्य पुरोवर्त्तिनि स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितरजतभेदाग्रहस्य हेतुत्वात्। सत्यरजतस्थले तु विशिष्टज्ञानस्य सत्त्वात् तदेव कारणं। अस्तु वा तत्रापि भेदाग्रह एव कारणमिति। न वाऽन्यथा ख्यातिः सम्भवति। रजतप्रत्यक्षकारणस्य रजतसन्नि-

भाषा॰ प्रमात्वं न स्वतो ग्राह्यं संशयानुपपत्तितः ॥ १३५ ॥

सिद्धा॰ कर्षस्याभावात्। रङ्गे रजतबुद्धेरनुपपत्तेरिति चेन्न। सत्यरजतस्थले प्रवृत्तिं प्रति विशिष्टज्ञानस्य हेतुतायाः क्लृप्तत्वात्। अन्यत्रापि तत्कल्पनात्॥ न च सम्वादिप्रवृत्तौ तत्कारणं विसम्वादिप्रवृत्तौ तु भेदाग्रहः कारणमिति वाच्यं। लाघवात् प्रवृत्तिमात्रे तस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनात्। इत्यञ्च रङ्गे रजतत्वविशिष्टबुद्ध्यनुरोधेन ज्ञानलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिकल्पनेऽपि न क्षतिः। फलमुखगौरवस्यादोषत्वात्। किञ्च यद् रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रजते इति ज्ञानं जातं तत्र न कारणबाधोऽपि। अपि च यत्र रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रजतरङ्गे इति ज्ञानं तत्रोभयत्र युगपत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्यातां। रङ्गे रङ्गभेदग्रहे रजते रजतभेदग्रहे ऽन्यथाख्यातिभयात्। त्वन्मते रङ्गे रङ्गभेदाग्रहस्य रजते रजतभेदाग्रहस्य च सत्त्वात्। दोषादेव रङ्गे रजतभेदाग्रहस्य रजते रङ्गभेदाग्रहस्य च सत्त्वात्। किञ्चानुमितिं प्रति भेदाग्रहस्य हेतुत्वे जलह्रदे वह्निव्याप्यधूमवदभेदाग्रहाद् अनुमितिर्निर्व्वाधा। यदि च विशिष्टज्ञानं कारणं तदाऽयोगोलके वह्निव्याप्यधूमज्ञानमनुमित्यनुरोधादापतितं। इत्थं अन्यथा ख्यातौ प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रमाणं। रङ्गं रजततया जानामीत्यनुभवादिति सङ्क्षेपः ॥ १३५ ॥

भाषा॰ व्यभिचारस्याग्रहोऽपि सहचारग्रहस्तथा।
हेतुर्व्याप्तिग्रहे तर्कः क्वचित् शङ्कानिवर्त्तकः ॥ १३६ ॥

सिद्धा॰ पूर्वं व्याप्तिरुक्ता तद्ग्रहोपायस्तु न दर्शित इत्यतस्तं दर्शयति। व्यभिचारस्येति। व्यभिचाराग्रहः सहचारग्रहश्च व्याप्तिग्रहे कारणमित्यर्थः। व्यभिचारग्रहस्य व्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् तदभावः कारणं। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सहचारग्रहस्यापि हेतुता। भूयोदर्शनन्तु न कारणं। व्यभिचारास्फूर्त्तौ सकृद्दर्शनेऽपि क्वचिद् व्याप्तिग्रहात्। क्वचिद् व्यभिचारशङ्काविधूननद्वारा भूयोदर्शनमुपयुज्यते। यत्र तु भूयोदर्शनादपि शङ्का नापैति तत्र विपक्षबाधकतर्कोऽपेक्षितः। तथापि वह्निविरहिण्यपि धूमः स्यादिति यद्याशङ्का भवति तदा सा वह्निधूमयोः कार्य्यकारणभावस्य प्रतिसन्धानान्निवर्त्तते। यद्ययं वह्निमान् न स्यात् तदा धूमवान् न स्यात्। कारणं विना कार्य्यानुपपत्तेः। यदि क्वचित् कारणं विनापि भविष्यति अहेतुक एव वा भविष्यतीति तत्राशङ्का भवति तदा सा व्याघातादपसरणीया। यदि कारणं विना कार्य्यं स्यात् तदा धूमार्थं वह्नेस्तृप्त्यर्थं भोजनस्य नियमत उपादानं तवैव न स्यादिति। यत्र स्वत एव शङ्का नावतरति तत्र न तर्कापेक्षापीति तदिदमुक्तं तर्कः क्वचित् शङ्कानिवर्त्तक इति॥ १३६ ॥

भाषा० साध्यस्य व्यापको यस्तु हेतोरव्यापकस्तथा ।

सिद्धा० इदानीं परकीयव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धार्थमुपाधिं निरूपयति । साध्यस्येति । साध्यत्वाभिमतव्यापकत्वे सति साधनत्वाभिमताव्यापक इत्यर्थः॥ ननु स श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वाद् इत्यत्र शाकपाकजत्वं नोपाधिः स्यात्। तस्य साध्यव्यापकत्वाभावात्। श्यामत्वस्य घटादावपि सत्त्वात्। एवं वायुः प्रत्यक्षः स्पर्शाश्रयत्वाद् इत्यत्र उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नोपाधिः स्यात् । प्रत्यक्षत्वस्यात्मादिषु सत्त्वात् तत्र रूपाभावात् । एवं ध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वाद् इत्यत्र भावत्वं नोपाधिः स्याद् विनाशित्वस्य प्रागभावे सत्त्वात् ॥ तत्र च भावत्वाभावादिति चेन्न । यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाधनाव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थतात्पर्य्यात् । मित्रातनयत्वावच्छिन्नश्यामत्वस्य व्यापकं शाकपाकजत्वं। एवं वहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वस्य व्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं वहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नसाधनस्याव्यापकञ्च। एवं ध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकं* भावत्वं। सद्धेतौ तु एतादृशो धर्मो नास्ति । यदवच्छिन्नस्य साध्यस्य व्यापकं तदवच्छिन्नस्य साधनस्याव्यापकं किञ्चित् स्यात्। व्यभिचारिणि तु

* काकः श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वाद् इत्यादावपि मित्रातनयत्वावच्छिन्नश्यामत्वस्य व्यापकत्वं शाकपाकजत्वं इति यत्नाकरोऽयं पाठः ॥

भाषा॰ स उपाधिर्भवेत्तस्य निष्कर्षोऽयं प्रदर्श्यते ॥ १३७ ॥

सर्व्वे साध्यसमानाधिकरणाः स्युरुपाधयः ।

हेतोरेकाश्रये येषां स्वसाध्यव्यभिचारिता ॥ १३८ ॥

व्यभिचारस्यानुमानमुपाधेस्तु प्रयोजनं ।

सिद्धा॰ अन्तत उपाध्यधिकरणं यत्साध्याधिकरणं यच्चोपाधिशून्यं साध्यव्यभिचारनिरूपकमधिकरणं तदन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नस्य साध्यस्य व्यापकत्वं साधनस्य चाव्यापकत्वमुपाधेः सम्भवतीति ॥ १३७ ॥

अत एव लक्ष्यमपि रूपमेतदनुसारेण दर्शयति । सर्व्व इति ॥ स्वसाध्येति । स्वं उपाधिः स्वञ्च साध्यञ्च स्वसाध्ये तयोर्व्यभिचारिता इत्यर्थः ॥ १३८ ॥

उपाधेर्दूषकताबीजमाह । व्यभिचारस्येति । उपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं उपाधेः प्रयोजनमित्यर्थः । तथाहि यत्र शुद्धसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र शुद्धेनोपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं । यथा धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादौ वह्निर्धूमव्यभिचारी आर्द्रेन्धनव्यभिचारित्वाद् इति व्यापकव्यभिचारिणो व्याप्यव्यभिचारावश्यकत्वात् । यत्र तु किञ्चिद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र तद्धर्म्मवति उपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं । यथा श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वाद् इत्यत्र मित्रातनयत्वं श्यामत्वव्यभि-

भाषा० शब्दोपमानयोर्नैव पृथक् प्रामाण्यमिष्यते ॥ १३९ ॥
अनुमानगतार्थत्वादिति वैशेषिकं मतं ।

सिद्धा० चारि । मित्रातनये शाकपाकजत्वव्यभिचारित्वादिति। वाधानुन्नीतपक्षेतरस्तु साध्यव्यापकताग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् स्वव्याघातकत्वाच्च नोपाधिः। वाधोन्नीतस्तु पक्षेतर उपाधिर्भवत्येव। यत्र वह्निरनुष्णः कृतकत्वाद् इत्यादौ प्रत्यक्षेण वह्नेरुष्णत्वग्रहे वह्नीतरत्वमुपाधिः। यत्र साध्यव्यापकत्वादिकं सन्दिह्यते स सन्दिग्धोपाधिः। पक्षेतरस्तु सन्दिग्धोपाधिरपि नोद्भावनीयः कथकसम्प्रदायानुरोधादिति ॥ केचित्तु सत्प्रतिपक्षोत्थापनमुपाधिफलं। तथाहि अयोगोलकं धूमवद्वह्नेरित्यादौ अयोगोलकं धूमाभाववद् आर्द्रेन्धनाभावाद् इति सत्प्रतिपक्षसम्भवात्। इत्यञ्च साधनव्यापकोऽपि क्वचिदुपाधिः। यथा करका पृथिवी कठिनसंयोगवत्त्वादित्यादौ अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वं ॥ न चात्र स्वरूपसदुपाधिरेव दूषणमिति वाच्यं। सर्व्वत्रोपाधेर्दूषणान्तरसाङ्कर्य्यात्। अत्र च साध्यव्यापकपक्षाद्वृत्तिरुपाधिरिति वदन्ति। शब्दोपमानयोरिति ॥ १३९ ॥

वैशेषिकाणां मते प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च प्रमाणं शब्दोपमानयोरनुमानविधयैव प्रामाण्यं। तथा हि दण्डेन गामभ्याजेत्यादिपदानि वैदिकपदानि वा तात्पर्य्य-

भाषा॰ तन्न सम्यग्विना व्याप्तिबोधं शब्दादिबोधतः ॥ १४० ॥
द्वैविध्यन्तु भवेद् व्याप्तेरन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।

सिद्धा॰ विषयस्मारितपदार्थसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्व्वकानि आकाङ्क्षादिमत्पदकदम्बलाद् घटमानयेतिपदकदम्बवत् । यद्वा एते पदार्था मिथः संसर्गवन्तः योग्यतादिमत्पदोपस्थापितलात् तादृशपदार्थवत् । दृष्टान्तेऽपि दृष्टान्तान्तरेण साध्यसिद्धिरिति । एवं गवयव्यक्तिप्रत्यक्षानन्तरं गवयपदं गवयत्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकं* असति वृत्त्यन्तरे वृद्धैस्तत्र प्रयुज्यमानत्वात् । यथा गोपदं गोत्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकं । यद्वा गवयपदं सप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकं साधुपदत्वाद् इत्यनुमानेन पक्षधर्मताबलाद् गवयत्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकं भासते तन्मतं दूषयति । तन्न सम्यगिति॥ विना व्याप्तिज्ञानं शब्दादितो बोधस्यानुभविकत्वात् । न हि सर्व्वत्र शब्दश्रवणाद्यनन्तरं व्याप्तिज्ञाने मानमस्तीति । किञ्च सर्व्वत्र शब्दस्थले यदि व्याप्तिज्ञानं कल्प्यते तदा सर्व्वत्रानुमितिस्थले पदज्ञानं कल्पयित्वा शाब्दबोध एव किं न स्वीक्रियत इति ॥ १४० ॥

द्वैविध्यमिति । अनुमानं हि त्रिविधं केवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिभेदात् । तत्रासद्विपक्षः केवलान्वयी । यथा ज्ञेयं अभिधेयादित्यादौ । तत्र हि सर्व्वस्यैव ज्ञेयत्वाद् विपक्षासत्त्वं ॥ ननु सर्व्वेषां

* गवयत्वावच्छिन्ने शक्यमित्यर्थः ॥

भाषा० अन्वयव्याप्तिरुक्तैव व्यतिरेकादथोच्यते ॥ १४१ ॥
साध्याभावव्यापकत्वं हेत्वभावस्य यद्भवेत् ।

सिद्धा० धर्म्माणां व्यावृत्तत्वात् केवलान्वय्यसिद्धिरिति चेन्न । व्यावृत्तत्वस्य सर्व्वसाधारण्ये तस्यैव केवलान्वयित्वात् ॥ किञ्च वृत्तिमदत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वं । तच्च गगणाभावादौ प्रसिद्धं ॥ असत्सपक्षः केवलव्यतिरेकी । यथा पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वादित्यादौ । तत्र हि जलादित्रयोदशभेदस्य पूर्व्वमनिश्चिततया निश्चितसाध्यवतः सपक्षस्याभाव इति ॥ सत्सपक्षविपक्षोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकी । यथा वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ । तत्र सपक्षस्य महानसादेर्विपक्षस्य जलह्रदादेश्च सत्त्वादिति ॥ १४१ ॥

तत्र व्यतिरेकिणि व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानं कारणं तदर्थं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिं निर्व्वक्ति । साध्याभावव्यापकत्वं हेत्वभावस्य यद्भवेद् इति । साध्याभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वमित्यर्थः । अत्रेदं बोध्यं । येन सम्बन्धेन यत्र येन रूपेण व्यापकता गृह्यते तत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकतद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नाभाववत्ताज्ञानाद् यत्सम्बन्धेन यद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नस्य व्याप्यता गृह्यते तत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकतद्धर्म्मावच्छिन्नाभावस्य सिद्धिः । इत्यञ्च यत्र विशेषणतादिसम्बन्धेनेतरत्वव्याप-

भाषा० अर्थापत्तेस्तु नैवेह प्रमाणान्तरतेष्यते ॥ १४२ ॥

सिद्धा० कत्वं गन्धाभावे गृह्यते तत्र गन्धाभावाभावेनेतरत्वात्यन्ताभावः सिध्यति। यत्र तु तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेनेतरव्यापकता गृह्यते तत्र तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेनेतरस्याभावः सिध्यति। स एवान्योन्याभावः॥ एवं यत्र संयोगसम्बन्धेन धूमं प्रति संयोगसम्बन्धेन वह्नेर्व्यापकता गृह्यते तत्र संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकवह्न्यभावेन जलहृदे संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकधूमाभावः सिध्यति। अत्र च व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहे व्यतिरेकसहचारज्ञानं कारणं। केचित्तु व्यतिरेकसहचारेणान्वयव्याप्तिरेव गृह्यते न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानं कारणं। यत्र व्यतिरेकसहचाराद्व्याप्तिग्रहस्तत्र व्यतिरेकीत्युच्यते। साध्यप्रसिद्धिस्तु घटादावेव ज्ञायतां पश्चात् पृथिवीत्वावच्छेदेन साध्यत इति वदन्ति॥

अर्थापत्तेस्त्विति। अर्थापत्तिं प्रमाणान्तरं मन्यन्ते केचन। तथा हि यत्र देवदत्तस्य शतवर्षजीवित्वं ज्योतिःशास्त्रादवगतं जीविनो गृहासत्त्वञ्च प्रत्यक्षादवगतं तत्र शतवर्षजीवित्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या वहिःसत्त्वं कल्प्यते तदनुमानेन गतार्थत्वान्नेष्यते तथाहि जीवित्वस्य वहिःसत्त्वगृहसत्त्वान्यतरव्याप्यत्वं गृहीतं। तत्रान्यतरसिद्धौ जायमानायां गृहसत्त्वबाधा द्वहिःसत्त्वमनुमितौ भासते।

भाषा० व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिबुद्ध्या चरितार्था हि सा यतः ।
सुखन्तु जगतामेव काम्यं धर्म्मेण जन्यते ॥ १४३ ॥
अधर्म्मजन्यं दुःखं स्यात् प्रतिकूलं सचेतसां ।
निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते ॥ १४४ ॥

सिद्धा० एवं पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इत्यादौ पीनत्वस्य भोजनव्याप्यत्वावगमाद्भोजनं सिध्यति । दिवाभोजनवाधे रात्रिभोजनं सिध्यति । अभावप्रत्यक्षस्यानुभविकत्वादनुपलम्भोऽपि न प्रमाणान्तरं । किञ्चानुपलम्भस्याज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वे ज्ञानाकरणकत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वं । ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वे तु तत्राप्यनुपलम्भान्तरापेक्षेत्यनवस्था । चेष्टापि प्रमाणान्तरं न । तस्याः सङ्केतग्राहकशब्दस्मारकत्वेन लिप्यादिसमशीलत्वाच्छब्द एवान्तर्भावात् । यत्र तु व्याप्त्यादिग्रहस्तत्रानुमितिरेवेति ॥ १४२ ॥

सुखं निरूपयति । सुखन्तु जगतामेव काम्यं धर्म्मेण जन्यः इति । काम्यमभिलाषविषयः । धर्म्मेति धर्म्मत्वेन सुखत्वेन कार्य्यकारणभाव इत्यर्थः ॥ १४३ ॥

दुःखन्निरूपयति । अधर्म्मेति । अधर्म्मत्वेन दुःखत्वेन कार्य्यकारणभाव इत्यर्थः । प्रतिकूलमिति दुःखत्वज्ञानादेव सर्व्वेषां स्वाभाविकविषय इत्यर्थः ॥ इच्छां निरूपयति । निर्दुःखत्व इति ॥ १४४ ॥

भाषा॰ इच्छा तु तदुपाये स्यादिष्टोपायत्वधीर्यदि।
चिकीर्षा कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारेच्छा च या भवेत् ॥ १४५॥
तद्धेतुः कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमतिर्भवेत्।
बलवद्द्विष्टहेतुत्वमतिः स्यात् प्रतिबन्धिका ॥ १४६ ॥
तदहेतुत्वबुद्धेस्तु हेतुत्वं कस्यचिन्मते।

सिद्धा॰ इच्छा हि फलविषयिणी उपायविषयिणी च। फलन्तु सुखं दुःखाभावश्च। तत्र फलेच्छां प्रति फलज्ञानं कारणं। अत एव स्वतः पुरुषार्थः सम्भवति। यज्ज्ञानं सत् स्ववृत्तितयेष्यते स स्वतः पुरुषार्थ इति तल्लक्षणात्। इतरेच्छानधीनेच्छाविषयत्वं फलितोऽर्थः। उपायेच्छां प्रतीष्टसाधनताज्ञानं कारणं॥ चिकीर्षेति। कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारिका कृतिसाध्यक्रियाविषयिणीच्छा चिकीर्षा। पाकं कृत्या साधयामीति तदनुभवात् ॥ १४५ ॥

चिकीर्षां प्रति कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानमिष्टसाधनताज्ञानञ्च कारणं। अत एव वृष्ट्यां कृतिसाध्यताभावान्न चिकीर्षा॥ बलवदिति। बलवद्द्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानं तत्र प्रतिबन्धकं। अतो मधुविषसंपृक्तान्नभोजने न चिकीर्षा। बलवद्द्वेषः प्रतिबन्धक इत्यन्ये॥ १४६ ॥

कस्यचिन्मत इति। बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वज्ञानं कारणमित्यर्थः। कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानादिमता बलवदनिष्टसा-

भाषा० द्विष्टसाधनताबुद्धिर्भवेद् द्वेषस्य कारणं ॥ १४७ ॥
प्रवृत्तिश्च निवृत्तिश्च तथा जीवनकारणं ।
एवं प्रयत्नत्रैविध्यं तान्त्रिकैः परिदर्शितं ॥ १४८ ॥
चिकीर्षा कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमतिस्तथा ।

सिद्धा० धनताज्ञानशून्यस्य बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वज्ञानं विनापि चिकीर्षायां विलम्बाभावात् कस्यचिन्मत इत्यस्वरसो दर्शितः॥ द्वेषं निरूपयति। द्विष्टसाधनतेति। दुःखोपायविषयकं द्वेषं प्रति द्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानं कारणमित्यर्थः। बलवदिष्टसाधनताज्ञानञ्च प्रतिबन्धकं। तेन नान्तरीयकदुःखजनके पाकादौ न द्वेषः॥ १४७ ॥

यत्नं निरूपयति। प्रवृत्तिश्चेति। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिजीवनयोनियत्नभेदात् प्रयत्नस्त्रिविध इत्यर्थः ॥१४८॥

चिकीर्षेत्यादि। मधुविषसंपृक्तान्नभोजनादौ बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वेन चिकीर्षाभावान्न प्रवृत्तिरिति भावः। कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानादिव बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वज्ञानमपि स्वतन्त्रान्वयव्यतिरेकात् प्रवृत्तौ कारणमित्यपि वदन्ति॥ कार्य्यताज्ञानं प्रवर्त्तकमिति गुरवः। तथाहि ज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तौ जननीयायां चिकीर्षातिरिक्तं नापेक्षितमस्ति। सा च कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानसाध्या। इच्छायाः स्वप्रकारप्रकारकधीसाध्यत्वनियमात्। चिकीर्षा हि कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारिकेच्छा। तत्र कृतिसाध्यत्वं प्रकार-

सिद्धा० स्वप्रकारकज्ञानं चिकीर्षायां तद्द्वारा प्रवृत्तौ च हेतुः। न त्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानं तत्र हेतुः। कृत्यसाध्येऽपि प्रवृत्त्यापत्तेः। कृत्यसाध्यताज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकमिति चेन्न। तदभावापेक्षया कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य लघुत्वात्। न च द्वयोरपि हेतुत्वं गौरवात्॥ ननु तन्मतेऽपि मधुविषसंपृक्तान्नभोजने चैत्यवन्दने च प्रवृत्त्यापत्तिः कार्य्यताज्ञानसत्त्वादिति चेन्न। स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यकार्य्यताज्ञानस्य प्रवर्त्तकत्वात्। काम्ये हि यागपाकादौ कामना स्वविशेषणं। ततश्च बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धिकाम्यसाधनताज्ञानेन कार्य्यताज्ञानं। ततः प्रवृत्तिः। तृप्तश्च भोजने न प्रवर्त्तते। तदानीं कामनायाः पुरुषविशेषणत्वाभावात्। नित्ये च शौचादिकं पुरुषविशेषणं। तेन शौचादिज्ञानाधीनकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् तत्र प्रवृत्तेः॥ ननु तदपेक्षया लाघवेन बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनताविषयककार्य्यताज्ञानमेव हेतुरस्तु बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वञ्च दृष्टोत्पत्तिनान्तरीयकदुःखाधिकदुःखाजनकत्वं बलवद्विष्टविषयदुःखाजनकत्वं वेति चेन्न। इष्टसाधनत्वकृतिसाध्यत्वयोर्युगपज्ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्। साध्यत्वसाधनत्वयोर्विरोधाद् असिद्धस्य तु साध्यत्वं सिद्धस्य च साधनत्वं। न च एकमेकेनैकदा सिद्धमसिद्धञ्च ज्ञायते। तस्मात् कालभेदादुभयं ज्ञायते। मैवं। लाघवेन बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनत्वे सति कृतिसाध्यताज्ञा-

सिद्धा० नस्य हेतुत्वात्। न च साध्यत्वसाधनत्वयोर्विरोधः। यदा-कदाचित साध्यत्वसाधनत्वयोरविरोधात्। एकदासा-ध्यत्वसाधनत्वयोस्त्वाज्ञानात्॥ नवीनास्तु ममेदं कृतिसा-ध्यमिति ज्ञानं न प्रवर्त्तकमनागतेष्टस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्। किन्तु यादृशस्य पुंसः कृतिसाध्यं यदिष्टं तादृशत्वं स्वस्य प्रतिसन्धाय तत्र प्रवर्त्तते तेनौदनकामस्य तत्-साधनताज्ञानवतस्तदुपकरणवतः पाकः कृतिसाध्यस्ता-दृशश्चाहमिति प्रतिसन्धाय पाके प्रवर्त्तत इत्याहुस्तन्न। स्वकल्पितशिष्यादिप्रवृत्तौ यौवने कामोद्भेदादिना स-म्भोगादौ च तदभावात्। इदन्तु बोध्यं। तदानीमिष्ट-साधनत्वादिज्ञानं प्रवर्त्तकं। तेन भाविपौवराज्ये बालस्य न प्रवृत्तिः। तदानीं कृतिसाध्यत्वाज्ञानात्। एवं तृप्तो भोजने न प्रवर्त्तते। तदानीमिष्टसाधनत्वाज्ञानात्। प्रव-र्त्तते च रोगदूषितचित्तो विषादिभक्षणे। तदानीं बल-वदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वज्ञानात्॥ न चास्तिकस्यागम्यागम-नशत्रुवधादिप्रवृत्तौ कथं बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वबुद्धि-र्नरकसाधनत्वज्ञानादिति वाच्यं। उत्कटरागादिना नरकसाधनताधीनिरोधनात्। वृष्ट्यादौ तु कृतिसाध्य-ताज्ञानाभावान्न चिकीर्षाप्रवृत्ती। किन्त्विष्टसाधनता-ज्ञानादिच्छामात्रं। कृतिश्च प्रवृत्तिरूपा बोध्या। तेन जीवनयोनियत्नसाध्ये प्राणपञ्चकसञ्चारे न प्रवृत्तिः। इत्यञ्च प्रवर्त्तकत्वानुरोधाद्विधेरपि तावानर्थः। इत्यञ्च

सिद्धा० विश्वजिता यजेत इत्यादौ यत्र फलं न श्रूयते तत्रापि स्वर्गः फलं कल्प्यते । नन्वहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यादौ इष्टानुत्पत्तेः प्रवृत्तिः कथं ॥ न चार्थवादिकं ब्रह्मलोकादि प्रत्यवायाभावो वा फलमिति वाच्यं । तथा सति काम्यत्वे नित्यत्वहान्यापत्तेः। कामनाभावेऽकरणापत्तेश्च। इत्थञ्च फलश्रुतिस्त्वर्थवादमात्रमिति चेन्न । ग्रहणश्राद्धादौ नित्यत्वनैमित्तिकत्वयोरिव भरणीश्राद्धे काम्यत्वनैमित्तकत्वयोरिव नित्यत्वकाम्यत्वयोरप्यविरोधात् ॥ न च कामनाभावेऽकरणापत्तिः । त्रिकालस्तवपाठादाविव कामनासद्भावस्यैव कल्पनात् ॥ ननु वेदबोधितकार्य्यताज्ञानात् प्रवृत्तिः सम्भवतीति चेन्न। इष्टसाधनत्वमज्ञाय तादृशकार्य्यताज्ञानसहस्रेणापि प्रवृत्तेरसम्भवात् ॥ यदपि पण्डापूर्व्वफलमिति तदपि न । कामनाभावे करणापत्तेस्तौल्यात् । कामनाकल्पने त्वार्थवादिकफलमेव रात्रिसत्रन्यायात् कल्प्यतामन्यथा प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तेन ।

क्षयं केचिदुपात्तस्य दुरितस्य प्रचक्षते ।
अनुत्पत्तिं तथा चान्ये प्रत्यवायस्य मन्वते ॥

एवं ।

सन्ध्यामुपासते ये तु सततं शंसितव्रताः ।
विधूतपापास्ते यान्ति ब्रह्मलोकमनामयं ॥

एवं ।

सिद्धा० दद्यादहरहः श्राद्धं पितृभ्यः प्रीतिमावहन्।

इत्यादिकमेव फलमस्तु॥ न च पितृप्रीतिः कथं फलं व्यधिकरणत्वादिति वाच्यं। गयाश्राद्धादाविव उद्देश्यत्वसम्बन्धेनैव फलजनकत्वस्य क्वचित् कल्पनात्। अत एवोक्तं शास्त्रदर्शितफलमनुष्ठानतो रीत्युत्सर्ग इति। पितृणां मुक्तत्वे तु स्वस्य स्वर्गफलं यावन्नित्यनैमित्तिकानुष्ठानस्य सामान्यतः स्वर्गफलकल्पनात् षण्डापूर्व्वार्थप्रवृत्तिश्च न सम्भवति। न हि तत्सुखदुःखाभाववत् स्वतः पुरुषार्थः। न वा तत्साधनं। प्रत्यवायानुत्पत्तौ कथं प्रवृत्तिरिति चेत्। इत्थं। यथा हि नित्यकृते प्रत्यवायाभावस्तिष्ठति तदभावे तदभावः। एवं प्रत्यवायाभावस्य सत्त्वे दुःखप्रागभावसत्त्वं तदभावे तदभाव इति योगक्षेमसाधारणकारणताया दुःखप्रागभावं प्रत्यपि सुवचत्वात्। एवमेव प्रायश्चित्तस्यापि दुःखप्रागभावहेतुत्वमिति॥ ननु न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यत्र विध्यर्थे कथं नञर्थान्वयः। इष्टसाधनत्वाभावस्य कृतिसाध्यत्वाभावस्य च बोधयितुमशक्यत्वादिति चेन्न। तत्र बाधादिष्टसाधनत्वं कृतिसाध्यत्वञ्च न विध्यर्थः किन्तु बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वमात्रं तदभावश्च नञा बोध्यते। अथवा बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनत्वे सति कृतिसाध्यत्वं विध्यर्थः। तदभावश्च नञा बोध्यमानो विशिष्टाभावो विशेष्यवति विशेषणाभावे विश्राम्यति॥

सिद्धा॰ ननु श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेतेत्यत्र कथं बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वमर्थः। श्येनस्य मरणानुकूलव्यापारस्य हिंसात्वेन नरकसाधनत्वात्॥ न च वैधत्वान्निषेध इति वाच्यं। अभिचारे प्रायश्चित्तोपदेशात्॥ न च मरणानुकूलव्यापारमात्रं यदि हिंसा तदा खड्गकारस्य कूपकर्त्तुश्च हिंसकत्वापत्तिर्गललग्नान्नभक्षणजन्यमरणे स्वात्मवधित्वापत्तिश्चेति वाच्यं। मरणोद्देश्यकत्वस्यापि विशेषणत्वात्। अत एव सप्तमीतैलाभ्यङ्गस्य न हिंसात्वं। अन्योद्देश्यकक्षिप्तनाराचहतब्राह्मणस्य तु वाचनिकं प्रायश्चित्तमिति चेन्न। श्येनवारणायादृष्टाद्वारकत्वेन विशेषणात्। अत एव काशीमरणाद्यर्थकृतशिवपूजादेरपि न हिंसात्वं॥ न च साक्षान्मरणजनकस्यैव हिंसात्वं श्येनस्तु न तथा किन्तु तज्जन्यापूर्व्वमिति वाच्यं। खड्गाघातेन ब्राह्मणे व्रणपाकपरम्परया मृते हिंसात्वानापत्तेः। केचित्तु श्येनस्य हिंसाफलं न तु मरणं। श्येनजन्यखड्गघातादिरूपा हिंसा अभिचारपदार्थः। तस्य च पापजनकत्वं। अतः श्येनस्य वैधत्वात् पापाजनकत्वेऽपि अग्रिमपापं प्रतिसन्धाय सन्तो न प्रवर्त्तन्ते॥ आचार्य्यास्तु आप्ताभिप्रायो विध्यर्थः। पाकं कुर्य्याद् इत्यादौ आज्ञानिरूप्येच्छावाचित्वाल्लिङ्गात्रस्येच्छावाचित्वं लाघवात्। एवञ्च स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यादौ यागः स्वर्गकामकृतिसाध्यतयाऽभीष्ट इत्यर्थः। तत

भाषा० उपादानस्य चाध्यक्षं प्रवृत्तौ जनकं भवेत् ॥ १४९ ॥
निवृत्तिस्तु भवेद् द्वेषाद् द्विष्टसाधनताधियः ।

सिद्धा० आप्तेष्टत्वेनेष्टसाधनत्वादिकमनुमाय प्रवर्त्तते । कलञ्ज-भक्षणादौ तदभावान्न प्रवर्त्तते । यस्तु वेदे पौरुषेयत्वं नाभ्युपैति तं प्रति विधिरेव तावद्गर्भ इव श्रुतिः कुमार्य्याः पुंयोगे मानं ॥ न च कर्त्रस्मरणं वाधकं । कपिलकणादादिकमारभ्याद्यपर्य्यन्तं कर्तृस्मरणस्यैव प्रतीयमानत्वात् । अन्यथा स्मृतीनामप्यकर्तृकत्वापत्तेः । तत्रैव कर्तृस्मरणमस्तीति चेद्वेदेऽपि छन्दांसि जज्ञिरे तस्मादित्यादिकर्त्तृस्मरणमस्त्येव । एवं प्रति मन्वन्तरं चैषा श्रुतिरन्या विधीयत इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यं ॥

स्वयम्भुरेष भगवान् वेदो गीतस्त्वया पुरा ।
शिवाद्या ऋषिपर्य्यन्ताः स्मर्त्तारोऽस्य न कारकाः ॥

इति वेदस्य स्तुतिमात्रं ॥ न च पौरुषेयत्वभ्रमादिसम्भवादप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति वाच्यं । नित्यसर्व्वज्ञत्वेन निर्दोषत्वात् । अत एव पुरुषान्तरभ्रमादिसम्भवान्न कपिलादेः कर्त्तृत्वं वेदस्य । किञ्च वर्णानामेवानित्यत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् सुतरां तत्सन्दर्भस्य वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति ॥ उपादानस्येति । उपादानस्य समवायिकारणस्याध्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षं प्रवृत्तौ कारणमिति ॥ १४९ ॥

द्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य दुःखसाधनविषयकनिवृत्तिं

भाषा० यत्नो जीवनयोनिस्तु सर्व्वदाऽतीन्द्रियो भवेत् ॥ १५० ॥
शरीरे प्राणसञ्चारकारणं परिकीर्त्तितं *।
अतीन्द्रियं गुरुत्वं स्यात् पृथिव्यादिद्वये तु तत् ॥ १५१ ॥
अनित्ये तदनित्यं स्यान्नित्ये नित्यमुदाहृतं ।
तदेवासमवायि स्यात् पतनाख्ये तु कर्म्मणि ॥ १५२ ॥
सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वं स्यान्नैमित्तिकमथापरं ।

सिद्धा० प्रति जनकत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकादवधारितमिति भावः ॥ यत्न इति । जीवनयोनियत्नो यावज्जीवनमनुवर्त्तते । स चातीन्द्रियः ॥ १५० ॥

तत्र प्रमाणमाह । शरीरे प्राणसञ्चारकारणं परिकीर्त्तितमिति। प्राणसञ्चारो हि अधिकः श्वासादिः प्रयत्नसाध्यः। इत्थञ्च प्राणसञ्चारस्य यत्नसाध्यत्वानुमानात् प्रत्यक्षयत्नस्य वाधाच्चातीन्द्रिययत्नसिद्धिः । स एव जीवनयोनिप्रयत्नः ॥ गुरुत्वं निरूपयति । अतीन्द्रियमिति ॥ १५१ ॥

अनित्ये द्व्यणुकादौ तद्गुरुत्वमनित्यं । नित्ये परमाणौ नित्यं। गुरुत्वमित्यनुवर्त्तते। तद्गुरुत्वं असमवायि असमवायिकारणं। पतने आद्यपतने इत्यर्थः॥ १५२ ॥

द्रवत्वन्निरूपयति। सांसिद्धिकमिति। द्रवत्वं द्विविधं

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* तत् प्रकीर्त्तितमिति पाठान्तरः ।

भाषा॰ सांसिद्धिकन्तु सलिले द्वितीयं क्षितितेजसोः ॥ १५३ ॥
परमाणौ जले नित्यमन्यत्रानित्यमुच्यते ।
नैमित्तिकं वह्नियोगात्तपनीयघृतादिषु ॥ १५४ ॥
द्रवत्वं स्यन्दने हेतुर्निमित्तं सङ्ग्रहेतु तत् ।
स्नेहो जले स नित्योऽणावनित्योऽवयविन्यसौ॥ १५५ ॥
तैलान्तरे तत्प्रकर्षाद् दहनस्यानुकूलता ।

सिद्धा॰ सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकञ्चेति। द्वितीयं नैमित्तिकं परमाणाविति ॥ १५३ ॥

जलपरमाणौ द्रवत्वं नित्यं । अन्यत्र पृथिवीपरमाण्वादौ जलद्व्यणुकादौ च द्रवत्वमनित्यं । कुत्रचित्तेजसि कुत्रचित् पृथिव्याञ्च नैमित्तिकं द्रवत्वं । तत्र को वा नैमित्तिकार्थस्तद्दर्शयति ॥ नैमित्तिकमिति। वह्नीति पदन्तेजोऽर्थकं। तथा च तेजःसंयोगाग्निसंयोगजन्यं नैमित्तिकं द्रवत्वं। तच्च सुवर्णादिरूपे तेजसि घृतजतुप्रभृतिपृथिव्यां वर्त्तत इत्यर्थः ॥ १५४ ॥

द्रवत्वं स्यन्दने हेतुर्निमित्तं सङ्ग्रहे तु तदिति । हेतुरिति असमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः। सङ्ग्रहे सक्तुकादिसंयोगविशेषे तद्द्रवत्वं स्नेहसहितमिति बोद्धव्यं। तेन द्रुतसुवर्णादीनां न सङ्ग्रहः ॥ स्नेहं निरूपयति। जले इति । जल एवेत्यर्थः । असौ स्नेहः ॥ १५५ ॥

ननु पृथिव्यामपि तैलस्नेह उपलभ्यते । न चासौ

भाषा० संस्कारभेदो वेगोऽथ स्थितिस्थापकभावने ॥ १५६ ॥
मूर्त्तमात्रे तु वेगः स्यात् कर्म्मजो वेगजः क्वचित् ।
स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कारः क्षितौ केचिच्चतुर्ष्वपि ॥ १५७ ॥
अतीन्द्रियोऽसौ विज्ञेयः क्वचित् स्पन्देऽपि कारणं ।

सिद्धा० जलीयः ॥ तथा सति दहनप्रातिकूल्यं स्यादत आह। तैलान्तरे तत्प्रकर्षाद्दहनस्यानुकूलतेति । तत्प्रकर्षात् स्नेहप्रकर्षात्। तैल उपलभ्यमानस्नेहोऽपि जलीय एव। तस्य प्रकृष्टत्वादग्नेरानुकूल्यं। अपकृष्टस्नेहं हि जलं वह्निं नाशयतीति भावः ॥ संस्कारन्निरूपयति। संस्कारेति। वेगस्थितिस्थापकभावनाभेदात् संस्कारस्त्रिविध इत्यर्थः ॥ १५६ ॥

मूर्त्तमात्रे तु वेगः स्यात् कर्म्मजो वेगजः क्वचिदिति। कर्म्मजवेगजभेदाद्वेगो द्विविध इत्यर्थः। शरादौ हि नोदनजनितेन कर्म्मणा वेगो जन्यते। तेन च पूर्व्वकर्म्मनाशादुत्तरं कर्म्म । एवमग्रेऽपि। विना च वेगं कर्म्मणः कर्म्मप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् पूर्व्वकर्म्मनाश उत्तरकर्म्मोत्पत्तिश्च न स्यात् । यत्र वेगवता कपालेन जनिते घटे वेगो जन्यते स वेगजो वेगः ॥ स्थितिस्थापक इति। आकृष्टशाखादीनां कपित्यागे *पुनर्गमनस्य स्थितिस्थापकसाध्यत्वात्। केचिदिति। चतुर्षु क्षित्यादिषु स्थितिस्थापकं केचिन्मन्यन्ते तदप्रमाणमिति भावः ॥ १५७ ॥

* परित्यागे इति साधु ॥

भाषा० भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कारो जीववृत्तिरतीन्द्रियः ॥ १५८ ॥
उपेक्षानात्मकस्तस्य निश्चयः कारणं भवेत् ।
स्मरणे प्रत्यभिज्ञायामप्यसौ हेतुरुच्यते ॥ १५९ ॥

सिद्धा० असौ स्थितिस्थापकः । क्वचित् आकृष्टशाखादौ ॥ भावनाख्य इति ॥ १५८ ॥

तस्य संस्कारस्य । उपेक्षात्मकज्ञानात् संस्कारानुत्पत्तेरुपेक्षानात्मक इत्युक्तं । तत्संशयात् संस्कारानुत्पत्तेर्निश्चय इत्युक्तं । तेनोपेक्षान्यनिश्चयत्वेन संस्कारं प्रति हेतुतेति भावः ॥ ननु स्मरणं प्रत्युपेक्षान्यनिश्चयत्वेन हेतुत्वं तेनोपेक्षादिस्थले न स्मरणं इत्यञ्च संस्कारं प्रति ज्ञानत्वेनैव हेतुतास्त्विति चेन्न । विनिगमनाविरहेणापि संस्कारं प्रति उपेक्षान्यनिश्चयत्वेन हेतुतायाः सिद्धत्वात् । किञ्च उपेक्षास्थले संस्कारकल्पनाया गुरुत्वात् संस्कारं प्रति चोपेक्षान्यत्वेन हेतुतायाः सिद्धत्वात् ॥ तत्र प्रमाणं दर्शयति । स्मरणे प्रत्यभिज्ञायामप्यसौ हेतुरुच्यते इति । असौ संस्कारः स्मरणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानञ्च जनयति । अतः संस्कारः कल्प्यते । विना व्यापारं पूर्वानुभवस्य स्मरणादिजननासामर्थ्यात् । स्वस्वव्यापारान्यतराभावे कारणत्वासम्भवात् ॥ न च प्रत्यभिज्ञां प्रति तत्तासंस्कारस्य हेतुत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः संस्कारजन्यत्वेन स्मृतित्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यं ।

भाषा॰ धर्म्माधर्म्मावदृष्टं स्याद् धर्म्मः स्वर्गादिसाधन।
गङ्गास्नानादि यागादि व्यापारः परिकीर्त्तितः॥१६०॥

सिद्धा॰ अप्रयोजकत्वात्। परे तु अनुद्बुद्धसंस्कारात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानुदयादुद्बुद्धसंस्कारस्य हेतुत्वापेक्षया तत्तत्स्मरणस्यैव प्रत्यभिज्ञां प्रति हेतुत्वं कल्प्यत इत्याहुः॥ १५९॥

अदृष्टं निरूपयति। धर्म्माधर्म्माविति। स्वर्गादिसकलसुखानां स्वर्गसाधनीभूतशरीरादीनाञ्च साधनं धर्म्म इत्यर्थः॥ तत्र प्रमाणं दर्शयितुमाह। यागादीति। यागादिव्यापारतया हि धर्म्मः कल्प्यते। अन्यथा यागादीनां चिरं विनष्टतया निर्व्यापारतया च कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गजनकत्वं न स्यात् तदुक्तमाचार्य्यैः।

चिरध्वस्तं फलायालं न कर्म्मातिशयं विना इति॥

ननु यागध्वंस एव व्यापारः स्यान् न प्रतियोगितद्ध्वंसयोरेकत्राजनकत्वं। सर्व्वत्र तथात्वे मानाभावात्॥ न च लभ्यते फलानन्त्यं मन्मते चरमफलस्यापूर्व्वनाशकत्वान्न तथात्वमिति वाच्यं। कालविशेषस्य सहकारित्वाद् इत्यत आह। गङ्गास्नानेति। गङ्गास्नानस्य हि स्वर्गजनकत्वेऽनन्तानां जलसंयोगध्वंसानां व्यापारत्वमपेक्ष्यैकमपूर्व्वं कल्प्यते लाघवादिति भावः॥ १६०॥

भाषा० कर्म्मनाशाजलस्पर्शादिना नाश्यस्त्वसा मतः ।
अधर्म्मो नरकादीनां हेतुर्निन्दितकर्म्मजः ॥ १६१ ॥
प्रायश्चित्तादिनाश्योऽसौ जीववृत्ती त्विमौ गुणौ ।

सिद्धा० ननु ध्वंसोऽपि न व्यापारोऽस्तु ॥ न च निर्व्यापारस्य चिरध्वस्तस्य कथं कारणत्वमिति वाच्यं । अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात् । अव्यवहितपूर्व्ववर्त्तित्वं हि चक्षुःसंयोगादेः कारणत्वं न तु सर्व्वत्र कार्य्यकालवृत्तित्वमिव समवायिकारणस्य कारणत्वमित्यत आह । कर्म्मनाशाजलस्पर्शादिना नाश्यस्त्वसौ मत इति । यदि हि अपूर्व्वं न स्यात् तदा कर्म्मनाशाजलस्पर्शादिना नाश्यत्वं धर्म्मस्य न स्यात् । न हि तेन यागादिनाशः प्रतिबन्धो वा कर्त्तुं शक्यते । तस्य पूर्व्वमेव वृत्तत्वादिति ॥ एतेन देवताप्रीतिरेव फलमित्यपास्तं । गङ्गास्नानादौ सर्व्वत्र देवताप्रीतेरसम्भवात् । देवातायाश्चेतनत्वेऽपि तत्प्रीतेरनुद्देश्यत्वात् । प्रीतेः सुखस्वरूपत्वेन विष्णुप्रीत्यादौ तदसम्भवात् । जन्यसुखादेस्तत्राभावात् । तेन विष्णुप्रीतिजन्यत्वेन पराभिमतस्वर्गादिरेव विष्णुप्रीतिशब्देन लच्यते ॥ अधर्म्मो नरकादीनां हेतुर्निन्दितकर्म्मज इति । नरकदुःखादिसकलदुःखानां नारकिशरीरादीनाञ्च साधनमधर्म्म इत्यर्थः ॥ १६१ ॥

प्रमाणमाह । प्रायश्चित्तादिनाश्योऽसौ । जीववृत्ती

भाषा० इमौ तु वासनाजन्यौ ज्ञानादपि विनश्यतः ॥ १६२ ॥

सिद्धा० त्विमौ गुणाविति । यदि ह्यधर्म्मौ न स्यात् तदा प्रायश्चित्तादिनाप्यलं न स्यात् । न हि तेन ब्रह्महननादीनां नाशः प्रतिबन्धो वा विधातुं शक्यते । तस्य पूर्व्वविनष्टत्वादिति भावः । जीवेति । ईश्वरस्य धर्म्माधर्म्माभावादिति भावः ॥ इमौ तु वासनाजन्यौ ज्ञानादपि विनश्यत इति । इमौ धर्म्माधर्म्मौ । वासनेति । अतो ज्ञानिना कृते सुकृतदुष्कृतकर्म्मणी न फलायालमिति भावः । ज्ञानादपीत्यपिना भोगपरिग्रहः ॥ ननु तत्त्वज्ञानस्य कथं धर्म्माधर्म्मनाशकत्वं । नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपीति वचनविरोधात् । इत्थञ्च तत्त्वज्ञानिना झटिति कायव्यूहेन सकलकर्म्मणां भोगेन क्षय इति चेन्न । तत्र भोगस्य वेदबोधितनाशकोपलक्षितत्वात् । कथमन्यथा प्रायश्चित्तादिना कर्म्मणां नाशः । तदुक्तं । ज्ञानाग्निः सर्व्वकर्म्माणीत्यादिना । श्रूयते च । क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्म्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे इति ॥ ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिनस्तर्हि शरीरावस्थानं सुखदुःखादि च न स्यात् ज्ञानेन च सर्व्वेषां कर्म्मणां नाशादिति चेन्न । प्रारब्धेतरकर्म्मणामेव नाशात् । तत्तच्छरीरभोगजनकं हि यत्कर्म्म तत् प्रारब्धं तदभिप्रायमेव नाभुक्तमिति वचनमिति ॥ १६२ ॥

भाषा० शब्दो ध्वनिश्च वर्णश्च मृदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः।
कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्या वर्णास्ते कादयो मताः ॥१६३॥
सर्व्वः शब्दो नभोवृत्तिः श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते।
वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्त्तिता ॥ १६४ ॥
कदम्बकोरक*न्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते।
उत्पन्नः को विनष्टः क इति बुद्धेरनित्यता ॥ १६५ ॥

सिद्धा० शब्दं निरूपयति। शब्दो ध्वनिश्च वर्णश्च मृदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः। कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्या वर्णास्ते कादयो मताः ॥ सर्व्वः शब्दो नभोवृत्तिः श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते इति ॥ नभोवृत्तिराकाशसमवेतः ॥ दूरस्थशब्दस्याग्रहणादाह। श्रोत्रेति ॥ ननु मृदङ्गाद्यवच्छेदेनोत्पन्ने शब्दे श्रोत्रे कथमुत्पत्तिरत आह। वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्त्तितेति। आद्यशब्दस्य वहिर्देशदिगवच्छिन्नोऽन्यः शब्दस्तेनैव शब्देन जन्यते। तेन चापरस्तद्व्यापकः। एवं क्रमेण श्रोत्रोत्पन्नो गृह्यत इति ॥१६३॥ १६४ ॥

कदम्बकोरकन्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते इति। आद्यशब्दाद् दशदिक्षु दशशब्दा उत्पद्यन्ते। ततश्चान्ये दशशब्दा उत्पद्यन्त इति भावः। अस्मिन् कल्पे गौरवादुक्तं कस्यचिन्मते इति ॥ ननु शब्दस्य नित्यत्वादुत्पत्तिः कथ-

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* कदम्बगोलकेति पाठान्तरः ॥

भाषा० सोऽयं क इति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्यमवलम्बते ।
तदेवौषधमित्यादौ सजातीयेऽपि दर्शनात् ॥ १६६ ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायविद्यानिवासभट्टाचार्य्यसुतश्रीयुतविश्वनाथपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्य्यविरचितो भाषापरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ॥ * ॥

सिद्धा० मत आह । उत्पन्नः को विनष्टः क इति बुद्धेरनित्यतेति । शब्दानामुत्पादविनाशप्रत्ययशालित्वादनित्यत्वमित्यर्थः ॥ १६५ ॥

ननु स एवायं ककार इत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्छब्दानां नित्यत्वं । इत्थं चोत्पादविनाशबुद्धिभ्रमरूपा चेत्यत आह । सोऽयं क इति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्यमवलम्बते । तदेवौषधमित्यादौ सजातीयेऽपि दर्शनादिति । तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य तत्सजातीयत्वं विषयो न तु तद्व्यक्त्यभेदो विषयः । उक्तप्रतीतिविरोधात् । इत्थञ्च द्वयोरपि बुद्ध्योर्न भ्रमत्वमिति ॥ ननु सजातीयत्वं सोऽयमितिप्रत्यभिज्ञायां भासते इति कुत्र दृष्टमित्यत आह । तदेवेति । यदौषधं मया कृतं तदेवान्येनापि कृतमित्यादिदर्शनादिति भावः ॥ १६६ ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायविद्यानिवासभट्टाचार्य्यपुत्रश्रीयुतविश्वनाथपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्य्यविरचिता सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली संपूर्णा ॥ * ॥

भाषापरिच्छेदस्य शुद्धिपत्रं।

पृष्ठाङ्क	पङ्क्त्यङ्क	अशुद्ध	शुद्ध
१	२०	यविघ्नध्वस	विघ्नध्वंस
१२	४	समवायिकारणत्व	समवायिकारणत्वं
१३	१	जनक	जनकं
१६	३	गुणकर्म्ममात्त	गुणकर्म्ममात्र
४०	१२।१३	ब्रह्मेत्याअदि	ब्रह्मेत्यादि
४६	१	गाचरो	गोचरो
४६	४	द्रव्यत्व	द्रवत्वं
४९	२०	वैशिष्ठ्य	वैशिष्ट्य
५९	८	प्रत्नक्षं	प्रत्यक्षं
६५	१	वाध्यं	बोध्यं
७८	२१	पदतन्या	पदजन्य
८८	१२	दण्डत्योः	दम्पत्योः
८९	१८	नैवोपत्तेः	नैवोपपत्तेः
९६	१२	द्रव्यत्व	द्रवत्वं
९८	२१	द्वित्वदि	द्वित्वादि
११०	१	पृथक्त्व	पृथक्त्वं
११३	२१	पाटलीपुत्रात	पाटलीपुत्रात्
१२०	३४	क्वाचित्	क्वचित्
१२८	७	वह्न्यभावेन	वह्न्यभावेन
१३३	२	कदाचित	कदाचित्
१४२	१	साधन	साधनं
१४३	१	नाभ्यस्वसा	नाभ्यस्वसौ

TRANSLATION.

INTRODUCTION.

In the following introduction to a translation of the Bhásha Paricchéda,* one of the most celebrated works of the Nyáya philosophy, it has been my endeavour to subject the logic of the Nyáya, as well as the leading ideas of this and the Vaiséshika systems, to a critical review, in order to bring the discussion about the merits of the philosophical researches of the Hindus more to a point. Colebrooke's exposition of those systems, though founded on the ablest and most exact researches, as well in a philosophical as in a critical point of view, does not suffice for this purpose, as it is a mere abstract from the works of those schools, and does not enter upon the discussion of the position they are to hold as systems of philosophy.

It is well known, how difficult it is to write a history of ancient India, only a few strictly historical records having been left to us by the Hindus themselves. The same difficulty obtains with regard to the history of their philosophy, as in the mind of the Hindus philosophy was associated with the idea of being raised above change, and no regard therefore paid to the social and intellectual condition of the time, in which lived the founder of a system or his successors who more

* I have translated Bhásha, in deviation from its ordinary sense "speech," by "categories of the Nyáya philosophy;" for Bhásha means here evidently not "speech" in general, which would give no sense whatever, but "Nyáya Bhásha," speech in the Nyáya, that is to say the philosophical language or terms of the Nyáya. In the Sabda Kalpa Druma, "Bhásha" (under the head of Bhásha Paricchéda) has the meaning of Paribhásha, which is explained by the authoritative language of the teachers which considers the meanings of the words (Padártha). This sense agrees essentially with the rendering which I have given.

developed it. Still it is not impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy, if it be limited to the task of tracing the gradual development of philosophical principles and modes of thinking, without reference to a strict chronological order; for the internal nature of a doctrine will point out its more ancient or modern date. At the same time we must admit, that even in this attempt, we can only partially succeed. The doctrines even of those who are considered as the founders of the different schools, bear the marks of a far advanced progress in systematical arrangement, and must therefore have been the result of a long series of preceding philosophical enquiries.* Hence it would be preposterous to expect, that we should be able to discover the first steps of their researches. We, however, decline here embarking upon a historical research of such a kind, believing, that under the present circumstances, when only so few of their philosophical works have

* Lassen's Indische Alterthumskunde, vol. ii. p. 477. His (Páṇini's) text-book continued to be the norm of the whole following time, and the labours of his successors were limited to the task to narrow or amplify his rules or more lucidly to arrange them. From his work the same effect results, as from other pursuits of the Hindus on the field of science. By a person of superior talent the labours of his predecessors were rendered more perfect and brought to a close; he united them in a system of rules, or Sútras, which he condensed as much as possible. This exposition remained the standard of all later times, and formed the foundation for the succeeding teachers of the same science, whose efforts were in general directed to the correct explanation and elucidation as well as to the emendation and perfection of the fundamental work, and by whom the science was carried to a higher degree only as to its extent, but not as to its contents. We may discover a double motive, from which this manner of exposition took its rise. First, the sum total of the results which had been gained, should be condensed in the shortest form and hence the learning by rote facilitated..... Secondly, this mode of exposition rendered the understanding of the text difficult and often impossible, unless it was accompanied by an explanation. Such an explanation was at the disposal of the teachers, and by their guidance alone the pupils were able to comprehend the obscure sense of the text-books. The Bráhmans, the only possessors of the sciences, thus secured for themselves the privilege of communicating them only to those whom they thought worthy of this information, and of preventing the other castes from an initiation with them. It is only in this sense that a secret doctrine of the Bráhmans can be admitted. From the circumstance, that for each single science text-books of this kind were generally acknowledged as standards, it was a consequence, that the works of the first founders and of the predecessors of the person who brought a science to perfection, were forgotten and frequently lost.

been published, and in general so many more materials are required for the task than we can boast to possess, it is more important to place an original work of Hindu philosophy before the public, and to examine the principles under which it has been constructed. For this end we consider the Nyáya in that shape, which it has acquired by its amalgamation with the doctrines of the Vais*é*shika, since we are of Colebrooke's opinion, that both sprang from the same root, and are but branches of the same school; the one being directed more to the explanation of material, the other of logical forms.* Or to state it more exactly,—to the Nyáya belong the logical doctrines of the forms of syllogisms, terms and propositions; to the Vais*é*shika the systematical explanation of the categories (the simplest metaphysical ideas) of the metaphysical, physical, and psychical notions, which notions are hardly touched upon in Goutama's (the supposed founder of the Nyáya) Sútras. They differ in their statement of the several modes of proof; the Nyáya asserting four modes of proof—from perception, inference, analogy, and verbal communication; the Vais*é*shika admitting only the two first ones.†

The name of logic, usually applied to the Nyáya, does not correctly define it. It does not treat of the theory of syllogisms and the notions connected with them, as its direct object, but only as a component part of its investigation. It rather aspires to the distinction of giving a complete system of philosophy, based upon the most elementary metaphysical notions, and the division dedicated to the explanation of syllogistical forms, is not even more explicitly treated than other parts of the system. To call the Nyáya logic, would be the same as to assign this name to the philosophy of Aristotle. There is no doubt, however, that the Nyáya has first among the philosophical systems of the Hindus thoroughly examined the art of reasoning, and shaped it into its present form. Hence it gained such ascendancy among the learned Hindus, that all of them, however they may deviate from other doctrines of the Nyáya, refer to it as to their standard in logic, and deem its study necessary for the purpose of giving a firm basis to their reasoning.

* Vid. Colebrooke's Miscell. Essays, Vol. i. p. 261.

† The view above given, was based upon the Sútras of Gautama, without a reference to a work of the Vais*é*shika school. I have since compared the Sútras of Kaṇáda and found my view completely confirmed.

It is indeed one of the principal merits of the Nyáya, that its progress is marked by an admirably exact division of the topics, treated in it, and in this respect it is not only superior to all other systems of the Hindus, but even modern philosophy might, with advantage, study it on account of its clearness and exactness. Though none of its investigations has been carried on to a satisfactory end, the Nyáya has, with the means at its command, fully described the circle within which it moved. We must at the same time admit, that notwithstanding its exactness, there is one inherent fault in its exposition, viz. the neglect of all analytical method, a fault of all systems of the Hindus, which has, perhaps, more than any thing else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon. This fault, which, however, it shares with many other expositions of philosophy, for instance, to mention a celebrated name, with Spinoza's system, is rather a fault of exposition than of the system itself; for no synthesis (in science) is possible without analysis, and having well understood the leading notions of a system, we can easily trace the analytical way by which they were obtained. This apparent absence of analysis in the construction of the philosophical systems of the Hindus is the reason why so many enquirers have done injustice to their philosophical talent. For want of a clear analysis, unable to understand the aphorisms of the Hindu schools, composed in a language in form as well as in thought, foreign to them, they thought the philosophical productions of many centuries and of an ingenious people, a web of either abstruse or puerile notions. On a closer examination we shall come to a juster opinion of them, and although we find a limit as well in the range as the depth of their enquiries, we shall come to place them among the nations which advanced the intellectual progress of mankind.

That Hindu philosophy will, however, have any great influence upon the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization, must be denied. Why should this be the case? Although we must admit, that the philosophical researches of the Hindus are as worthy of attention as those of the Greeks, still it is at the first glance evident, that the philosophical works of the former are unfit to be transferred to another soil, while those of the latter will have always the same influence upon every rising generation in every clime and age. This difference lies not so much in the development of the system

as in the form. You are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems, from which point it is easy either to look back upon the way you have made or to advance further. The Hindus, on the other hand, are dogmatical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led to them. Hence it is impossible for any one to understand their writings who has not previously, to a considerable degree, been practised in philosophical enquiries. The punishment however of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest, felt in the study of their writings. The same doctrines which might have been instrumental in enlightening thousands, are now forgotten, or in the possession of a few who are hardly able to comprehend them.

Among the general metaphysical notions, the notion of substance is the most important one, as upon it all other notions are either founded or are closely connected with it, and whatever may be the solution of all other metaphysical problems, it must be influenced by the notion of substance.

Substances are, according to the Nyáya, the substrata of qualities and actions,* a definition, which is the right one, as *the basis of further investigation*—it is the right one, because founded on experience. Substance, we add, is in so far the substratum of qualities and actions, as the existence of qualities and actions depends upon the existence of substance; if quality were independent of another, it could not represent another, whose quality it is. The existence of substance must therefore be absolute, that is to say, not dependent upon the existence of another; for in this case, it would be comprehended, not by the notion of substance, but by that of quality. And consequently, to think the idea of substance by any notions including dependance, is a contradiction. This contradiction (of comprehending substance under the notion of quality, and therefore of dependance) was committed by the Nyáya by the distinction between eternal and non-eternal substances, because the

* Or rather of qualities alone according to the mod ern school of the Nyáya. The definition, that substances are the substrata of qualities and actions, belongs to Kaṇáda.

existence of the latter is not independent. In the notion of eternal substance, however, the true notion of substance is included, which is to be independent of time and cause.

Another question is, how a substance is united with its qualities? That a substance should have qualities, appears a matter of course, and to question it, shows a vast progress in metaphysical thinking. Although the Nyáya entered not expressly into the discussion of this subject, it must have felt its weight, as they found it necessary to invent a contrivance for such a connexion. A substance is, according to them, united with its qualities by a relation, called intimate relation, which is something real, and is neither in substances, nor qualities, nor actions. We do not intend here to analyze this notion any further (stating, however, that the difficulty is not really removed by it,*) but we turn to a third point in the notion of substance. Substance, according to the Nyáya, is not only united with its qualities by the relation, just mentioned, but all substances are united with the general notion of substance, and single substances in the same way with the notion of their own class. This general notion is rather a common property; for it does exist, independent of the mind which may conceive it, in the substances (also in qualities and actions) themselves, and is even eternal in eternal substances, not eternal in transient substances. This notion exactly corresponds with that of the so-called realists among the scholastic philosophers, who maintained the reality of general notions. Duns Scotus, for instance, asserted, that general properties (notions) were not only in objects *potentiá*, but *actû*, and that generality was not only formed by the understanding, but that it existed previously to the mental conception *per se* as a reality, viz., the quiddity itself, which was

* For if it is necessary, that qualities require some link to unite them with substances, it is also necessary, that this link should be united with them by a similar link, and so on. The difficulty, as regards the connection of qualities, is briefly stated, thus. The existence of qualities is dependent upon the existence of the substance, whose qualities they are, but not vice versâ. Substance in accordance to its notion, is independent of qualities. Substance therefore is something of itself, and also something on which qualities are dependent, and in this latter respect it is not substance, which is to be independent of qualities. That is to say, the notion of substance in this form is contradictory, and should be abandoned for a notion which is consistent.

indifferent to general or individual existence. A cause, however, was required to remove this indifference, viz. another more extensive quiddity, closely united with the first, and with the principle of individuity. (afterwards called haecceity.)*

In one point the Nyáya went a step in advance of most of the ancient systems of philosophy, viz., in its assumption, that the special qualities of substances are effects; for instance earth is the intimate (or material) cause of smell, the soul of knowledge, &c. They were no doubt urged to this assumption by the contradiction, which arises, if beside substance, a quality which is necessary and therefore belongs to the quale of the substance, is admitted. If quality is an effect of substance, its existence is evidently derived, and the contradiction removed. Although, however, this hypothesis is a step in advance, it is not the complete solution of the difficulty; for here again the question will arise, how it is possible, that a substance can become a cause, that is, produce something, which is foreign to itself.

Substances, as before said, according to the Nyáya, are either eternal or non-eternal. Eternal are space, time, ether, soul, and the atoms of mind, earth, water, fire, and air. Non-eternal are all compounds, or the things which we actually perceive, and which must have a cause of their existence. Thus substances are divided into those which are without cause, and those which have a cause.

There are three causes;—1. The cause of intimate relation, or material cause, as yarn is the material cause of cloth;—2. The proximate cause, or the actual union of the parts which are to form a compound; —and 3. The instrumental cause, viz. the cause by which this union is effected.

This is similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, who admitted four causes; a material cause, a moving cause, a formal cause, and an end cause. The instrumental cause includes Arisotle's formal, moving, and end causes.

The notion of causality is certainly well considered, and infinitely superior to the notions which other Indian systems formed of it; for there are already made some steps in advance towards the proper discussion of this notion, if a difference in causes is acknowledged. In the enumeration of causes—the cause of motion appears to have been omitted; it is,

* Vid. Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie, Vierte Aufl. p. 256.

however, contained in the notion of instrumental causality. All activity according to the Nyáya is limited to motion, acts of the mind being considered by them as qualities, and as all actions abide in substances, we must think every substance as a cause of motion (viz. the last cause). They did not, however, discuss, whether motion was necessary to all substances, or only to some or to one, that is to say, whether there is a *primum mobile* or not; they did not discuss the question, whether or not different motions require different causes; nor did they lastly enter into an explanation of the notion itself.* They appear in fact not to have been aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the idea of causality, which undoubtedly is one of the most difficult metaphysical notions.† The contradictions in the notion of cause and effect appear with special force to apply to such causes, by which a change in the qualities of a substance is effected, as chemical, animal, and psychical effects. Such effects are, however, denied by the Nyáya. Material causes must be understood as only the substrata, or the materials for a new union, as for instance, the two halves from which a pot is produced, are the material cause of the pot. There are therefore no real changes, but only changes of the accidental form, which substances may assume in their connexion with others; and there should not be changes at all we add. Every compound substance, according to the Nyáya, is ultimately produced from simple substances. Simple substances, however, are eternal, and all their qualities are also eternal. If this is the case, there is also

* The contradictions which Zeno found in the idea of motion, are well known, and without fully acknowledging their weight, it is impossible to obtain a correct notion of it. Aristotle was well aware of this, and endeavoured to remove Zeno's objections to this notion. How important it is, correctly to define this notion, is evident even from the influence, which it exercised on the Nyáya, where motion is considered as an *act*, and even as the only act.

† Vide Sext. Emp. Adv. mathem. in Ritter's History of Philos. Vol. iv. p. 339. That cause could not be later than effect, is evident; but also the effect cannot be later than the cause; for if so, the cause, being antecedent to the effect, would be without effect, and a cause without effect, is a contradiction. And if the effect would be consequent to the cause, it would be, when the cause is no more, therefore an effect without cause. Both therefore must be necessarily together. If this be conceded, then there is the difficulty, why the one more than the other is producing (or cause). These are only part of the difficulties, and without solving them, the objections made against causality, are quite just.

no change of qualities in any compound substances, because by any connexion between them, different from an accidental relation, they would assume changes, contradictory to the notion, under which they are conceived. As the Nyáya, however, admits an actual change in compound substances, in which qualities, not to be met with in the simple substances, are produced, and moreover admits a compound, in which there is a comparatively firm connexion of the parts with each other, it has deviated from its notion of causality, and is hence guilty of the contradiction which it first endeavoured to escape. Notwithstanding these deficiencies of the Nyáya, we still maintain, that it approached nearer than any other Hindu system, to the true notion of causality, causality being, according to Pantheistic, not less than to skeptical idea, a product of habit in the association of our ideas.

In passing from the general metaphysical (ontological) to more special investigations (comprehending natural philosophy and psychology), we may first observe, that the same clearness obtains in the latter as in the former. Existence, or rather that which exists (*το ὄντως ὄν*, in its connexion with material and immaterial phenomena, is much more distinctly conceived than in other systems of the Hindus. We find indeed the same material elements as in the latter; viz., earth, water, light, air, and ether, and also the same qualities; but while in all others they are only generally described, here there is made an attempt to explain the special phenomena as well as the sources of our perception of them, or in one word, we find here the basis of observation, and of the first lineaments of the consequent reflection upon the results of that observation. We meet here also with the first remarks about space and time, and even with some correct notions of their nature, and although both of them are placed among the substances, we must not forget the intrinsic difficulties of this subject, which in our times only has been more satisfactorily investigated by Kant, Fichte, and Herbart. The error of considering space and time as substances, is a consequence of the notion the Nyáya had formed of substance, viz. as the substrate of qualities and actions, This idea would, indeed, have been correct, had the notion of existence been preserved. The Védánta certainly had a much more exact idea of existence, maintaining, that which exists (*το ὄντως ὄν*) must be simply existent, without any attribute whatever, and should strictly not be even considered by a plurality of notions. The Védánta,

however, by denying the reality of phenomena, had nothing to explain, while the Nyáya, retaining the crude notions, given by observation, had no principles whereby to explain them. The most interesting point in this part of the system is the investigation into the nature of matter, an investigation which was indeed entered into by other Hindu systems, yet not with the same success. The Védánta, for instance, reduced the objects of the senses, or the things composed of the gross elements, to elements which are finer and imperceptible to the senses, undoubtedly for the same reasons as the Nyáya, viz. because the origin, the changes, and the destruction of the material things compelled the mind to fix the notion of existence upon some other natures, not affected by those conditions. But according to the Védánta, the simpler elements are only simple, because they are unmixed with others. As regards space, however, no reduction was made, and their view on this point is very like the doctrine of Anaxagoras, who also started from an original identity of the elements with space. The Védánta indeed did not confine its thoughts to those elements, but proceeded to the supposition of a substance, in which there is no difference whatever, but for what reason this supposition was here made, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory reply, and as regards the principal point, space filled out by matter, it was not even touched upon. The Nyáya, on the other hand, has examined matter under this point of view, and arrived at the theory of atoms,* in the same way as Leucippus and Democritus. It proceeded even further. With Leucippus and Democritus atoms have some, though imperceptible, extent, and also different figures and mo-

* It is astonishing, that the Nyáyaikas made the supposition of such a substance as the ether, which, like space and time, is pervading and infinite. It is not space itself, but a kind of matter, filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from it merely by a less degree of density. If so, the consequence should have been, that it was also composed of parts, the last elements of which are atoms. Instead of this, ether is some thing analogous to space, by its being infinite, and yet filling out an infinite space. In fact it appears, they assumed this notion of ether only historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed previously to them. The doctrine of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth) is one of the most ancient hypotheses of Indian philosophy. It is taught already in the Upanishads, and probably more ancient even than the doctrine of the soul. Hence it passed over into the different systems, viz. the Védánta, Sáṅkhya and Nyáya, modified according to the different views they held of substance.

tions, while the Nyáya held them to be absolute units of space, without any dimensions and motions, that is, mathematical points as regards space. They are eternal and unchangeable, and while they are without cause themselves, they are the cause of the material universe. They are imperceptible to the senses, and the knowledge of them is obtained by inference.

The system of Democritus is throughout a crude materialism. The last elements of existence are with him atoms which have no qualities whatever beside form and motion. The soul itself is merely a compound of round atoms, and a deity is of course impossible. A theory of atoms of such a kind is contradictory in its principle, and in its results leads to an annihilation of truth in general. The Nyáya is vastly superior to Democritus' theory; for atoms are first conceived in their real notion as units of matter without any extent, and secondly the theory of atoms forms only a subordinate part of their researches.

The same clearness and to a certain degree comprehensiveness is met with in their psychological enquiries. The faculties of the soul and its relations to the material things and other objects of knowledge, are methodically described. The Nyáya draws a marked line between matter and spirit, by distinctly stating the notions, under which either is perceived.

The soul has, according to the Nyáya, qualities, opposite to the qualities of the substances perceived by the senses, and is therefore distinct from these substances, that is to say, as regards special qualities; for as to qualities, ascribed to substances as far as they are substances, both must of course agree. Qualities of the soul are the emotions and desires, volition and aversion, etc. and knowledge. Knowledge is produced by intellect, which is one of the qualities (faculties) of the soul. Intellect is again fourfold, it is perception, inference, analogy and verbal knowledge. Perception (viz. perception generally, as well of external as of internal objects), is the source from which all other knowledge flows, or rather, without objects of perception the other faculties of intellect have no materials to work upon. All knowledge, that is perceived, is perceived through a medium, through an instrument, by which the soul is in communion either with objects from without or from within itself. External objects are perceived through five external senses, these being in contact with the mind, while internal objects, and

by them the soul, are only perceived through the mind. The doctrine of the communication of the soul with external objects is very curious and interesting, not only because it is original, but because it shows a remarkable acuteness in overcoming difficulties, met with in every system, which considers substances not only as individual beings, but also as a common essence that exists, although dependent upon the individual substances. To perceive individual external substances, and their properties in common with others, it is necessary that the intercourse of the senses with the external objects should take place accordingly, that is to say, that individual substances should be perceived by the connexion of the senses with these individual substances, and the common properties by the connexion of the senses with these common properties. Substances are then perceived in their different relations, viz. first, in the relation of this individual substance and this individual quality, or of this individual substance and this individual act; further, in the relation, which this individual substance has with its class (general essence) or with its generality; and lastly, in the relation, which this individual quality or this individual act of this individual substance has with its class or generality.

This, however, is not sufficient; for a full comprehension, there are required also *general notions*, corresponding with those relations. A tree for instance would not be perceived, without the general notion of a tree, by which a tree at any place and at any time is perceived. This general notion requires again a kind of special knowledge, by which the general notion of a tree is referred to a certain tree. This kind of knowledge, though corresponding with the relations of all substances, which have both general and special properties, and though (implicitly) contained in every object of perception, still differs from the general properties of the things. It is a conception of the soul, produced by its own activity. This knowledge then is internal perception, that is to say, it is not produced by inference, or analogy, or verbal communication, but it is immediate and complete, as all knowledge by perception. Every perception of external objects then, according to this exposition, is based upon two elements, an external and an internal, or as these expressions do not exactly represent their notions, an immediate and mediate, an objective and ideal knowledge. In the same way are the objects of the soul perceived, viz. its different qualities, as aversion,

volition, &c. are called. Though the soul is the object of the mind, it is not directly perceived by it, but is inferred from its qualities. It is not necessary here to explain the other faculties of intellect, viz. inference, comparison, and verbal communication, as they are discussed in another part of this paper. We here only add, that they must be considered as parts of the quality of knowledge, or, as we would express it, as modified operations of one and the same activity of the soul.

The mind, by which all knowledge is perceived, is not a quality or faculty of the soul itself, but an independent substance, atomic in its nature.* Hence only a single perception or idea is at one time perceived by the soul.

The soul itself is eternal, and therefore so also are its qualities, we should say, also its knowledge, although this knowledge be not perceived by the soul itself. It is at the same time every where, not, however, as an infinite soul, as the universal soul of the Védánta, where all things constitute the pervading soul, be it even a piece of matter, though bound by ignorance to a state of apparent material existence, but in the same way as space and time are connected with every thing. There is a general soul, and there are individual souls. The general soul has the same qualities with the individual souls, with the exception of aversion, pleasure, pain, merit and demerit, because these qualities would involve imperfections. The individual soul is subject to the law of transmigration, and happiness and misery are the consequences of its good or bad actions. It is, however, possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowedge.

Here it is necessary to point out what place the notion of the general soul or the deity (I'swara, the Ruler) holds in the system of the Nyáya.

The Védánta denies a personal deity. There is a supreme soul, but this soul is all in all, individual souls are emanations from it, as sparks from fire, and are essentially identical with it. Nature in its first elements as well as in its development depends upon it. The

* How is mind united with the soul? Not by any act of either; for they are independent of each other. They are united by something without them, viz. by the power of God, in the same way, as atoms are united with each other; for these latter, although the material causes of compound substances, are not causes of their connexion.

Védánta in fact destroys the distinctions between God and nature; every distinction is delusion, and there is nothing but one all-pervading, knowing and blissful being, and even such distinctions as of existence, knowledge, bliss, are not real distinctions, they are but contrivances to approach to the true idea of the One.—If there is nothing but existence, but knowledge, but truth, there should be no difference whatever, and least of all any delusion, on the contrary, there is with man almost nothing but delusion; only few approach the true notion of God, and but inadequately; in most men there is only difference found, and nature is altogether opposed to it. Nay, this is not only the case in the last emanation of this deity, but if we comprehend nature in its principle, where all differences of substance, quality, form, &c. disappear, if we comprehend it as dependent upon the soul, it is ignorance, that is to say, indiscrete matter, it is non-existence, non-knowledge, &c. but this, Proteus-like being, of which it cannot be said, that it exists, nor, that it does not exist, is to be placed upon the soul, to be understood by it. This is to say: in theory the Védánta acknowledges but one principle, the infinite soul, in fact, however, two, soul and non-soul, ignorance or matter.

With reference to God, the Sánkhya is divided into two sects, the theistical and the atheistical.*

* Col. M. E. pp. 251-2. God, I'swara, the supreme ruler according to Pátanjali, is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by the ills with which they are beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology) himself infinite, unlimited by time.

Kapila, on the other hand, denies an I'swara, ruler of the world by volition, alleging, that there is no proof of God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute, source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, that the truth of such an I'swara is demonstrated, the Creator of worlds, in such sense of creation; for "the existence of effects," he says, "is dependent upon consciousness, not upon I'swara," and, "all else is from the great principle." Yet, that being is finite, having a beginning and an end, dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guider of the universe by volition, Kapila positively denies.

See also Wilson's Sánkhya Kárika, pp. 166 to 168.

Kapila denied altogether a deity; the I'swara whom he admits, is only a finite being; for although he assumes a being, whose intelligence is absolute, yet this being issues from nature, and is again to terminate in nature. It is very much to be regretted, that of Pátanjali's doctrine nothing as yet has been published. It is difficult to form an exact idea of his being from the words, quoted by Colebrooke. According to them he has some attributes of the deity; he is of the utmost omniscience, infinite, unlimited by time; but how he is connected with the creation and ruling of the universe, it is impossible to conceive. *If* his doctrine in other points agrees with the atheistical Sánkhya, all the development of the world in its different forms is independent of him; for it is the necessity of nature, that certain emanations are issuing from it, and returning to it after certain periods. It would rather appear, that he is a kind of Epicurean deity, blissful in himself and unconcerned with the affairs of the world.

The Nyáya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes; for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them to a subject which exists, which has knowledge, &c. He is not the supreme soul of the Védánta which is the whole universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but altogether different from nature, and self-existent. He is also not, as appears to be Pátanjali's opinion, a merely omniscient being; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, and nature could not exist independent of a God, or could exist only without order, harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, but one of its chief springs; for all the substances in the world, without God, remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference; of themselves they have no action, produce no effects, and not even the simplest compound of two atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for certain objects, not the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, for

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they are not united with mind, the instrument, by which they are connected with the world, among themselves and with the creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially teleological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the world as to its form, not as to its matter.

The Nyáya approaches most closely of all Hindu systems the Christian notion of God, as its deity is an infinite spirit and at the same time personal, as it is wholly distinct from matter, and the creator and ruler of the universe.

It would be superfluous to point out the marked distinction, drawn here between body and soul. Though a higher development of philosophy may destroy the distinctions between soul and matter, that is, may recognise matter, or what is perceived as matter, as the same with the soul (as for instance, Leibnitz did), it is nevertheless certain, that no true knowledge of the soul is possible, without first drawing a most decided line of demarcation between the phenomena of matter and of the soul. In the Nyáya there is even an approximation to the doctrine, that soul and matter are as to their principles one and the same, viz. in the theory of atoms, according to which atoms are the negation of space. From this notion we may draw the inference, which has not been drawn by the Nyáya, it is true, but which would have been only a necessary consequence from the premises, that matter, being a compound of atoms, is only a phenomenon, as regards its extension through space. Where then is here shown the difference between the soul and the true substratum of matter? Let us see then, what is the soul? The soul is different from matter, as this last is perceived by the senses as extended through space. This distinction is true, but further to conclude, that the soul is also different from matter in its real nature, where matter is not extended, is certainly hasty, and does not follow from the premises. What then is the soul according to them? It is all-pervading, infinite, like ether, space and time. This answer, though far from satisfactory, shows, that they felt the difficulty in determining the notion of the soul, when their other notions had undergone a decided alteration.— The most peculiar notion in their psychological theory is the existence of

of the mind independent of soul, although most intimately connected with it; for through the mind only the soul perceives, as well its own qualities, as the qualities of external substances. How could the Nyáya have made a supposition in which the contradiction is so evident? For it is easy to conclude, that if the mind is independent, its perception is also independent. If the mind perceives, this perception is not in the soul, and if this perception is in the soul, it is not perceived. The soul then has knowledge, which is not real knowledge, because not perceived, and the mind has no knowledge, though it perceives.

We may solve this difficulty at least in some way. The mind was first undoubtedly considered as an internal sense according to the analogy of external senses, in order that there be a unity of perception, and that, as the external objects are perceived through different media, the objects of the soul be perceived through an analogous internal medium, a supposition, which has also been made in modern (English) philosophy. So far the Nyáya might have considered the mind as an internal sense, but they met with a difficulty, which was not felt in the same intensity by modern philosophers. If knowledge be perceived by the soul through the medium of the mind (the internal sense), why is it not always present in the mind? why does it disappear and give place to other objects of perception, etc.? Locke was surprised at the narrowness of the human mind, without being able to account for it; the Nyáya in endeavouring to account for it, invented an independent substance, the mind, which is an atom, and according to its atomic nature only able to represent or to perceive one object at one and the same time.

This, I think, is the solution of the difficulty, and though it is certainly only an evasion, because its supposition creates greater difficulties than the former one, it still gives evidence of a spirit of enquiry in the school.

In comparing the psychological theory of the Nyáya with more modern doctrines (with the exception of the latest period) we must admit, that in a metaphysical point of view there is no great difference between them. The same objections are to be made to either, the doctrine of faculties being involved in the same contradictions as that of qualities. In either case, if you are to explain, what the soul is, you have to state, what it is, independent of its qualities or faculties, and

also to enumerate the latter. Your explanation will thus point out a quale, which is not a unity, but something defined by a variety of notions. This, however, is not the place to discuss the matter, and we wished only to remind the reader, that modern philosophy in this respect cannot boast to have advanced one single step beyond that of the Hindus, that is to say, in the metaphysic of the soul, although it would be absurd to deny, that modern psychology, as to the observation of psychical phenomena, has made rapid strides towards perfection.

In passing over to the strictly logical enquiries of the Nyáya, we have to premise, that we cannot view them with the same satisfaction, and although we may make ample allowance for the different forms of language, in which they are explained, we are compelled to confess, that they are neither exact nor complete.

The Nyáya has treated the logical topics in the inverse order of that adopted by us, viz. first inference, then ideas, and lastly propositions. This order is followed, not in consequence of a different method of arrangement, but in consequence of the subjects being based upon different grounds, and flowing from different sources. Logic might undoubtedly be treated analytically and commence with the exposition of syllogistical forms. Considering argument as a fact, we might analyse various arguments, and proceeding to their elements, that is to propositions, gradually arrive at ideas or notions. But the Nyáya, far from following such an analytical course, holds inference to be a quality (or modification of a quality), different from the quality of forming names and notions, and discusses inference before verbal knowledge, evidently with the purpose of showing, that the latter in some way depends upon the former.

We, however, treat these doctrines in their common order, with no other intention than to make ourselves better understood.

Verbal knowledge is one of the divisions of intellect. The first act or the first condition of understanding words, is the forming of the name! A name is corresponding to a certain object, and this object is connected with the name by the power of the name. A name which has such a power, is a word. The clear and distinct knowledge of what is implied in a word, is produced by a third act, and is the meaning of a word. This latter is in fact identical with idea or notion, as is evident from the examples given, as for instance, a tree is a thing which has root, stem, branches, leaves, etc.

Here again is the order perverted, the name is certainly not the first operation, and the object to be named, the second, but just the reverse. There must be objects to be named, and though we may admit, that the clear idea of a subject often succeeds a name, still the object, of which the notion is formed, is the first, and we must assert, that what precedes the notion, also precedes the name.

The enquiry, how ideas are formed from a variety of similar objects, belongs to psychology, and however interesting this question otherwise may be, logic has nothing to do with the psychical process, by which ideas are produced. If this were the case, we might still have to wait for a logic, as a psychological theory has not yet been established to general satisfaction, while logic as a science has been complete for more than two thousand years. By the considering first of the names and afterwards of the corresponding notions, the real character of a notion has been at least obscured. From the given examples we see, that a notion, instead of being defined by the genus, under which it is contained, and the specific difference, is explained by a genus, which is distant from it by a number of intervening notions (for instance, genus of tree=thing) and by a specific difference, which besides its own difference, enumerates properties which it partakes with others (for instance root, stem, leaves, etc.=specific difference).

The meaning of a word or idea, ought to have been considered in its connexion with other ideas, as made up by genus and differentia specifica, and as excluded from them by their compatible, contrary, and contradictory opposition. Here, however, are genus and species raised to categories under the names of generality and particularity, being there the common properties of substances, qualities, and acts, while the opposition of ideas or terms is treated in the seventh category, that of negation. Negation is the category which arises, if the categories are mutually denied of each other. It is the mutual difference of the categories and therefore the same with logical opposition. Negation is again of four kinds, mutual negation, antecedent negation, (negation of a thing, that is to be,) emergent negation (destruction) and absolute negation. Of them antecedent and emergent negations are not logical, but metaphysical negations, viz. the relations which a thing may have with regard to its origin or cessation in time. Mutual negation corresponds to contrary opposition (oppositio contraria) of terms. For instance

black is the negation of white, of red, &c. and vicê versâ; here the one is not denied in an absolute, but in a relative manner. Absolute negation* would correspond to contradictory opposition (oppositio contradictoria) as is evident from an allusion to it in the explanation of a negative inference. Here it is said, that a notion is the negation of its absolute non-existence, for instance cloth is the negation of its absolute non-existence, non-cloth, or A = Non—Non— A, that is to say, A is the negation of what is in contradictory opposition to A.

From this arrangement then did not only result an imperfect exposition of the logical relations among ideas, but an important metaphysical error, by which logical relations of ideas are considered as real properties of substances.

In finding the logical treatment of notions by no means satisfactory, we may at the same time observe, that there are many valuable remarks on some psychological and grammatical relations of ideas which we do not recollect to have found elsewhere. These we have given in a note to the text, where this subject is explained.

A proposition to convey a distinct meaning, must, according to the Nyáya, have four qualities:

1. Contiguity, which, according to some, is the uninterrupted succession of the words pronounced in a sentence, so that for instance, the first word of it be not pronounced in the present moment, and the next half an hour afterwards, according to others, the arrangement of the words according to their grammatical connexion, for instance, that a preposition be placed together with the word which depends upon it, and not with a word, to which it does not refer.

2. Consistency, or the mutual agreement of the words, according to their sense, so that contradictory terms be not connected.

3. Structure, or the grammatical (terminations) forms of the words, which correspond in their meanings (for instance, that the verb agrees with the subject in number and person.)

* There is a difference of opinion in the Nyáya with reference to absolute negation. Some appear to conceive it merely as a negation of present existence, others as the negation of a contradictory notion. In this last sense Colebrooke understood it, (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 288,) and this is also the interpretation of the Mímánsa, (Wilson's Sánkhya Karika, p. 19.) That the author of the Bhásha Paricchéda adopted also this sense, appears to me evident from the above explanation.

4. Intention, that is, the meaning which the speaker wishes to convey by a sentence.

There again the logical characteristics of a proposition have been omitted, as all those points, with the exception perhaps of consistency, belong to the grammatical structure of a sentence.

The logical explanation of propositions, as a matter of course, passes over any grammatical form a proposition may assume; it treats only of the relation between two ideas, and its simple question is, whether two ideas can be connected or not.

It is evident, that in this way neither quantity, nor modality of propositions could have been discovered. We might, however, dispense with them, as these forms are not strictly logical; but not even the division of propositions according to their quality has been made by the Nyáya.

The theory of ideas and propositions is the weakest point in the logic of the Nyáya; they are more successful in explaining the form of arguments; for though the theory of syllogism is far from exact and complete, we must admit, that they understood the general character of a syllogism.

According to Gautama a complete syllogism contains five members (Avayava = proposition). 1. The proposition (pratijná, that which is to be proved by the argument). 2. The reason, argument (hétu). 3. The instance (Udáharaṇa, drishṭanta). 4. The application (upanaya). 5. The conclusion (nigamana), for instance:

1. This hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes,
3. What smokes is fiery, as for instance, a culinary hearth.
4. This hill smokes,
5. Therefore it is fiery.

The modern school of the Nyáya reduced the syllogism to three, and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted,* as it is in the Tarka Sangraha and Bhásha

* Colebrooke (Mis. Essays, Vol. I. p. 292), adverted only to Gautama's Sútras, and not to a more modern work of the Nyáya, when he asserted, that the regular syllogism of the Nyáya consisted of five members. The modern school of the Nyáya (*vide* Dr. Ballantyne's Lectures on the Tarka Sangraha, p. 31), declares the five membered form rhetorical in distinction from its logical form, which contains only two members. Dr. Ballantyne has clearly pointed this out in his trea-

Paricchéda. In this form the two premises, viz. major and minor propositions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description.

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1, a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term, with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decided by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predicate of the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as determined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a man from former observation know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth;

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tise on the Nyáya system, and also in his Lectures on the Nyáya philosophy. He says, (Nyáya system of philosophy, p. 5.)

"Now, in this form of the syllogism (which we do not find alluded to in Mr. Colebrooke's essay), there is neither more nor less than there is in the Aristotelic syllogism. The wonder would be if there had been. The first formal difference observable is, the wrapping up of the premises in one logical datum. The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable members of a single statement appears to have been this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind, that the premises suggest the inference, and this simultaneousness of cognizance is secured by combining the two assertions in a period, or sentence, of which the whole becomes intelligible only when the last word in it has been uttered..... If we separate the two members of the original datum in the example above cited, we obtain the following:

Whatever smokes, is fiery;
The hill smokes,
Therefore the hill is fiery;"

and p. 9. "To return to our text-book. The author tells us, that a man, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred the presence of fire from the perception of smoke, may wish to impart his conviction to another. In other words having ascertained the truth as a logician, he may wish as a rhetorician, to establish it to the satisfaction of somebody else. Here we step distinctly out of the province of logic, and enter that of rhetoric."

let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition, that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowldge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyáya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The exposition is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, determined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent; for the Nyáya, as Aristotle, connects one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The second difference is, that the Nyáya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the preposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore not only directed to the logical operation of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible.

With the exposition of the form of syllogism the logical theory of the Nyáya is nearly completed. Gautama divided inference into three kinds; 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its

having the quality of smell. This division, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nyáya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are: only affirmative inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished, and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

It is a remarkable circumstance, that the general form of syllogism should have been found by the Hindus, and yet that they should not have discovered the different figures and moods, the diversities of which are the result of mere combination. We think, this deficiency was the consequence of two causes especially,—first, of their technical language, which although precise, is yet cumbrous and not comprehensive, and secondly, of their pious regard for every thing traditional, be it in political institutions, in religion, or in science. The Sútras, which are the foundations of their systems, have always remained text-books, and any discovery that had been made in theory, did not prompt them to attempt a new exposition of science, but gave only occasion to a new interpretation of the school.

The Bhásha Paricchéda itself is a work of the modern Nyáya. The author Viswanátha Panchánana Bhaṭṭa, the son of Vidyánivása Bhaṭṭa, accompanied the text with a commentary under the title "Siddhánta Muktávalí" (the pearl-wreath of truth), and he is known also by his commentary to Gautama's Sútras, which bears the title "Nyáya Sútra Vrittí." According to the statement of the Pandits he lived about two hundred years ago. The Bhásha Paricchéda is a text-book in the schools of the Nyáya in Bengal. There is no Pandit of any repute who does not know it well, and many know the whole of it by heart. And indeed it is admirably adapted for the purpose of introduction into the study of the Nyáya philosophy. It is a succinct exposition of the principal topics of the whole system, and may easily be committed to memory. It is written in the well known Anusṭup metre. The style,

however, is not poetical at all, but that of the most sober prose, and nowhere is the attempt made to combine the graces of imagination with philosophical method.

The course, followed in the work, is simple. The author gives first the leading ideas of the system, that is, the most comprehensive metaphysical notions, viz. the notions of substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation. He then enumerates the various substances, qualities, actions, &c. and defines the properties common to all categories as well as those common to more or less of them. After this exposition the different substances in their relations to themselves, to other substances and to their qualities and actions are explained. In the same way the author discusses the qualities of substances, and his work is finished, when he has treated on the last quality, enumerated at the commencement of his treatise.

The commentary is in thought and language a very different composition. It is written with the object of supporting the views of the author and of the school in its controversy with other doctrines, and enters therefore frequently into intricate discussions in establishing the fundamental tenets or defending disputed points of the system, and makes use of the whole armory of the sometimes very abstruse technical language of the Nyáya.

This commentary has again been commented upon by Mahádéva Bhaṭṭa, but I received a MS. of his work too late to make any other use of it than to compare it with the text.*

The Sanscrit text of the Bhásha Paricchéda was first printed in Bengali characters in 1821, with the addition of a Bengali translation of the text and of the commentary. The translation of the latter, however, is rather, a paraphrase, as the alterations are sometimes considerable.†

* The MS. is in the Library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta, of which, however, I was for a long time not aware, as it is not mentioned in the list of books in that Library, printed in the Sanscrit Catalogue of the Asiatic Society. It has two titles, "Mahádéva Bhaṭṭa-krita Muktávali Prakása:" and the shorter one, "Dinakarí Ṭíká." In his introduction, the author mentions also the name of his father, Balakrishna.

† The title is, "A system of Logic, written in Sunscrit, by the Venerable Sage Boodh, and explained in a Sunscrit commentary by the very learned Viswonath Tarkalancar, translated into Bengalee by Kashee Nath Turkopunchanun. Calcutta, 1821.

Another edition of the Sanscrit text together with the commentary, appeared in 1827, under the auspices of the Committee of Public Instruction. The text is correct, but not so the commentary. It is full of mistakes, omissions and interpolations. The interpunctation is either faulty or entirely disregarded, and the numbers of the successive Slokas are not attached to the corresponding portions of the commentary, so that an easy reference of the one to the other is impossible.

The present edition has been carefully revised partly by comparison with Mahádéva Bhaṭṭa's commentary, partly by a reference to the corrections in the copy of Jayanáráyana Tarkapanchánana, the professor of Nyáya in the Sanscrit College, which he had the kindness to lend me, and for which I offer my grateful acknowledgments.

The notes which I have added to the translation, are chiefly given for the purpose to elucidate the principal points of the system of the Nyáya, in accordance with the object of this work to contribute to a fair estimate of the merits of Hindu philosophy, and are therefore more copious in such parts as contain the distinguishing features of the Nyáya, for instance, the ontological portions, the doctrine of atoms, their notion of the deity, and their logical theory. They are less copious in portions which contain their explanation of the differences of matter; for as natural science with the Hindus has hardly made its beginning, their explanation is without any value. I would, however, guard here against the misconstruction, that their failing to explain the phenomena of matter, affected also the correctness of the principles, by which they tried to explain them. Natural science with reference to those phenomena is quite distinct from the philosophical theory for the interpretation of them. Democritus' explanation of natural phenomena may be entirely false, and still his theory of atoms may be correct, (although it is not in our opinion,) which is at least partly borne out by the fact, that in modern chemistry the theory of atoms has been adopted, although no one would admit the application of it which Democritus made for the explanation of the phenomena. The cause of this is a double one; first, philosophy is quite distinct from natural science, the latter being based upon observation and experiments, the former upon the relations which notions have among each other. Secondly, a philosophical system may have obtained the true principles for the explanation of intellectual and material phenomena, but at the same time

not have fully investigated the intermediate notions which may be necessary for explanation. A hasty application of these principles without due regard to such notions and to the results of natural science, is very apt to throw discredit upon the previous researches by which a system arrived at its principles, and also upon philosophy itself.

To mark the more the method of the philosophical discussion of the Nyáya, I have generally preferred to give their interpretation in their own words, and therefore made large extracts from the commentary in as literal a translation as possible, which I hope, will be found also useful to the student of the Nyáya in general, as facilitating the reading of the commentary and the understanding of the technical language of the Nyáya.

DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY.

SALUTATION TO GANE'SA.

1. To Krishna, radiant like the new cloud, the thief of the clothes of the milkmaids, to him, who is the seed of the tree of the world, be adoration.

2. There are seven categories,[1] substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation and negation.

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1. Padártha is explained in verse 13, as that which is object of knowledge, the commentary adds object of proof, of nomination; but as this applies to every idea, the definition is too wide, and ought to have been restricted to the most general objects of knowledge.

I have followed Colebrooke in translating Padártha with category, although that term somewhat differs from the idea which Aristotle expresses by the same. According to him, categories are the most extensive classes of what is denoted by the simple word (the word in no connexion with another), Cat. 2. *τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει κ. τ. λ.* He enumerates ten, viz. essence (*οὐσία*), quantity (*πόσον*), quality (*ποιόν*), relation (*πρός τι*), the where (*ποῦ*), the when (*ποτέ*), position (*κεῖσθαι*), to be possessed of (*ἔχειν*), action (*ποιεῖν*), and passion (*πάσχειν*).

Ritter in his history of philosophy (English Transl. Vol. III. p. 66) remarks on them: "If the categories had been put forward as an accurate and exhaustive division of the modes of being, it would be open to many objections, but Aristotle does not usually ascribe much importance to this enumeration of the most general notions, so that we may regard it as nothing more than an attempt to exhibit in a clear

light the signification of words taken absolutely in order to show, how truth and falsehood consist in the right or wrong combination of these elements."

However, as most of Aristotle's categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy, the term of category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge, or what is the same, the general modes of existence. It will be interesting to compare the categories of the Nyáya with those of Kant, with which they have a curious resemblance.

They are:

1.
Quantity.
a. Unity.
b. Multiplicity.
c. Totality.

2. Quality.	3. Relation.
a. Reality	a. Inherence and subsistence (substantia and accidens).
b. Negation.	b. Causality and dependence (cause and effect).
c. Limitation.	c. Community (Mutual causality).

4. Modality.
a. Possibility (impossibility).
b. Existence (non-existence).
c. Necessity (accidentalness).

The categories may be divided, according to the commentary, into two classes: into categories of affirmation, and negation. It was, however, not necessary, expressly to introduce this division in the text; for, the seventh being the category of negation, it is self-evident, that the six preceding must be categories of negation. The number of seven categories is adopted by the Vaiséshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyáya, as established in the Bháshya.

Kaṇáda acknowledged only the six first categories, excluding negation. Gautama, the founder of the Nyáya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories) soul, body, sense, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, condition of the soul after death (transmigration), retribution, pain, deliverance from pain. Two more categories, power and similarity, adopted in the Upamána Chintamaṇi, are contained in the first six categories, and must therefore be rejected.

3—5. Substances[2] are earth, water, light, air, ether, time,

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2. The definition of substance* is to be the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiality (v. v. 24). To explain this more fully, it is said in the commentary to be the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (Samavaya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prágabháva) that is of future existence. The latter definition is given to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production. When substances are produced, they have according to the Nyáya no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition, that substances are the substrates of qualities. By the second definition, that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existence, this objection is removed.

With regard to substantiality or the genus of substance the commentary remarks: If somebody (this is the statement of the Charvákas) would say: There is no proof that substantiality is a genus; for it is not proved by perception, as melted butter or lack (according to your own admission) have no substantiality,—we contradict, because substantiality is proved by the necessity, that there should be some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of an effect, or some distinguishing attribute of the intimate cause of the connection and separation (between the parts composing a substance). This argument is founded on the supposition of the Nyáya, that every cause must have some distinguishing attribute (कारणं यत् किञ्चिद्धर्मावच्छिन्नं) under which it is comprehended; it is a cause, because for instance, it has the general attribute of earth, water, &c. Substance therefore, as the cause of qualities, for instance earth of smell, must be conceived by the distinguishing attribute of substantiality. The genus substantiality depends therefore not on perception, but on inference.

Some suppose, continues the commentary, darkness to be also a substance; for, they argue, it is proved by perception, it has colour and action, and is neither earth nor any of the other substances. Its organ is the eye, at the time that it is without light. This argument is not valid;

* Kanáda gives the following definition of substance, Vid. Vaiséshika Sútra. 1st Adhyaya. 11th Sútra. क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणं ॥ Substance is the substrate of qualities and actions, and has intimate causality.

space, soul and mind; qualities[3] are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, priority, and posteriority, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, gravity, fluidity viscidity, faculty, fate, (merit and demerit) and sound.

6. There are five actions,[4] throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding and going.

7. Wandering about, evacuating, trickling, flaming upwards, moving crookedly, are included in going.

8. Generality[5] is considered two-fold, extensive and non-

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for, darkness being produced by the absence of light, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another substance. The supposition of its colour arises from delusion, as does also the supposition, that it has action, viz., from the cessation of light. If darkness were a separate thing, and not included in the category of negation, as gold is included in light, an infinite number of substances, (viz. in accordance with an infinite number of negations) must be assumed.

3. The definition of quality,* which is given in verse 89, is: Quality is, whose substrate is substance, and which is without quality and action, that is to say, there is no quality of a quality, nor an action of an action, or the notion of quality would be changed to that of substance. The argument, by which it is proved, that quality in a class, is the same as that, which proves the same of substance.

4. Action,† according to the Bengalee translation, is the special category, which in the relation of intimate union is present in a substance which has velocity, or the category, which after a duration of five moments is subject to destruction, viz., at first, there is contact; 2, Separation; 3, Destruction of a former connection; 4, A new connection; 5, Cessation of the action.

5. *Commentary.*—Generality (or class) is intimate union of many

* Kaṇáda's definition of quality is: द्रव्याश्रयी गुणवान् संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणं॥ A. 1. that is, quality is sited in substance, has quality and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.

† एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्षमिति कर्म्मलक्षणं॥ A. 1. action is, whose site is substance alone, which is without quality, and does not depend upon conjunction and separation without cause.

extensive. Existence, as including substances, qualities and actions, is called extensive.

9. The class which differs from this is called non-extensive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non-extensive.

10. By its including many things, it is extensive; by its being included in a more extensive class, it is non-extensive.

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in something eternal, or is eternal and the intimate union of many. It is said, "in something eternal," because intimate union of many exists also between things in contact. "*Of many,*" because intimate union in something eternal exists also in such infinite quantas as the sky, "*in intimate union,*" because the existence of many in something eternal refers also to absolute negation. Consequently there is no generality or genus, where only one individual exists, or where there is no difference of individuality, or where there is confusion, or where there is a retrogress in infinitum, or where an idea is changed to its contrary, or where there is no relation. For instance, the sky forms no class on account of its individuality. The notions of a donkey and of an ass (in Sanscrit the terms : घटः and कलसः are selected, either of which means a jar) are no class. The notions of element and form are no class, because the value of these notions is confounded. Generality is no class, because, there is no place of support for it, (it would require a retrogress in infinitum; for if there is a class of a class, or a notion of a notion, there must also be a class of the class of the class and so further) particularity is no class, because it would thus be changed to its contrary. (Particularity by becoming generality would be the contrary of its notion.) Intimate union is no class, because it is not in the relation of intimate union (in the relation of intimate union are only substances, qualities and actions).

According to their definition of class only substance, quality, and action, further the general notion of those three, which is reality, the notions of the substances, with the exception of sky, space and time, the notions of the different qualities and actions as well as the notions which are included in them, form generalities or classes. The other four categories are not classes, but as the Bengalee Translator calls them, Upadhis, titles, general characteristics.

The ultimate condition of eternal substances is called particularity.[6]

11. The connexion *of a substance with its componing parts, as* of a jar, &c. with its two halves, &c.; further the connexion of substances with qualities and actions, and *lastly* the connexion of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation.[7]

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6. *Comm.*—The ultimate condition of eternal substances is particularity.* The ultimate condition, viz., the condition, which remains ultimately, last after all (according to the Bengalee translation, the condition which remains until the general conflagration of the world), than which there is no further particularity, that is to say, the condition, abiding in one substance only; for in compound substances from a jar down to the union of two atoms there is mutual difference, by means of the difference of all their respective parts; but the mutual difference of atoms is particularity; this is a difference by itself, and a particularity further than this does therefore not exist.

7. *Comm.*—The relation, of parts with things possessed of parts, of generality with single objects, of qualities with things possessed of qualities, of actions with objects possessed of actions, is intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation. It is proved by the fact, that the intellect, when determined by qualities and action, is in the relation of what is determining and what is determined (predicate and subject) for it is a determined intellect, as the sentence: The man bears a stick, is the result of a determined intellect. Hence, since in this case neither the relation of contact nor any other relation is possible, intimate relation is proved.

As the Bengalee translation expresses the meaning much more clearly, I have given it here instead of the explanation of the original. Intimate relation, excluding distinctive relation, is constant relation of only one thing which regulates a condition. By the term "constant" the relation of contact is excluded, by the term "excluding distinctive relation," the relation of distinction, by the term "which regulates a con-

*सामान्यविशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षं ॥ A. 1. Both, generality and particularity depend on intellect. The commentator, *S*ankara Misra adds, "generality is the intellect, which is found in many; particularity, which is separated from others."

12, 13. Negation[8] is two-fold, universal negation and reciprocal negation. The first includes three kinds, antecedent

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dition,'' the relation of identity, as for instance of the sky; for the relation of identity (the relation, that a thing is to be comprehended under its own notion) is not regulating a condition, by the term "of only one thing,'' the notion of mutual negation. In the relation of contact, is for instance, a jar with the ground. The class of distinction is three-fold, viz. as referring to time, space and place. In the distinctive relation of time and space are all things. The distinctive relation of place is again two-fold, the distinctive relation of negation, and the distinctive relation of identity (of a thing with itself) The distinctive relation of negation is the site of negation. In the distinctive relation of identity is for instance the notion of the sky with the sky. In the relation of identity remains every thing with itself. In mutual relation is the notion of the jar with the ground.

8. *Comm.*—Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six categories, that is to say, negation arises from the six categories, being denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation. Antecedent negation is a negation, which is afterwards removed, for instance, if it is said, in this half a jar is to be produced, there is a negation of the jar, which is to be produced. Emergent negation or destruction is a negation of what is produced, for instance, in the sentence, in these parts a jar is destroyed, there is a negation in the cause (the parts) subsequent to the production of the effect. Absolute negation is constant universal negation, for instance in the sentence, here is no jar. Here, this objection may be made: If a jar or any other thing is removed from a certain place, and again brought back to it, the notion of absolute negation cannot be applied; for, absolute negation being constant negation, the notion of absolute negation is not produced, when the jar is brought back. Hence they have assumed a fourth kind of negation, referring to the liability of a thing to be produced or destroyed, excluding absolute negation. For instance, in the notion: a black pot is not red, and a red not black, there is antecedent and

negation, destruction and absolute negation. The common notion of all seven categories is object of knowledge,[9] and similar ideas.

14. The five first categories[10] are positive, many and in the connection of intimate relation. The three first (substances, qualities, actions) have the attribute of existence; qualities and the subsequent categories are without qualities and actions.

15. Class (generality), and the subsequent categories are considered to be without generality; causality[11] is a predicate of all substances which are not atoms (whose measure is not an atom).

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emergent, but not absolute negation. The modern school, however, reject this view, because they deny, that a contradiction has been proved; according to their opinion absolute negation is met with in emergent as well as in antecedent negation.

Negation is assumed as a distinct category; for in denying it, an infinite number of negations, corresponding to the things, whose negations they are, would be necessary.

9. Object of knowledge, &c. viz. capable of being known, named, proved, &c.

10. *Comm.*—The general notion (definition) of substances, qualities, actions, generalities and particularities is multiplicity, positiveness and connection by intimate relation. Multiplicity is also found in negation; therefore the distinction of the five is: the state of position in many. It is said, "which are in the connection of intimate relation," and not, which have intimate relation, because otherwise the categories of generality and particularity would be excluded.

11. *Comm.*—Causality is an attribute of all substances, whose measure is not an atom (पारिमाण्डल्यं means, whose measure is an atom.) *Or: Atoms, considered as a measure, have no causality.* A substance whose measure is an atom, cannot be the cause of any thing; for a measure commences things, which are included in its notion (as for instance the half of a jar is the measure, from which the jar is produced) but this is impossible in this instance; for a measure produces a measure, exceeding the measure, contained in its own notion (that is from a measure is produced something greater than itself) hence as the greater is

16. The notion of the necessary previous existence of a thing, which has not the fault of superfluous causality,[12] is causality.*

17. Of this three kinds are specified, viz. causality of intimate relation, of non-intimate relation (the connexion of the

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produced, if the measure commences from the great, so from the infinitely small (the atom) would be produced something smaller (more an atom). This is impossible (hence the measure contained in the conjunction of two atoms, is not produced from the measure of an atom, but from number). For the same reason causality must be denied of substances which are infinite, further of any class, transcending the senses, and lastly of particularity. (The reason for this is clear; any thing infinite which can be exceeded, must have become finite; there cannot be any thing which exceeds the senses more than another thing, both being thought under the same idea, viz. to exceed the senses. Particular are the distinctions of eternal things; they cannot be distinguished by any thing else, because they are the last distinctions.)

12. I give here a note of the Bengali translation. The category, which has not the fault of superfluous causality, and whose existence constantly precedes, is causality, or cause is, by the existence or non-

* The principal Sútras of Kaṇáda, referring to causality, are:

कारणाभावात् कार्य्याभावः । 1st Adh.

कार्य्याभावात् कारणाभावः ॥ 1st Adh.

कारणपूर्व्वकः कार्य्यगुणो दृष्टः । 1st Adh.

कारणमिति द्रव्ये कार्य्यसमवायात् ॥ 10th Adh.

कारणे समवायात् कर्म्माणि ।
(असमवायिकारणानीति शेषः ॥) } 10th Adh.

तथारूपे कारणैकार्थसमवायाच्च । 10th Adh.

If there is no cause, there is no effect.

If there is no effect, there is no cause.

The quality of the effect depends upon the cause.

The cause, which refers to substance, is intimate cause, because substance is intimately related to effects, (viz. compound substances, qualities and actions.)

Action is a non-intimate cause, because they are intimately related to the cause (the intimate cause.)

In the same manner are *qualities* intimately related to substances; *therefore they are also non-intimate causes.*

component parts), and instrumental causality is mentioned as the third by the followers of the Nyáya philosophy.

18. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is produced; (for instance thread from which cloth is made,) is causality of intimate relation; that which is proximate to this, (the conjunction of the threads) is the second cause, (of non-intimate relation), and as the third (instrumental causality) must be considered what is different from either, (for instance the loom of the weaver.)

19. There are five classes of superfluous causality,[13] viz.

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existence of which the existence or non-existence of an effect is necessary. If there is no thread, there is no cloth; if there is no conjunction of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar; if there is no virtue, there is no happiness, &c. There are three kinds of causes, intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes. Such things as, intimately united, (that is, such as are in the connection of intimate relation) produce an effect, are intimate causes. Two atoms for instance are the cause of a bi-atomical compound, threads of cloth, the two halves of a jar. Non-intimate is a cause, which is proximate to an intimate cause, that is, which is connected with the intimate cause; for instance the conjunction of two atoms is the proximate cause of the bi-atomical compound, the conjunction of threads of cloth, the conjunction of two halves of a jar. Instrumental is the cause, differing from either; for instance, the instrumental cause of a jar is the stick, of cloth the loom, of a bi-atomical compound god. It must here also be borne in mind, that an effect may be destroyed either by the destruction of the intimate cause, or by that of the non-intimate cause, as a jar is destroyed by the destruction of the two halves, and a bi-atomical compound by that of the conjunction of the two atoms. The intimate, non-intimate and instrumental causes are called special causes; God, the omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time, space, antecedent negation and fate (virtue and vice) general causes.

13. A cause is called superfluous (अन्यथासिद्ध:) if, without its co-operation, the effect is produced in another way. Commentary. Faults of superfluous causality are: 1. The notion, under which the cause is per-

1st.—*The general idea* (class), under which the former state *of a cause* is perceived; 2nd, that *the existence* or *non-existence* of which can only be comprehended *by the existence or non-existence* of the cause; 3rd, that of which the previous existence *is applied to the effect*, when its previous existence is already applied to another (effect).

20. 4th, that *the existence of which is applied to the effect*, because it necessarily precedes the existence of the producer *of the effect*; and 5th, that which is superfluous beside the thing whose former existence is necessary.

21, 22. Of the first class is an example the notion, under which the stick (by which a jar is made) is perceived, of the second the form, &c. of the stick, of the third the ether, of the

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ceived, as for instance the idea of a stick (दण्डत्वं the class of a stick) by which (stick) for instance a jar is produced. 2. Such things as cannot be thought of themselves as causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect, but are causes of the existence or non-existence of an effect only by means of the *real* cause, as for instance the shape of a stick; (for it cannot be said, that, if this or that shape of a stick is given, the effect, viz. the jar, is given, nor, if this or that shape of a stick is not given, the jar, is also not given.) 3. The application of a cause to an effect, if this cause has been already applied to another effect, for instance, if the ether should be considered as the cause of a jar. The ether could be only the cause of a jar by its being perceived under the notion of ether; this, however, is the intimate cause of sound, and it is therefore first taken as the cause of sound, and secondly as the cause of the jar. 4. The application of a cause to an effect, by which (cause) the (actual) cause of an effect is produced; for instance, if the father of the potter would be considered as the cause of the jar; for the potter only is the producer of the jar. 5. The application of any thing (as cause of an effect) which is not necessary to the production of the effect, as for instance the donkey, carrying the earth, &c., of which a jar is made. Of all the kinds of superfluous causality the last alone is necessary, as including the other kinds.

fourth the father of the potter, of the fifth the donkey, &c. Among those superfluous causes the last alone is necessary (because the others are included in it).

23. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality only to qualities and actions.[14]

24. Dependence[15] is the attribute of every thing, save eternal substances. The property of all nine kinds of substances is: to have substantiality and qualities.

25. Earth, water, light, air and mind are the sites of comprehensive and non-comprehensive generality, form,[16] action and velocity.

26. Time, ether, soul and space have the attributes of ubiquity and infinity.[17] Of the five elements, viz. earth and the subsequent four substances (water, light, air, and ether), are the first four the sites of touch.

27. The commencement of things takes place in the four first substances. The special qualities of ether and soul[18] are: limitation to space, and momentary duration.

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14. Intimate causality belongs to substances; non-intimate causality to qualities and actions, that is, intimate causality is the common attribute of substances, non-intimate causality that of qualities and actions.

15. *Comm.*—Dependence in the common attribute of all things except eternal substances; it is to be thought under the idea of intimate relation. Eternal things are only dependent on distinctive relation (vide p. 7) as for instance on the relation of time. Eternal substances are atoms, (viz. of air, fire, water, earth) ether, time, space and soul. The common attribute of substances is, substantiality and substrate of qualities.

16. Form (मूर्त्तत्व) is, the measure of which is limited.

17. Infinity (परमं महत्व) is, the measure of which exceeds every other measure.

18. *Comm.*—The special qualities of the ether and soul are: a state which does not pervade (is limited), and a state which has only momentary duration. (A state which does not pervade is such as is produced only in one part, and is not present in another. And a thing has momentary duration, if in the third moment after its production it is

28. Earth, water and light, have the properties of colour, fluidity and perceptibility by the senses; earth and water have gravity and taste; the fluidity of earth and light is a derived one.

29. The soul and the elements have special (contrary) qualities; that which is considered the property of the one, is the opposite of the others.

30. The qualities of the air are touch, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity are assigned to light.

31. Water is the site of 14 qualities, viz. of the eight, before mentioned, and further of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, savour and viscidity.

32, 33. Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscidity, and the addition of smell.—The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit. The qualities of time and place are number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction. The same qualities together with sound belong to the ether.

34. Those five qualities, together with intellect, desire and volition are sited in God, the same five qualities, with priority and posteriority and velocity, in the mind.

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destroyed.) The special quality of the ether is sound, which does not pervade: for it is produced in a small part only of the ether, and not found in a different portion. It has only momentary duration; this means, it is destroyed in the third moment, *after* it has commenced to exist. Because the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced, therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the case with knowledge, &c.; for knowledge is produced in the soul, which is a pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and it is absent in any other part of space, for instance in the part belonging to a jar. In the same manner knowledge continues only for two moments, and pervading substances are therefore those whose special

35. The earth is the cause of smell (the intimate cause), and the site of the various colours. Savour is of six kinds (sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid and saline), smell two-fold (fragrance and stench).

36, 37. It has three kinds of feel, hot, cold and temperate. It is twofold[19] eternal and non-eternal; eternal as considered in its atoms, non-eternal as being composed of parts; this latter is threefold, organism, organ and object (inorganic matter).

38. Organisms are viviparous, *oviparous, engendered in filth and vegetative;* organ is the sense of smell; objects are all compound substances from the smallest, of two atoms, to the largest, Bramhá's egg.

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qualities are: existence that does not pervade, and momentary duration. The special qualities of earth, &c., are: existence which does pervade, and continuance for a longer time.

19. *Comm.*—Earth is two-fold, eternal and non-eternal, eternal in its atoms,* non-eternal, if different from atoms, viz. if consisting of two, three, &c. atoms. Earth, if non-eternal, is composed of parts.

If it is said: 'What evidence is there, that earth is composed of parts; (viz. a part being already a compound of two, three, &c. atoms) for you obtain the same notion, if any earthly substance, as a jar, is thought to be composed of the totality of the single atoms. *Under this supposition you need not fear,* that the invisibility of each single atom implies the invisibility of a jar, &c., *which consists of atoms;* because, although each single atom is invisible, yet the totality of them is visible, as from a certain distance the hairs *of the head* together are visible, although none of them alone is visible. Moreover we arrive at the idea for instance of one extended great jar, as we arrive at the idea of one great heap of rice.'

We reply: If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms is also beyond the perception of the senses. As to your example,

* सदकारणवन्नित्यं ।। 3. A. Kaṇ. Sút.
अतो विपरीतादणुः ।। 4. A.

An atom is, what exists has no cause, and is without commencement and end; an atom is contrary to what has a measure (अतःपरममहत्त्वात् अतिदीर्घत्वाच्च ।)

39. Water has white colour; its taste, and feel, are sweet and cold; it has also viscidity, and its fluidity is innate.

40. As to its eternity and non-eternity the same holds good as before; its organisms are not born. Its organ is the tongue; its objects are the sea, snow and similar substances.

41. Light is hot to the feel, its colour white, its fluidity not innate, but an effect from some cause; eternity and non-eternity are attributed to it in the same way as to the earth.

42, 43. Organ is the eye, objects are fire, gold, &c. The feel in the air is considered as natural; it is *temperate*, neither hot nor cold; its motion is crooked; its qualities are touch, &c.

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we maintain, that a hair, although at a distance, is not beyond the perception of the senses, because it will be perceived, if brought nearer. Nor can you say, that from a totality of invisible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced, on the ground, that it is not contradicted by perception; for visible things are not produced from invisible things; otherwise heat of the eye for instance would one or the other time become visible. If you say, that a quantity of invisible heat, contained for instance in very heated oil, may produce a visible burning, we object; for the visible burning arises from the visible parts, contained therein.

You can also not maintain, that from the invisible compound of two atoms the production of a compound of three atoms (which is visible) is impossible; for we do not say, that the visibility or invisibility of a thing arises from its own nature but from its necessary causes, as greatness, manifest form, &c. A compound of three atoms for instance is visible on account of its greatness, but not a compound of two atoms, as it has no greatness. This, however, is according to your view, impossible, because there is no greatness in an atom.—As in this manner it is proved, that *earthly substances as a jar*, are composed of parts (a part, as above already reminded, is a compound of at least two atoms) so it is clear, that they are not eternal, in consequence of their production and destruction. And there is no difference between the mountain Méru, and a mustard seed, because in either there is the same composition of parts after parts. Therefore it is necessary, that there should

Eternity and non-eternity are assigned to it as before to the other elements. Its organ is the skin, which extends over the whole body; objects are all substances, intermediate between the vital air and the great element.

44, 45. The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound, organ is the ear. Though one, it has many titles. Time[20] is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds; it is the cause of the knowledge of

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be somewhere an end (in the division of parts). To say; that the point, where the end is obtained, is not eternal, would be to admit the production of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater, finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from a small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. There is certainly no end of the division, if one has arrived at the compound of three atoms, because a compound of three atoms as an object of the eye, has parts like a jar, &c.; for from the argument, that the parts of a compound of three atoms have parts on account of its size, like the half of a jar, it is evident, that such a compound has parts. Nor can you say, there is no necessity for this (for assuming parts of such a small compound as that of three atoms) because many things (atoms) are required to produce a magnitude for so small things. This, however, does not prove the necessity of a continuation of parts after parts, because thereby a regress is infinitum would become necessary.

20. *Comm.*—Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the "now." If for instance the perception: here is now a jar, is given, there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction (vide p. 7) or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation *of a different kind,* which is produced by time.—That time is to be thought under the notion of a substrate, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception of priority

priority and posteriority; *though one*[21] it has many names as that of moment, &c.

46. Space is the cause of the notions of distance and proximity; it is one and eternal.

47. Though one, it obtains various designations, as east, west, from the division of its attribute. The soul is governing[22] the

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and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined: Time is the substrate of the *special* union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority.

21. *Comm.*—Although one, it has many names, viz. moment, hour, day, &c., past, future and present time. Past is the time, whose destruction is present, as yesterday; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, because there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be the case at the general conflagration, where also the terms of "moment," "day," &c. are applied.

22. *Comm.*—"The soul is ruling the senses and the body."—The class of soul is the class, by which the intimate cause of happiness, and unhappiness, &c. is comprehended (or: soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness, &c. and the substantiality of the soul is proved by its being the substrate of the qualities: happiness, unhappiness, &c.) I'swara (the ruler, God) is thought under the same notion (class); but since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to him, he is not subject to happiness or unhappiness; for we do not admit the invariableness of the rule that, that which is a consequence from the nature of a thing, will necessarily exist.*

Others† say: The notion (class) by which the soul‡ is thought, is not applicable to I'swara, as there is no proof for this; yet hence it does not follow, that a tenth substance must be assumed, as *the soul* is dis-

* Or in other words, for though it is necessary, that when there is an effect, there is also a cause, yet it is not necessary, that, when there is a cause, there is invariably an effect.

† Probably the ancient Nyáya is meant.

‡ The individual soul.

senses and *the body*; for an organ (instrument) must possess its agent.

48. There is no consciousness[23] in the body, as is proved by its disappearance after death. If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed.

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tinguished from *the other substances* by the idea: to be subject of knowledge. "Is governing the senses," &c., because it successively produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, I am happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, etc. To prove this, the text says: "for an instrument must possess its agent." As an instrument, for instance a knife, the instrument for cutting, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

23. To show, that the body is not the agent, it is said in the text: "There is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappearance of consciousness after death." If it is maintained: 'Conscience is knowledge, and this in your opinion is not present in the soul which has obtained liberation. Why should it therefore not just as well be absent in a dead body, because, if life ceases, also knowledge ceases?' We answer: this is impossible; for, if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles.

Nor can it be said, 'that by an impression, produced in a former body, an impression in the second body is produced,' because this would oblige you to assume an infinite number of impressions.—Further, if consciousness were inherent in the body, a child could not commence to take the milk from the breast of its mother; for the cause of this action is the knowledge of what accomplishes the desire, and at that time there does not exist the recollection of any means, accomplishing the desire. According to my opinion the commencement of the action takes then place by the recollection of the causes of the desires, experienced in a former birth. Nor can it be objected: 'Well, if this be true, let any body

49. The mind is likewise not the site[24] of consciousness, because then knowledge and other *internal* qualities would remain imperceptible.

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recollect any thing else, experienced in a former birth;' for there is nothing which calls it into recollection. In this instance there is no other means but to admit of fate for the individual soul. If this is the case, the body is without commencement, and also the soul. Hence the eternity of the soul also follows; for what is without beginning, cannot be destroyed.

'Well, let us then transfer to the eyes and the other senses the notion of cause and agent with regard to knowledge; for otherwise no cause is possible.' The answer is: "If such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed." If the eyes and other senses were destroyed, how could, by the absence of the eye, recollection remain, as the subject which perceives exists no more, and as it is quite unreasonable, that the same thing should be seen by one, and recollected by another sense, because perception and recollection must depend on the same subject, as being cause and effect.

24. *Comm.*—'Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (external) but be maintained for the eternal mind.' The answer of the text is: "The mind is likewise not the site of consciousness, because then knowledge and other *internal* qualities would remain imperceptible;" for as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, will afterwards be explained.

If it is said, (by the Védántists): 'The soul is knowledge; for its consciousness is proved by its self-manifestation; but knowledge *of this or that object,* happiness, &c. are special forms of it. And because this (special form) has only the existence of a production (भावत्वात्; I translated जन्यभावत्वात) its duration is momentary. Further, since the preceding knowledge is the cause of the consequent knowledge, and the former again the effect of a preceding, there is even in deep sleep an uninterrupted chain of knowledge down to the time of universal destruction, as the smell of musk remains in cloth. And by the communication of the impressions, produced by prior and prior *acts of*

knowledge, with posterior and posterior *acts of* knowledge, recollection and similar acts are possible.'

We deny this; for if the object of recollection is the world, omniscience would be obtained (because knowledge is a product of self manifestation); and if the object is something, there is no proof for the second member of the alternative; for hence would also follow, that in sound sleep knowledge were manifesting its object.

And if you say, 'that in this state (in the state of sound sleep) knowledge remains, but without form,' we object also; for you cannot prove, that knowledge manifests itself, as otherwise such things as a jar, &c. would also be possessed with knowledge.

Nor can you say, 'that this would answer your purpose;' for it is impossible to reject the perception of a jar and similar things.

If you maintain, 'that this is a special form of knowledge,' we would ask, what is that form? Is it distinguished from knowledge, we agree with the assumption of something different from knowledge. Is it not distinguished from knowledge, then in accordance with the general notion of knowledge, a jar of blue colour would be the same with one of yellow colour, because by its own nature there is no distinction of knowledge.

If you pretend, 'that any special property of knowledge, as yellow and blue colour, &c. must be abandoned,' we object, because the contrary notions of blue, yellow, &c. cannot be predicated of one and the same thing; otherwise it would be difficult to connect any meaning with contrary ideas.

Nor is there any communication of desires, because the communication of desires even between son and mother is impossible.

You can also not say, 'that there is a rule for things, that are the causes, and others that are the effects of communication,' because there is no communication of desires.

And if you define 'communication to be the production in something else,' there is again a contradiction; for there is no producer.

If you contend, 'that it is produced by another knowledge,' you must admit another knowledge of the same kind, and so on in infinitum.

If you think, 'there is but little contradiction in a momentary knowledge,' you cannot prove such a knowledge, and your assumption is complicated.

For the same reason consciousness in bodies of momentary duration is rejected, because it has the fault of complication and cannot be demonstrated; in the same manner the production of the fruit from the seed and from collateral causes is evident, so that there is no need of assuming a special form of making, &c.

'Let the assumption of a momentary knowledge be complicated, yet you must grant, that the soul is eternal knowledge, which cannot be destroyed; for the *S*ruti says: Lo, this is the soul, true knowledge, the infinite Bramha.'

We object also to this, because such a knowledge is evidently without object, and because it cannot be proved, that knowledge has no object; in this case it would not have even itself as an object.

Therefore, it has been proved, that the soul is different from knowledge, and that it is eternal.

True knowledge, that is the supreme Bramha, is not found in individual souls, because they are clearly distinguished from it by knowledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness and similar qualities, and in consequence the difference of I'swara is established. Otherwise servitude and liberation were names without meaning.

If it be objected: 'The same text of the Véda which explains the difference of I'swara, brings also forward his identity by his indifference; for it says: "Let us strive for the state of indifference, therefore all is placed upon the soul," and also: "In the state of liberation ignorance is annihilated."

We deny this, because, the difference being eternal (constant) its annihilation is impossible. Admitted even, that the difference is destroyed, a dualism is *for this very reason* established, and it cannot be said, that duality is destroyed. And as it is well said, that to Bramha in his state without qualities, and therefore without the quality of existence, existence is yet attributed, so it is also well said, that although there is no duality, still there are two possessed of duality.

If you say, 'that the absence of unreality which is the place of identity, is there meant with existence,' we say likewise, that the absence of identity which is the state of two possessed of duality, is meant with duality.

Although every unit is comprehended by the notion of unity, still one is not both, as it is said: smell is no attribute of earth and water,

which is clear to every body. As regards the passage of the *S*ruti, establishing the indifference at that time (the time of liberation), it establishes in fact an equality by the removal of unhappiness, &c., as it may be said, that this Puróhita by great prosperity has become a King. In this sense it is said in the *S*ruti: "He who is without sin, obtains the supreme state," meaning equality.

God is not the soul which is knowledge and happiness, but the substrate of knowledge. In such a sentence as: "Bramha is eternal knowledge and happiness," the term "knowledge" means the substrate of knowledge, by the authority of a passage like this: "He who knows all, is omniscient;" hence happiness means also a person who is happy.......

Hence is also the doctrine of the Sánkhyas refuted, which is as follows.* Nature, (Prakriti) is the agent; the soul (Púrusha) remains

* To understand more clearly the argument of the Nyáya against the Sánkhya, I shall briefly state the principles of this doctrine. According to the Sánkhya there are two kinds of substances which are the substrates of all phenomena, nature and soul. Nature (Prakriti) is one and undistinct in its original state, which is incomprehensible to the senses. As such it is Múla Prakriti, nature as the root of all things. It is productive, and in its productions various. Nature in its state as production is Vikriti, changed, or derived nature. The first production is intellect (Buddhi) or the great one, Mahat, which as a production of nature has no consciousness.—The soul (Púrusha) is manifold, or there are many souls. The soul, as contrary to nature, is not active, but it is conscious. Accordingly it has no activity in the production of ideas, which are given to the soul by intellect, and the opinion, as if the soul were an agent, is a mere delusion.

The following quotation from Prof. Wilson's Sánkhya Kárika will still more elucidate the subject (p. 16.)

....III.—Nature, the root (of all) is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

Bháshya. Múla (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhána (chief) from its being the root of seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. "No production." It is not produced from another.... "Seven principles," —Mahat and the rest, from its being the great (mahat) element; this is intellect (Buddhi).

....The seven principles are 1. intellect; 2. egotism 3—7, the five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and productive, in this manner. Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature) that again produces egotism, whence it is productive (prakriti). Egotism as derived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtile elements, it is productive. The subtile rudiment

without stain (that is untouched, neither active nor suffering) as a lotus-leaf by water; but it is conscious. It is without causality, because there is no difference between cause and effect (cause and effect are identical) and hence with the destruction of the effect, that which is like the effect, would also be destroyed. This idea (that the soul is conscious) is necessary, because the perception of consciousness which is found in intellect, would be otherwise impossible. Intellect is a modification of nature. Intellect is also called greatness and the internal organ. Under the condition, that it (intellect) exists or not exists, the soul is subject to transmigration or liberation. Its modification has the form of knowledge through the channel of the senses. If it (this modification of knowledge) is in connection with external things, as with a jar, &c., the perception of agency takes place in the soul, and the perception of consciousness in the intellect, on the ground, that the difference is perceived. For instance if it is said: "By me this is to be performed;" the first member *of the sentence,* "by me," means the perception of the soul, which is without reality, because it is the reflection of consciousness (in the intellect) by the clearness of the intellect, as the reflection of the face in a looking-glass (is without reality by the clearness of the looking-glass). The second member: "this" means the perception of the object, which by its being modified through the channel of the senses, has reality (truth) as the unclearness, produced by breathing upon a looking-glass. The third member: "Is to be performed" refers to the performance of business. Hence is intellect possessed of three parts. The connection of the soul (Púrusha) with knowledge, which is a modification of intellect, is called untrue, as is the percep-

of sound is derived from egotism, and is therefore a production, but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile element of such as generated from egotism, is a production, as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell is derived from egotism, and therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of form is a production from egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the great principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements; these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikára being the same as vikriti. Soul is neither a production nor productive.

The site[25] of merit and demerit is perceptible[26] by its being united with distinguishing qualities.

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tion of the face in an unclear looking-glass. What has been said about knowledge, &c., is also true with regard to happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, endeavour, merit and demerit, because they are evidently identical as being effects of intellect; but intellect is not possessed of consciousness, because it is a modification.

This doctrine of the Sánkhya is refuted on the ground, that consciousness is dependent on the same substrate, as action, fate and enjoyment, because there is no proof, that there is another substrate, different from this.

If you say, 'that from such a sentence as: I, who am conscious, am acting, an error of the part of consciousness is possible in consequence of the modification of intellect,' we reply by asking, whether this is not also possible on the part of the agent. Otherwise, if intellect is eternal, there is no liberation, or, if it is not eternal, there is no transmigration.

If you further contend, 'there is no consciousness of intellect, because it is an effect of unconscious nature, as effect and cause are identical,' we protest, because this has not been shown; there being no proof, that the agent is a production; for from the text, that it is without passion, that it has no birth, it follows, that it is without beginning, and as such it is also without end, as it is unreasonable, that it should be destroyed. Of what use is therefore the assumption of nature (Prakriti) and similar notions?

Nor can you say, 'that our opinion does not agree with the passage of the Bhagavadgíta saying: "by the qualities of nature are everywhere actions done; the soul, blinded by pride, fancies: I am the agent;" for its real meaning is: by "nature's," fate's, "qualities," the qualities, produced by fate, viz. by desire, etc., I am agent. If this is the case, the intention of the Bhagavadgíta is attained by the words: He, who believes the soul to be the sole agent, is liberated.

25.—"The site," &c., viz. the soul is the site. If the body were the site of them (merit and demerit, &c.), the consequences of the works, done in a former body, could not be experienced by a later body.

26.—"It is perceptible by its being united with distinguishing qualities." The soul becomes perceptible by its being united with its respective special qualities, and not in another way by such an observation: I know, I do.

50. It can be deduced from activity[27] and similar phenomena, as the charioteer from the motion of the carriage. It is the site (substrate) of egoity, and perceptible only through the mind.

51. It is pervading, and the site of intellect and other qualities. Intellect is two-fold, apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension includes four sorts, viz.

52. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal knowledge. Perception[28] comprehends six kinds, in accordance with the six organs of perception.

53. The object of the nose is smell and the notion of

27.—*Comm.* " It can be deduced from activity, &c." That the soul is in another body, is inferred from activity, etc. Activity means here exertion. As it has been mentioned before, that knowledge, desire, endeavour, &c. do not exist in the body, and further as exertion implies endeavour, it follows that there is a soul which has endeavour, on the ground that there is exertion.

28.—*Comm.* Perception is the knowledge (apprehension) which is produced by the senses, and the cause of evidence from perception are the senses. Inference is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition (Vyápti) and inferential proof is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of a general proposition, which is the cause of the conclusion. Comparison is the knowledge, produced by similarity, and proof by comparison is the knowledge of similarity, which is the cause of comparison. Verbal knowledge is the apprehension, produced by the knowledge of words, and proof by verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words, which is the cause of the former.

29.—&c., means the notion of good and bad smell.

* Similarly says Kanáda: प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि ।। Sútr. 4th Adh. The vital airs, which go upwards and downwards, the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of the mind, and the modifications of the other senses, happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and endeavour are proofs of the soul.

smell, etc.[29] Thus the object of the tongue is savour,[30] and sound that of the ear.[31]

54-55. Object of the eye is proportionate form.[32] Substances of such kind (of perceptible greatness) individuality, number, conjunction and disjunction, priority, posteriority, viscidity, fluidity, quantity, action, class, and the relations which are appropriate to the respective objects are perceived by the eye through the contact of light with proportionate form.

56. Substances, perceptible of touch, are objects of the skin; the objects of the eye, with the exception of colour, are also objects of the skin.

57. In the perception of substances is the union of the skin with the mind the cause of knowledge. Through the mind are perceptible: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and volition.

58. A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses.[33] *Proportionate* greatness is the cause as regards the perception of the six classes; organs (instruments) are the different senses.

30.—Further, sweetness, &c.

31.—Sound, articulate and non-articulate, &c.

32—Proportionate means fit to be perceived. The same proportionate greatness must be admitted also with regard to the objects of the other senses.

33.—*Comm.* "A knowledge which is without determination, is beyond the perception of the senses." If (for a man who has not the knowledge of a jar) the contact of the eye etc. (with the jar) has taken place, the determined knowledge: This is a jar, viz. determined by the general notion (class) of a jar, does not exist, because there was not before the knowledge of that, which is determining, viz. the general knowledge of a jar, &c.; for the cause of a determined knowledge is another which is determining. For instance at first is produced a knowledge, not determined by the two parts,—that which is to be determined, and that which is determining,—as a jar and the general notion (class) of the jar. Such a knowledge is without determination, and no object of perception; for from perception it is evident that I know

59. The connexion of the senses with their objects is called intercourse; this is also six-fold. 1. The perception of things takes place by contact.

60. 2. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the things, by intimate relation with that which is in contact.

61. 3. The perception of what is in intimate relation with the last mentioned relation, (viz. intimate relation with that which is in contact,) by the corresponding intimate relation, (intimate relation of that which is intimately related with that which is in contact.) 4. The perception of sound, by intimate relation. 5. The perception of what is intimately related with sound, by the intimate union with that which is intimately related, and 6. The perception of every negation by particularity.*

62. If it takes place, it is perceived, at the place where it happens to be. Intimate relation is perceived by particularity.

63. Transcendent intercourse[34] is three-fold according to its division into intercourse whose character[35] is general,[36] or

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the jar. In this perception is knowledge the determination of the soul, the jar that of knowledge, and the general notion of jar the determination of the jar. The determination which is in the determination, is called the general notion of determination. The knowledge containing the general notion of determination, is the cause of the knowledge determined by determination. For instance in the knowledge without determination of a jar is the general notion of a jar not determining. Therefore when there is an undetermined knowledge of a jar, there is not such a knowledge, as: I know the jar under the general notion of the jar, (that is to say, not such a determined knowledge, by which the soul is determined by knowledge, knowledge by the jar, and the jar by the general notion of the jar.)

34.—*Comm.* "Transcendent intercourse." Perception is two-fold, common and transcendent. The intercourse of common perception is of six kinds, which have just been explained. The intercourse of transcendent perception is three-fold.

35.—*Comm.* If in this definition the term "character" denotes its

* See note to v. 11.

whose character is knowledge, or which is produced by Yoga.

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nature (its identity with itself) the meaning is, that the intercourse is of a general nature, and this must be understood as the determination of a determinable knowledge which is in connection with any of the senses. For instance, let smoke be in contact with the eye. Here is smoke the determinable knowledge, and the general notion (class) of smoke, which (general notion) forms the intercourse, is a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever. If it is then said, that such a knowledge is in contact with a sense, the consequence would be, that, if a cloud of dust by mistake were apprehended under the notion of smoke, there could not arise a knowledge, whose object is every smoke whatsoever, as in this case with the general notion (class) of smoke no connection of the senses could take place. According to my (the author's) opinion, however, the cloud of dust is in contact with the eye; the knowledge to be determined is smoke, and the general notion of smoke, which is here the determination, the intercourse. Its contact with the sense is the common one, which takes place on the part of the external sense. On the part of the mind, however, the intercourse is merely general, and determining the knowledge. Hence if by words any kind of perception of a Pisácha,* &c. has been obtained, the apprehension of all Pisáchas is produced.

The term "general" means *here* rather the state of similar things, and this is sometimes constant, as the general notion of smoke, &c. sometimes not constant, as a jar, &c. For instance a jar is perceived either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with its half. Hence arises afterwards the knowledge of all such things, as a jar, either in contact with the ground, or in intimate relation with their halves. This must be so understood, that the intercourse of similar things (of things included in the same notion) depends on the same relation, under which the generality itself is comprehended. On the other hand where after the destruction of this jar, &c. a recollection arises of a thing like this jar, there could not, by the intercourse of a general character, take place the perception of all things like this jar, because the generality would at that time be not present. Moreover, suppose the knowledge of a jar to be determined by the contact with any sense. Here does not exist even the next day a contact with the eye, yet there arises a knowledge of similar things, because there is a generality which

* A kind of goblins.

64. The intercourse of things, comprehended in a notion, is called general knowledge. It is required a thing which manifests this or that property produced by this or that sense.[37]

65. The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse, whose character is knowledge[38].—The intercourse, produced by Yoga, is of two kinds,

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determines the knowledge of similar things. Therefore the "knowledge" of "generality" is the intercourse, and not "generality." With this view it is said in the text:

36.—*Comm.* Intercourse, "whose character is general." The term "character" means object, and the sense is: intercourse is a knowledge whose object is general.

"But where without the contact of the eye, &c. the knowledge of the common state of similar things (generality) exists, should there not be a perception through the eye of all jars, &c.?

37.—*Comm.* To remove this objection, the text says: "It is required something which manifest this or that property, produced by this or that sense."

The meaning of this is: When by an external sense through an intercourse of a general character knowledge is to be produced, there is required an object of knowledge, to be produced by one or the other sense, of this or the other generality, with reference to a thing whose generality it is. This object is the contact (or a similar relation) of the light, further the contact of the eye, &c. Hence such a knowledge is not produced by the eye for instance, when it is dark.

But if the intercourse whose character is knowledge, is an intercourse, whose nature is knowledge, and if the intercourse whose character is general, is defined in the same way, what difference then is between them?

38.—*Comm.* To show this, it is said in the text: "The intercourse of any thing, of which there is a knowledge, is called the intercourse whose character is knowledge."

Namely an intercourse whose character is general, produces a knowledge of the things upon which it depends; but an intercourse whose character is knowledge, is intercourse of the knowledge with that object to which it refers, (which is comprehended by it.) The mean-

that which belongs to the Yogi who is perfect, and that which belongs to the Yogi, who strives after perfection.[39]

66. The intercourse of the former is a constant manifestation, that of the latter takes place by the assistance of meditation.[40]

The intercourse, as regards inference, is consideration,[41] the (instrumental) cause the knowledge of a subject, invariably con-

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ing of this is: A perception does not become manifest without intercourse. First without an intercourse whose character is general, how could there exist by the mere notion (class) of smoke and fire, an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever? For this reason an intercourse whose character is general, is necessary. The objection, 'that it does not matter, whether there is an apprehension of every smoke and fire whatsoever,' is not valid; for with the visible smoke the connection of fire is indeed perceived, but no other kind of smoke is included therein, and therefore a doubt, whether smoke is invariably connected with fire or not, could in this case not arise. According to my opinion, however, the doubt, whether smoke, in whatever place or time, is to be predicated of fire or not, takes place through the intercourse of general character, by which every smoke whatsoever is comprehended.

The objection, 'that on the supposition of an intercourse of general character man would be omniscient, because in the notion of all objects of knowledge every single object of knowledge is included,' is also untenable; for although all objects of knowledge may be known by this notion, yet, there is no omniscience, because the differences of all objects are not known.

Secondly, if no intercourse whose character is knowledge, were assumed, how could there be in the knowledge: "sandalwood is fragrant," also the perception of a thing, which is fragrant? Be knowledge of fragrant things granted through the intercourse whose character is general, but the notion of fragrancy is only possible by an intercourse whose character is knowledge.

39.—*Comm.* "Intercourse, produced by Yoga," that is, a special virtue, produced by the practice of Yoga, (the union of the soul with God by means of abstract contemplation,) in accordance with the evidence of the *S*ruti, the Purá*n*as and other aut horities.

nected with a predicate in a general proposition. (The knowledge of the Vyápti.)

67. The reason which is actually known, is not the cause; in this case, there would be no inference, if the reason had for instance not yet arrived, *or had been destroyed.*

68. Consideration is the knowledge that a subject in its invariable connection with a predicate is united with the place of conclusion (Paksha, subject of the conclusion).

The invariable connection of a subject with a predicate in a general proposition (Vyápti) is called the non-connexion of the reason (middle term) with any thing different from the subject of the conclusion, (Paksha, minor term.)

40.—*Comm.* Manifestation means the perception of all things, meditation is the thinking of the mind, which is separated from all objects.

41.—*Comm.* "The intercourse as regards inference is consideration." The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the knowledge of the invariable connection of the subject with the predicate in a general proposition, (व्याप्तिज्ञानं,*) and consideration is the intercourse. For instance, let a man who from the smoke on a hearth, etc. has become aware of the invariable connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any where on a mountain an uninterrupted line of smoke. He will then re-

* व्याप्तिः (Vyápti). It is difficult to find an adequate word for this term in English. It means literally, pervading inherence, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, (see Wilson's Dict.) but it is used in the Nyáya and other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to another in a proposition of such a kind, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn from it; or: it is the relation of the subject to the predicate, and vice versâ, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the व्याप्यः the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate, and if the former is thought, also the latter is thought. The predicate is the व्यापकः, the pervading notion; it has a greater extent than the subject, and the latter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyápti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. Further, the Vyápti is a proposition, from

69. Or the perception of the identity of the reason with the conclusion (predicate of) which is not connected with anything incompatible with the subject of the conclusion. Subject (of conclusion, minor term,) is the certainty of the conclusion where the intention to conclude is not absent.

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collect the general proposition, according to which smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence arises the knowledge, this (mountain) is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This (the knowledge, that any subject is connected by the middle term with a general predicate, or the knowledge of the two premises) is consideration. Hence arises the knowledge, this mountain is fiery, which is an inference. The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that it is invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. This is denied, in the text; for if the reason (लिङ्गं, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed, because then the reason, the *pretended* special cause of a conclusion, were not present.

which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a syllogism. The names of Vyápya, Vyápaka are only used with reference to the general proposition; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, viz., the Vyápya (middle term) the name of हेतुः, reason, argument, or लिङ्गं, sign, and the Vyápaka (major term) the name of साध्यं, conclusion, predicate of the conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) is called पक्षः place (minor term, subject of the conclusion), viz. the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.—If these names in their literal acceptation appear at first curious to a European student and totally deviating from those, used in the logical terminology of the west, it must be borne in mind, that their literal sense does not in the least affect their value as logical terms, and also, that the European names for the same notions are equally figurative, and the names for instance of subordination, co-ordination, subject, predicate, conclusion, &c., but very imperfectly express the logical relation to which they refer. In fact most of these relations are in all languages taken from relations of space, as almost all terms which are of an abstract nature. As the literal translation of Vyápti, Vyápya, &c. might easily lead to false views, I have preferred to give their equivalents in the terminology accepted in Europe.

70.—From the knowledge, that with such a place the reason (middle term) is connected, inference is the consequence.

42.—*Comm.* " Consideration is the knowledge, that a subject in a general proposition (the reason, the middle term) is united with the subject of conclusion," (terminus minor.)

The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connection with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place, (minor term,) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the conclusion (major term.)

Some think: 'Also from a two-fold consideration ensues the inference, that the place, (subject) is possessed of the conclusion (predicate of.) There is (according to them) no necessity for the knowledge, that the mountain is possessed with smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. First there is the perception, that the mountain smokes; further the recollection arises, that smoke is the subject, with which fire is invariably connected. In this case inference evidently takes place from those two *acts of* knowledge. A knowledge of something (of the Paksha, the minor term) determined by a notion, which is again determined by the predicate (by a notion, determined by the Vyápti,) can never be the cause, but there takes place the cause by the knowledge, that the place is determined by the general notion of the subject (middle term, for instance a mountain determined by the general notion of smoke) because this is necessary, and because the assumption of a knowledge, determined by what is determined (by the general proposition, by the Vyápti), has the fault of complication.'

71.—There are five semblances of a reason, which are called going astray, contradiction, inconclusiveness, equalization and absurdity.

72.—The fault of going astray is again three-fold, that which is too general, that which is not general enough and non-exclusive.

We deny this; for even if there is no knowledge of the general notion (the class) of the middle term (vyápya, for instance the general notion of fire) the inference takes place from the knowledge, that there is a subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by something (middle term) with which fire for instance is invariably connected. And this assumption is also more simple; for the cause takes place by the knowledge, that there is a determination of the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) determined by the predicate of the general proposition (determined by the Vyápti).

Moreover *according to your opinion* from the knowledge: "The mountain is smoking," the inference (the mountain is fiery) should follow, because there is a knowledge, that the subject of the conclusion (Paksha) is determined by the general notion (class) of smoke, which *in this case* is the general notion (class) of the middle term (vyápya) *but this of course will not be granted by any one.*

And if you further say, 'the cause is the knowledge that the subject (of conclusion, Paksha) is determined by the general notion of the middle term (vyápya) when perceived together with the predicate of the general proposition' (Vyápti) the consequence would be, that an inference would ensue, if Chaitra perceived a subject as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition, and Maitra the general notion (attribute, class) in connexion with the subject (of conclusion).

If you lastly assume, 'that the perception of the place, determined by a general notion, by A, in conjunction with the perception of the middle term in its invariable connexion with the major term (the middle term, determined by the Vyápti,) by the same A, is the cause of the conclusion, made by this A,' there would appear an infinite series of causes for the *same* effect.

According to my opinion, the knowledge of the attribute (middle

73.—It is too general,[43] if applied to the subject (of conclusion) and to an opposite one, not general enough,[43] if excluded from either.

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term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected, takes place through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation. In this case an infinite series of causes is avoided. On the contrary, if it is said, that the knowledge of the middle term as invariably connected with a predicate in a general proposition (with the major term, as the Vyápti) and also the knowledge of the general notion (attribute, middle term) of the subject (of conclusion, minor term, Paksha) are causes, independent of each other, there would be a two-fold state of the cause of the *same* effect, and a conclusion would follow from the sentences: "There is smoke, which is invariably connected with fire," and: "The mountain is fiery." If this is correct, we may say, that if there is a double knowledge, there must be also a determined knowledge, and here at the end of the discussion, where its result is given, a complication is no fault.

(This is on the whole an excellent exposition of the logical relation of the cause of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained, in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also, that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connexion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logical form of a syllogism does not consist of one premise, and the conclusion, but of two premises with the conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, given by our author, viz. the minor term in connexion with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connexions, viz. of the minor term with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two propositions or two premises.)

43.—*Comm.*—Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject *of the conclusion* as in an opposite one. (Subject of the conclusion is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor,

74.—Non-exclusive,[44] when no other subject (of the conclu-

&c. A subject, opposite to the conclusion, is where it does not abide, for instance, in the example above given, a tank is a subject, opposite to the major term.)

That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides *also* in a subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth be the subject (minor term), smoke the major term, and fire the reason, the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which would be false, because the reason is too general; for fire (the reason) is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an iron ball.

(We would not acknowledge this as a logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but as a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong; for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is: where there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite right as well in form as in matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The fault would, however, be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been taken for the minor term.

As the Nyáya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of them only the two moods Barbara and Camestres,* we may say, that the fallacy has arisen by the major proposition being special instead of general.)

44.—*Comm.*—Non-general is the reason, which has no similar subjects of conclusion for the major term† (that is where the major term has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.) (Thus says the commentary in explanation of the text.

* In Barbara, it is hardly necessary to say, there are all three propositions general affirmatives, in Camestres the first a general affirmative, the second a general negative and the third a general negative.

† This is much more clearly stated in the Tarka Sangraha. I quote the passage in Dr. Ballentyne's translation (Lectures on the Nyáya philosophy, p. 41.) "The pretended reason, which applies neither to similar instances nor dissimilar ones, is one devoid of community." As, when one says: "Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound." Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is nothing else, whether eternal or uneternal.

sion) is possible. A reason, which does not abide in the subject (of conclusion) is called contradictory.[45]

75.—Three kinds of inconclusiveness are enumerated, viz. in-

The latter, however, is here much clearer than the former, because the question is not, whether the major is immediately found in the minor but whether it is found there by the means of another term; in the first case there would be no necessity for an argument. The example given in the commentary is: Sound is not eternal, because belonging to the class of sound. Here is, according to it, no similar instance, in which the reason (the class of sound) and by it the major is found, as the class of sound abides only in sound, and no where else. We should reject this argument at once, as having only two terms; but the Nyáya is obliged to look out for some other appliance, because class is something different from the objects comprehended by it.)

45.—*Comm.*—Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation (where the major term may be predicated of any other notion). Hereby a general negative is impossible, and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

(The Bengalee translation gives the following explanation:

"A reason, for which there is only an affirmative, is non-exclusive, that is to say, a reason, whose subject does not exclude any thing, for instance all, &c. Let all be the subject, (minor term) object of proof the major, and fit to be named the reason. This argument is non-exclusive; for here cannot be given a similar instance with regard to the subject (minor term) as it can be given in the argument: "The mountain is fiery, because it smokes;" for here is a similar instance on the part of the subject a hearth, &c. According to the opinion of the modern school a non-exclusive reason takes place, where the major admits of only an affirmative (that is to say, where the major is not excluded from any other notion) for instance in the argument: "a jar is an object of proof, because it can be named.")

(We would not consider either of these conclusions faulty in form, because the middle term is properly connected with either of the extremes. A reason then goes astray, to state it briefly, if the reason is too wide, further if it does not refer to similar instances, and lastly, if it does not refer to dissimilar ones.)

conclusiveness on the part of the subject, inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason, and inconclusiveness from limitation.

76.—Where there is a jewel hill, for instance, subject of the conclusion, there is inconclusiveness on the part of the subject.[46] Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason[47] takes place, for instance, if the substantiality of a tank be inferred from its having the quality of smoke.

77.—Inconclusiveness from limitation[48] would take place, for

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46.—*Comm.*—"A contradictory reason is one which does not abide in the subject of conclusion," (minor term) that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term (a reason which is the contrary notion of the major term). Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference.

(Here the fault again is not in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.)

47.—*Comm.*—1. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject (the minor term) is impossible. For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.

(Here also is the conclusion not wrong, the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictionem.)

48.—*Comm.*—2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason (middle term) takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed (if the reason and the subject exclude each other). Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because it smokes. Tank (or water in the tank) and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke cannot therefore be predicated of a tank.

(Here again lies the fault in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contradictory.)

instance, if fire should be inferred from blue smoke. Equalization,[49] is called a consideration from contradictory reasons.

49.—*Comm.*—3. Inconclusiveness from limitation (on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate). This can be two-fold, on the part of the subject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. First on the part of the predicate. This takes place, if the predicate is a contradictory notion. For instance if the inference were made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire (major term) is contradictory.

(Here the major premise is wrong.)

b. Secondly, on the part of the reason. (This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were the mountain is fiery from golden smoke. The fault is here again in the major premise.)

Others say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.

(This division of inconclusiveness is evidently faulty; for the first kind is inconclusive, because the minor term is contradictory, the second, because the middle and minor terms exclude each other. In the third kind two divisions are mixed, in the first of which, both the reason and the major term, are considered as contradictory, in the second the reason and major term are limited in their application by an addition which they ought not to have (in the example the addition of blue).

There are accordingly three different divisions confounded. The first proceeds from contradiction in each of the terms. In this would be included the first member of the author's division, and *a* and *b* of the third, by which it is complete. The second division proceeds from the contradiction of two of the terms; of this only one part has been given in the second member, viz. where the reason and the minor term exclude each other. Of the two other members of this division, the first, where the minor and major terms are contradictory, has not been touched upon, and the second, where the reason and the major term are contradictory, has been given in another place, viz. under the head of contradictory reason. The third division proceeds from limitation,

78.—Absurdity[50] is called the error of stating a subject in which there is not the conclusion; as if, for instance, smell would be inferred to be a quality of a jar, because it was *accidentally* perceived at the time of its production.

79.—If a rustic first sees a Gayal (species of ox), &c. his similar knowledge of cows, &c. is the instrument *to form his notion of a Gayal.*

80.—The recollection of the meaning of a sentence which had been previously pronounced, is called the intercourse *in the comparison.* The result of comparison is the knowledge of the force of the word "Gayal" and similar expressions.

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that is to say, where, instead of the notion in its whole extent, only a part of it is connected with the other two notions (in the examples blue smoke, blue fire).

50.—*Comm.*—"An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons."

An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the consideration of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclusion (major term) the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.*

51.—*Comm.*—"Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion," (which is assigned to it.)

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject (minor term) for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar the jar is taken as the subject (minor term) and smell as the conclusion,

* The Tarka Sangraha (B. I. p. 42.) explains this: a counterbalanced reason is that along with which there exists another reason which establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, "Sound is eternal, because it is audible," as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be) it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that "Sound is not eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is."

81.—The knowledge of words is the special cause. The knowledge of the meanings of words, is here the intercourse,[52] and the result is verbal knowledge. The knowledge of the power[53] of words assists in this *act*.

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there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell.

52.—*Comm.*—" The knowledge of words* is the special cause; the knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse and the result is verbal knowledge."

The cause *of verbal knowledge* is not a word, when actually heard; for though there be no word spoken, yet there may be verbal knowledge, for instance, if one who has made a vow not to speak, writes down a Sloka.

53.—*Comm.*—" The knowledge of the meanings of the words is here the intercourse." Intercourse is the recollection of the meanings of the words, produced by the words. Otherwise a person who had a knowledge of words, (who heard words) would have verbal knowledge, if he had obtained the meanings of words by perception or any other evidence. (That is to say, if he heard words, the meanings of which were given to him by perception, inference, etc.; for instance, if he heard the word "tree," while at the same time the meaning of it were conveyed to him by his actually seeing a tree. There would be two kinds of knowledge, independent of each other, and not verbal knowledge which is produced by words alone.) Here it must also be understood, that the effects of words are produced by special relation (वृत्ति:) otherwise the effect of the word "jar" for instance, would be the recollection of ether by intimate relation, and there would be accordingly verbal knowledge of the ether.

Special relation is of two kinds, implication (ellipsis) and power.

The knowledge of the power *of a word* is necessary; for unless the power *of a word* is previously apprehended, there cannot be *verbal knowledge from* recollection, which depends upon that relation (power

* A word is a sound which has a power, as for instance, the power of the sound "man" refers to an animal which has hands, feet, &c. The meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, for instance, the meaning of the word "tree" is a thing, which has a trunk, branches, leaves, &c.

of a word) although there may exist a knowledge of the words (the words may be heard). The recollection of the meaning of the knowledge of a word takes place according to the rule of the knowledge of any object which is in relation.

Power is the connexion of the meaning of a word with the same word. That by such or such a sound such or such a meaning is understood, depends upon the will of God. In names, which are at present given, there is also a power, because the rule: "Let the father on the eleventh day (after the birth of a child) give a name to the child," depends on the will of God. In a sign, however, given at present, there is no power. Such is the opinion of some, but the modern school (of the Nyáyaikas) maintain, that the will of God is not the power, but merely will (of man.) Hence is also power in a sign, which may be given at present.

The apprehension of power depends upon grammar, comparison, dictionary, the instruction of persons worthy of confidence, actual intercourse, the supplying of the sentence, substitution, and the connexion with well-known words.

a. The apprehension of the root, of the inflective base, the derivative affixes, &c. of a word is produced by grammar; it does not take place, whenever there is an obstacle, as there is, if, according to the statement of the grammarians, the power of the grammatical terminations (that is of the verbs and nouns) refers to the agent. In the sentence: "Chaittra cooks" the termination in "cooks" is inseparably connected with the agent "Chaittra."

This connexion, we maintain, does in this case not arise, in consequence of its complication; but in the action (cooks) the power is produced, because this assumption is simple,* for it is manifest, that the action is a determination *of Chaittra*. .. .. ..

b. The power which takes place by comparison, has been before described.

c. In the same manner power is also apprehended by the dictionary; if there is, however, any obstacle, it is not apprehended. Thus according to the dictionaries, the adjective terms of "blue," &c. have power with reference to blue colour and to a thing which has

* According to the grammarians it must be said: "Chaittra, not separated from what is determined by the action referring to cooking," while the Nyáyaikas say: "Chaittra, determined by the action, referring to cooking."

blue colour; but it is more simple to say, that this term by its power refers to the quality of blue, and by implication to a thing which has blue colour.*

d. Or the power is derived from the word of a person, worthy of confidence, if for instance it is said, that the word "Pika" (a black cuckoo) is the same as "Kokila," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehended.

e. Or from actual intercourse. If for instance the master who is a grown up person, orders his servant who is also a grown up person, to bring the jar, and the jar is brought by the latter, a boy who attends to this, hence observes that the action of bringing a jar is connected with those words. If he further hears: "Take away the jar," "bring the cow," he understands the power of the term: "jar," &c., to be brought or to be taken away, with reference to a jar, &c. in connexion with an action.

Some say: 'Under this supposition there is no verbal knowledge in the sentence: "There is a blue jar on the ground;" for the power of a jar, &c. is apprehended by a jar, as connected with an action, and the power of any termination of a verb refers to the understanding of an action, but in this case there is no connexion of such a kind, and therefore no verbal knowledge?'

We do not agree, because, although it is at first necessary for brevity's sake to admit a power with reference to a jar, as determined by action, it is right to omit it afterwards.. .. .. ..

f. Or from supplying the sentence. (This takes place, if in a sentence a word has a special meaning, while from other sentences it is known, that the meaning is more general.)

g. Or from substitution. Substitution means the definition of the sense of a word by another word of the same sense; thus, if for the word belligerous "warlike" is substituted, the power refers to the word "warlike."† .. ..

h. Or from the connexion with well-known words, for instance in the sentence: "In this mango tree the Pika sweetly sings," the power of the word "Pika" is apprehended in this manner.

* If a word has several meanings, there is a separate power for each of them.

† In the original the examples are: "ghaṭa:" and "kalasa," either of which means a jar.

Some (the Mímánsikas) maintain: 'The power *of a word* refers to the class (notion) and not to the individual, because in the latter case it would go astray, and require assumptions without end. And on the first supposition there is also a knowledge of the individual, because without individuals the knowledge of a class is impossible.'

We deny this, because without assuming a power, the apprehension of an individual does not take place.

Nor does implication (ellipsis) refer to an individual; for an individual may be apprehended, although there is no want of apprehension *of the literal meaning of a word* (an implication is dependent on the circumstance, that a word cannot be comprehended in its literal sense.)

Nor need there be any fear, that by assuming a power, referring to an individual, the fault of an infinite number of hypotheses is committed; for we assume one and the same power for all individuals.

Nor is there (by the assumption, that power refers to the individual) a want of extension; for this extension is effected by the class of cow for instance (when a cow is the individual).

Moreover, if the power is apprehended for instance in cow, possessed of power, the force refers to an individual. If on the contrary the power is apprehended for instance in the class of cow, then there would be a recollection of the meaning of a word, determined by the class of cow, and a verbal knowledge would be impossible, because the knowledge of the power by the same determination would be the cause of the recollection of the meaning of a word and of verbal knowledge. Moreover, if the power refers to the class of cow, we must declare, that the class of the class of cow is the determination of what is possessed of the power. But the class of cow, which is not in intimate relation to any thing that is not cow, is in intimate relation to all cows. Hence your assumption of a determination of the notion of any thing, possessed of power, is complicated, because this notion does not refer to individual cows; therefore in order to comprehend this or that individual, possessed of this or that class, it is necessary to assume a power, which is founded on individuals, determined by class and form.

A word, possessed of power, is either Yaugika, or Rúḍha, or Yoga-rúḍha, or Yaugika-rúḍha.

1. A word is Yaugika, if its meaning is understood by the meaning of its parts; for instance in the word "giver" (in Sanscrit the ex-

82.—Implication,[54] is the relation of a word which has power, and it takes place when the intention *of the speaker* is not understood *by the literal meaning of a word.* The cause *of understanding a sentence* is contiguity, consistency, construction and intention.

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ample is Pachaka, cook) *the root giv (e) expresses the action give, and the termination "er" refers to the agent. And the whole expresses the meanings of the parts, viz. an agent with reference to the action "give."*

2. Rúḍha is a word, which, independent of the power of its parts, is only understood by the power of the whole, as for instance "go" (cow, for "go" is derived from "gam," to go, which does not express the meaning of go,) "ghaṭa :" (jar) etc.

3. Yogarúḍha is a word, which, beside the power of its parts, expresses a different meaning as a whole, for instance "Pankaja" (from "Panka," mud, and "ja," born) for the word "Pankaja" means by the power of its parts "an agent, born in mud" (which includes any thing, produced in such a manner) but by its power as a whole a "waterlily" (that is only one of the things, born in mud). .. .. ..

4. Yaugika-rúḍha is a word, which is understood either by the meaning of its parts, or by Rúḍha, for instance Udbhid. The power of the word "ud" refers to upwards, the power of the root "bhid" to cutting. Therefore by its Yaugika power it refers to tree, and by its power of Rúḍha it refers to any germ, produced from corn.

54.—*Comm.*—"Implication is the relation of a word, which has power, and it takes place, when the intention *of the speaker* is not understood *by the literal sense of a word.*"

For instance, let the sentence be given : "Ghosha dwells on the Gangá." If in this case, with reference to the literal meaning of "Gangá," viz. the current, either the connexion of Ghosha, or the intention of the speaker is not obtained, the meaning of "bank" is understood by implication. This implication is the relation of a word which has power. Here, from the knowledge of the connexion of the literal meaning of the current with the bank, a recollection of the bank is produced, and hence the meaning of the sentence is understood.

Moreover if the want of connexion *alone* were the cause of implication, there would be no implication in the sentence : "Let the staffs

83.—Contiguity,[55] is called the proximity of words.

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enter," because there is no want of connexion with reference to the entering of the staffs. Therefore, because here the entrance of the staffs has no reference to the intention of the speaker, which is the taking of food, the implication refers to the bearers of staffs. In the same manner, in the sentence: "Protect the ghee from the crows" the word "crow" has an implication to any thing which may injure the ghee, because the intention of the speaker refers to the preservation of the ghee generally. In the same manner, if it is said: "The umbrella-bearers are proceeding;" the word "umbrella-bearers" implies the merchants of a caravan.

This latter is called the implication which does not lose its own meaning (Ajahatsárthá Lakshaṇá, which keeps its own meaning, beside that which it obtains from implication) because by the term "merchants of a caravan" the bearers of umbrellas as well as those without umbrellas are understood.

Moreover, if the want of sense in the connexion *alone* were the cause of implication, sometimes the word "Gangá" would imply: "bank," sometimes the word: "Ghosha," "fish," &c. and there would be accordingly no rule. This, however, must be understood: if the connexion of the meaning of a word, possessed of power, is apprehended by the notion of bank, bank must be apprehended by the notion of bank; if, on the other hand, it is apprehended by the notion of the bank of the Gangá, it must be recollected by that notion. Therefore there is no implication in the general notion of an implication, because the general notion is understood without implication. Likewise, there is no power in the general notion of what has power, because any word is able to remind of the meaning of its general notion.

But if there is an implication by the successive connexion of a word, possessed of power, it is called an implied implication, as for instance in the word "Dwirépha" (literally, that which has two wings, figurative, "black bee") the connexion of: "two-winged," refers to "Bhramara" (black bee) that of "Bhramara" to black bee; this is an implied implication.. .. .. ..

55.—*Comm.*—Contiguity means proximity, viz. the uninterrupted succession of two *or more* words which have a connexion among each

other. Therefore there is no verbal knowledge in the words: "The by inhabited was Dévadatta volcano;" but if by a mistake in the proximity no mistake in the verbal understanding is the consequence, it does not matter.

'But in the sentence: "With umbrella, earrings and clothes adorned is Dévadatta," the recollection of the second word destroys the recollection of the first; accordingly, as there is an interruption, a recollection of the second word is impossible.'

We do not grant this, as by the impressions of each word until the last an uninterrupted recollection of all objects is possible; for as by several kinds of intercourse one and the same perception arises, so also one and the same recollection arises by several impressions, and the knowledge of the last letter together with the impressions of all words brings *all* to recollection. How could otherwise exist the recollection of any word that has many letters?

Moreover; some say, that, as in a field all pigeons are caught in the same net, so by the recollection of all the meanings of words does take place the verbal knowledge of all meanings of words, which is corresponding to the knowledge of the connexion depending upon the object and verb. Others say: if connected with all such words, as are construed, consistent and contiguous, verbal knowledge of all the words (included in the sentence) takes place; for, they say, after the meaning of the single sentences has been understood, the meaning of the great sentence will be comprehended by the recollection of the meanings of the words. Hence the assumption of a total impression of a word, manifesting all the letters, has been refuted, because by the apprehension of the last letter, together with the impressions of all the preceding letters which (apprehension) manifests the word, the word is apprehended. This must be understood, if it is said: "the door," the meaning of the word is obtained by the knowledge of the word "close," but not by the knowledge of the meaning of such acts as closing, &c., because the actual presence of the meaning of a word, which is produced by a word, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Moreover, as the words denoting action and object, are mutually connected, it is impossible, that there is verbal knowledge without a word, denoting a verb. In the same manner, if it is said: "Of the flowers," it is necessary to assume: "he is desirous," because without this the preposition "of" could not be applied.

Consistency[56] is the mutual correspondence of the meanings of the words.

84.—Construction,[57] is the selection of such terminations, without which the meaning of a sentence is unintelligible. Intention,[58] is based on the wish of the speaker.

56.—*Comm.*—Consistency is the connexion of the meaning of one word with that of another. Accordingly there is no verbal knowledge in such sentences as: "He sprinkles with fire," because there is no meaning in it. If it is objected, 'that previously to the verbal knowledge there is nowhere a knowledge of this consistency, because there is not before a meaning of the sentence,' we reply: there is a knowledge of consistency which is sometimes doubtful, sometimes certain, if there is a recollection of the meanings of the different words. The modern school, however, says, that the knowledge of consistency is no reason of verbal knowledge. If it is said: "He sprinkles with fire," there is no verbal knowledge, because the inconsistency, which is that fire cannot be an instrument in the action of sprinkling, is certainly an obstacle. Because the certainty of its absence is an obstacle only in a knowledge, which is not produced by common intercourse or by special defects, therefore it is proved, that it is an obstacle with reference to verbal knowledge—although it is not proved, that by the late appearance of consistency verbal knowledge is late.

57.—*Comm.*—Construction is the connexion of one word with another, without which the former has no sense. The case, denoting agent, has no connexion without the case, referring to action, and with this the former is construed. In fact, however, the proximity of the cases denoting agent and action, is included in contiguity. Moreover, with reference to the objective case, for instance of jar, the cause is the knowledge of the termination of the second case. Therefore there is no meaning in such sentences as: "The jar is the accusative case," "to bring is an action."

58.—*Comm.*—Intention is the wish of the speaker. Suppose, intention were not a cause of verbal knowledge, and such a sentence as: "Bring the Saindhava" (meaning horse and salt) were pronounced, there would sometimes the meaning of "horse," and sometimes the meaning of "salt," be obtained. It cannot be said, that the circum-

85.—The instrument[59] in the perception of happiness and other *internal qualities* is the mind.[60] The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time.[61]

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stances, &c. by which the intention is apprehended, are the cause of verbal knowledge, because they are not included *in the definition.* And if it is said, 'that they are included as being the cause of the knowledge of the intention,' it is simple to say, that the knowledge of the intention is the cause. In this manner, God is assumed for the knowledge of the intention with reference to the Védas. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is here the cause,' because at the commencement of the creation there is no teacher. Nor must it be said: 'there is no general conflagration (destruction of the world,) how can therefore be a commencement of creation?' for a general conflagration is proved by the *S*ástra. In the same manner is in the sentence of a parrot the knowledge of the intention of God the cause, but in a vile sentence of the parrot the knowledge of the intention of the speaker.

Others say: If there is a word which has different meanings, the knowledge of the intention is sometimes the cause; moreover, in the sentence of a parrot is also verbal understanding without the knowledge of the intention, and with reference to the Védas the meaning is apprehended by the discussions, which are purified by the eternal Mímánsa.

59.—*Comm.*—Intellect was divided into two kinds; viz. apprehension and remembrance (vid. verse 51.) The nature of apprehension has been explained. Remembrance will not be explained, because it is easy to be understood; for the cause of it is a former apprehension. Some say, 'the class (notion) of apprehension is not causality, but the class (notion) of knowledge;* otherwise there would be no remembrance after a remembrance, because the former impression would be destroyed by the remembrance of the common notion. According to my opinion, however, there is by this remembrance through a new impression a new remembrance produced.' This we cannot grant; where after the *remembrance of a perception* in its totality the remembrance of

* That is to say, apprehension is not the cause of remembrance, but knowledge in general.

86.—Qualities[62] abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions.

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the single objects (constituting a totality) as of cloth, jar, &c. is produced, but so that there is no remembrance of all the objects, there it must be said, that, as the impression of *every single* remembrance is not destroyed, time, or disease, or the last remembrance is the cause of the destruction of the impression. Accordingly, it cannot be said, 'that a gradual remembrance is impossible,' nor, 'that by repeated remembrance, a stronger impression is impossible;' for the word "strong" means here what suddenly recalls to mind. It also cannot be said, 'that the cause is knowledge, as there is no alternative;' for if the special attribute is assigned, there is no going astray; but knowledge has the fault of superfluous causality, as it is a general attribute. How could otherwise a stick be the cause *of a jar* by being turned round, and not as well by its being a substance or having colour? Nor must it be said: 'There is an apprehension, that the intermediate remembrance will go astray, because the impression is destroyed;' for by objecting to assuming an infinite number of impressions and by assuming the destruction of the impression of the last remembrance, a going astray cannot be apprehended.

60.—*Comm.*—The existence of mind is proved by the following inference. The perception of happiness, &c. takes place by an instrument, because the perception is a production, as for instance is the perception by the eye. This instrument is the mind. It cannot be said 'that the perceptions of unhappiness, &c. are produced by other instruments,' because the necessity of only one instrument as cause for all similar perceptions is evident from its simplicity. Thus the mind is proved as being the substrate of contact, which is the non-intimate cause of unhappiness, &c.

61.—*Comm.*—"The atomic nature of the mind is proved from the fact, that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at one and the same time."

It is clear from apprehension (perception) that various objects of perception, for instance, objects of the eye, of taste, &c. are not at one and the same time produced; for although there may exist an intercourse of the several senses with these objects, yet knowledge is produced by *only* one sense, because *the mind* is in contact with *only* one

Material qualities[63] are colour, taste, feel, and smell, priority and posteriority,

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sense, and it is not produced (at that time) by any other sense, as *the mind* is not in contact with it. Therefore if the mind were to be comprehended by the notion of a pervading substance, it should be connected with every thing; hence (as this is not the case) it follows, that the mind is not pervading. It must not be said, 'that the knowledge of the mind is late (successive) because at that time the special fate (merit or demerit) which reminds of knowledge, is also late;' for, if this were the case, there would be no necessity for assuming *such instruments of knowledge* as the eye, &c.

Nor must it be said: 'How *can the narrowness of the mind be reconciled with the fact,* that at one and the same time a knowledge from different senses exists, for instance at the time when one eats a large cake;' for the mind is some thing very subtle, and is therefore rapidly in contact with various senses, so that different kinds of knowledge may arise *in the same imperceptible succession,* as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced; it is a mere delusion, if *several kinds* of knowledge appear at the same time.

Nor must it be said, 'that both (the atomic and pervading nature of the mind) is reconciled under the assumption, that the nature of the mind may contract or expand,' because the assumption of many parts subject to destruction, &c. is complicated, and on the other hand, the assumption of a mind without parts is simple.

62.—*Comm.*—" Qualities abide in substances, and are without qualities and actions."

If it is asked, what proof is there for a separate class of quality? The answer is: The causality, found in what is possessed of generality, different from that (generality) referring to substances and actions,* is determined by some attribute, because causality for a thing which is not determined by some attribute, is impossible; but neither the class of colour, &c. nor the class of existence is this determination, because in the first case it would not comprehend enough (all other quali-

* To understand this, it must be recollected, that generality (class) abides in substances, qualities and actions; the generality therefore, different from the class of substance and action, must be that of quality.

87, 88.—Fluidity, gravity, viscidity and velocity.—Merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect and others of similar nature are called immaterial qualities by philosophers.[64] Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction are considered qualities of either class.

89.—Conjunction and disjunction, the different numbers from two upwards, separatedness found in two things or more, are qualities which abide not in one and the same thing.

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ties being excluded) and in the second it would comprehend too much, (viz., also substances and actions.) Therefore it is contained in the 24 (qualities) and is the class of quality.

"It abides in substances." Although it is not its definition: to be dependent on substance, because it would be too wide, as including also action and class, yet it is right to say: it is what is possessed of the class different from existence which class is the determination extending as far as substantiality, because the class of quality is the determination, extending as far as substantiality, and quality is what is possessed of this determination. The classes of action and substance are not determinations, extending as far as substantiality, because substantiality and action do not abide in the sky, &c. and the class of the class of substance, and the class of generality (class) are no *real* classes.

"Without qualities." Although action, generality, &c. are also without qualities, yet it must be understood as the absence of qualities, found in the category which is possessed of generality and different from action; for class and the subsequent three categories have no generality (class); action is not different from action, and substance is not without qualities. Therefore this definition is not too wide.

"Without actions" is only said to describe it, not to define it, because it would otherwise be too wide, the ether being also without action.

63.—Material substances are: earth, water, light, air and mind (material according to the Nyáya is that the measure of which has a limit, and for this reason, mind which is an atom, is included in it.)

64.—Immaterial qualities are: merit and demerit, memory, sound, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, and endeavour (volition). Immaterial substances are; the sky, time, space and soul.

90.—All the remaining qualities[65] abide only in one thing. Special qualities[66] are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, touch, viscidity, original fluidity,

91.—Fate, memory and sound: General qualities are: number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity.

92. 93.—Gravity and velocity. Number, quantity, separatedness, conjunction, and disjunction, priority and posteriority, fluidity and viscidity are perceived by two senses.

Sound, colour, taste, smell and touch, are *respectively* perceived by one of the external senses.

94.—Gravity, fate and memory, transcend the perception of the senses. The special qualities of the pervading substances[68] are not produced by the qualities of any cause.[69]

65.—*Comm.*—The remaining qualities are: colour, taste, touch, measure which is an unit, separatedness, found only in one individual, priority, posteriority, intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, gravity, viscidity, faculty, fate (merit and demerit) and sound.

66.—The special qualities of the earth are: colour, taste, smell and feel; of the water: colour, taste, feel, viscidity and natural fluidity; of the light: colour and feel; of the air: feel; of the sky: sound; of the soul: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, merit, demerit and memory.

67.—*Comm.*—By two senses, viz. by the eye and the skin.

68.—*Comm.*—Qualities of the pervading substances are: intellect, happiness, unhappiness, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, memory, and sound.

69.—*Comm.*—" They are not produced by the qualities of any cause." Colour, smell, &c. depend upon the quality of the cause (for instance the colour, taste, smell and feel of a jar depend upon the same qualities of the two halves, of which it is formed) the same cannot be admitted with regard to intellect, &c. because there is no cause of the soul, the ether, &c.

95. 96.—Natural colour, taste, smell, feel, likewise fluidity, viscidity, velocity, gravity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, quantity and elasticity are produced from the qualities of causes. Conjunction, disjunction and velocity are effected by actions.

97.—Colour, taste, smell, touch, quantity, unity, separatedness found in individuals, viscidity and sound are non-intimate causes,

98.—Special qualities of the soul have only instrumental causality. Hot feel, gravity, velocity, fluidity, conjunction and disjunction and the other qualities denoting two extremes, are of two fold causality.[69]

99.—The special qualities of pervading substances, as well as conjunction and disjunction and other qualities denoting two extremes,* are limited.

100.—Colour is perceived by the eye, it manifests substances, *qualities and classes,* it is the cause of the perception of the eye, and is white, &c., according to the variety of colours.

101.—It is eternal in the atoms of water and *light,*[70] in all other substances it has a cause. Taste is perceived by the tongue; it is various, as sweet, bitter etc.

(The special qualities of the soul are only instrumental causes; for intellect, &c. is not the non-intimate cause of any thing; but the knowledge of what is possible by action is the instrumental cause of the desire of action.)

69.—*Comm.*—Viz. the instrumental and non-intimate causes.

70.—*Comm.*—" Colour is eternal in the atoms of water and light," because it is there from their nature, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, as by the process of cooking another colour is produced.

* The second distich of this verse in the former edition has been omitted, the whole context showing that it is an interpolation. The same has been done with the first distich of verse 68, for the same reason, so that the present edition contains one verse less than the former.

102.—Its instrument (organ) is the tongue; as regards eternity, &c. it is like colour.[71] Smell is perceived by the nose, it is the cause of perception through the nose.

103.—There are two kinds of smell, good and bad.[72]

Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin.

104.—It is threefold, tepid, cold and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth; with regard to its eternity, the same holds good as above.[73]

105.—These[74] *qualities* as abiding in earth, are produced by cooking, while this is not the case as regards the other elements. The change produced by cooking takes place according to the opinion of the Vaiséshikas[75] in the single atoms.

71.—*Comm.*—Taste is eternal in the atoms of water, all other taste is non-eternal.

72.—*Comm.*—Smell is non-eternal (because it abides alone in earth, and in the atoms of earth another smell is produced by the process of cooking.)

73.—*Comm.*—The feel of earth and air is temperate, of water cold, and of light hot... Feel is eternal in the atoms of water, light and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth, (for the same reason as before.)

74.—*Comm.*—These, viz. colour, taste, smell and feel. As abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, smell and feel of earth are changed; not so as abiding in water, &c. for although water, &c. be a hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. takes place. The smell and heat of water, *on the other hand*, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth.

75.—*Comm.*—The Vaiséshikas say, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows. As long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible; but when by the union of fire the compound substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the

atoms which have become independent *of each other*. And again by the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three, &c. atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a compound of two atoms by a new production a compound, possessed of shape, &c. is formed in a few moments.

For the instruction of the student an explanation of this topic is here given.

The Sútra of the Vaiséshikas is as follows: "Action is a cause which is independent of conjunction and disjunction:" which means, that its consequent state is independent of its antecedent state; otherwise, as the action also produces the consequent conjunction, there would be the fault of too wide a definition, because the action would depend upon the destruction of the antecedent conjunction.

If here a disjunction, produced by disjunction, is not acknowledged, nine moments are required. If it is acknowledged, the disjunction, depending upon something produces disjunction; *but* if the cause is something independent, action takes place. If there is a disjunction produced by disjunction, as depending upon the time, which is determined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance commencing *perceptible* substances (for which a compound of three atoms is required) ten moments are necessary. If further the disjunction produced by disjunction depends upon the time or upon part (of a compound) either of which is determined by the destruction of a substance, eleven moments are necessary.

1. Nine moments.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction from another atom, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance (which consists of three atoms,) hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue, &c. in the atom, hence 3. the production of the quality of red, &c., hence 4. the action in accordance with the production of the first elements of things, hence 5. disjunction, hence 6. destruction of the former conjunction, hence 7. the conjunction, by which the first elements of a com-

pound are formed, hence 8. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 9. the production of the quality of red, &c.

If it is objected, 'that in the moment, when the quality of blue is destroyed, or in the moment, when the quality of red is produced, there is in the atom the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance;' we deny this, because in an atom, previous to the destruction of the action which takes place in an atom that is united with fire, and also previous to the production of a quality, there is no other action with regard to the atom possible; for *we hold the principle, that* in a thing where there is an action, no *other* action is possible, and also, that in a substance without quality an action, in accordance with production of the first elements of substances, cannot take place.

Nor can in an atom at the same time that the quality of blue, &c. is removed, the quality of red be produced, because the destruction of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent colour, etc.

2. Ten moments. They take place, if by disjunction, depending upon a time, determined by the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, another disjunction is effected.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, which is the element of a compound of twŏ atoms, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, by which the first elements of a compound are formed, hence 1. the destruction of the compound of two atoms and the disjunction, produced by disjunction, hence 2. the destruction of the quality of blue and the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 3. the production of the quality of red and the consequent conjunction, hence 4. the destruction of the action, produced by the conjunction* of the fire, with regard to the atom, hence 5. the action, in accordance with the production of the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 6. disjunction, hence 7. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 8. the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 9. the production of a compound of two atoms, and hence 10. the production of the quality of red, &c.

3. Eleven moments.

* Nodanam means a conjunction, by which no sound is produced. See v. 119.

From the conjunction of fire there takes place action in the atom, hence disjunction, hence the destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 1. the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 2. disjunction, produced by disjunction, depending upon a time determined by the destruction of a compound of two atoms, hence 3. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 4. the consequent conjunction, hence 5. the destruction of the action with reference to the atom, hence 6. the action, forming the first elements of a compound substance, like the conjunction of fate with the soul, hence 7. disjunction, hence 8. the destruction of the former conjunction, hence 9. the conjunction forming the first elements of a compound substance, hence 10. the compound of two atoms, hence 11. the production of the quality of red. One and the same conjunction of fire destroys not the *blue* colour and produces the red colour, as the intermediate sound destroys the preceding and produces the subsequent sound; for one and the same fire continues not for the whole time. Moreover, if the cause of the production were also the cause of destruction, then, if by the destruction of the colour &c. the fire were also destroyed, the atom would remain for a long time without colour. If on the other hand, the cause of destruction were also the cause of production, then, if at the production of the red colour the fire (the cause of the production) were destroyed, there could not be produced the red colour.

If in this manner the action is considered in another atom, the quality is produced in five and more moments.

In five moments. The action takes place in one atom, hence disjunction, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound substance, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and disjunction, produced by action in another atom. This is one time. Hence destruction of blue, &c. and from the disjunction the destruction of the former conjunction. This is the second time. Hence the production of the red, and the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound. This is the third time. Hence the production of the compound of two atoms, which is the fourth time, and hence the production of the red, which is the fifth time.—If one considers the destruction of the substance at the same time with the action in another atom, then the production of

106.—While the Naiyáyikas affirm,[76] that change is effected also in two or more atoms. The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number.[77]

107.—Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient unity to transient substances.[78] Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect,

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the quality takes place in six moments. In this manner. By the action in one atom disjunction takes place in another atom, hence destruction of the conjunction, forming the first elements of a compound, hence destruction of the compound of two atoms, and action in another atom, hence destruction of the blue and disjunction, produced by action in another atom, hence production of the red, and destruction of the former conjunction in another atom, hence conjunction in another atom, hence production of the compound of two atoms, then production of the red. In the same manner seven moments are required, if one at the time of the destruction of the blue considers the action in another atom, and eight moments, if one considers the production of the red at the same time with the action in another atom.

76.—*Comm.*—" While the Naiyáyikas affirm." It is the opinion of the Naiyáyikas, that also in compounds, viz. in compounds of two, three, &c. atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their view is this. As compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The opinion of Vaiséshikas is complicated, as it assumes the destruction of an infinite number of parts. If this is the case, the recognition: " this is that jar," is consistent; but where there is no recognition, there we can admit a destruction of the compound.

77.—*Comm.*—" The cause as regards the operation of counting, is called number." The cause, viz., the non-intimate cause.

78.—*Comm.*—" Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances, transient to transient substances." Eternal substances are the atoms of material substances, further time, space and soul, transient substances for instance a jar, &c.

108.—And they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object.[79] The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers are also destroyed.[80]

79.—*Comm.*—" Numbers from two upwards to an indefinite number are produced by comprehending intellect, and they are collectively apprehended in their dependance upon more than one object."

Numbers from two upwards, depending upon the addition of one to one, are produced by comprehending intellect.

Although the relation, indicating the class of two, three, &c. abides for instance in each of two, three, &c. jars &c. yet as there is not a knowledge, that one is two, and further as there is the knowledge, that one is not two, it must be assumed a relation, indicating the collective apprehension of two, three, &c. which depends upon more than one object.

80.—*Comm.*—" The comprehending intellect being destroyed, those numbers, (from two upwards) are also destroyed." First there is the comprehending intellect, then the production of the class of two, &c. then the determining knowledge, viz. the determination of the class of class of two, then the perception determined by the class of two. If the comprehending intellect is destroyed, also the class of two is destroyed.

Although no other knowledge does continue for three moments, because the special qualities of the respective pervading substances are destroyed by the qualities succeeding to them,* yet it must be assumed, that the comprehending intellect continues for three moments; otherwise the comprehending intellect would be destroyed at the time of determination, and thereby also the class of two, three, &c.; for there would be no perception of the class of two, because no object were present, and only when it is present, a knowledge is produced by the eye, &c. Therefore it must be assumed, that the perception of the class of two destroys the comprehending intellect.

It must not be asked, 'how by the destruction of the comprehending intellect the class of two, &c. is destroyed,' because at another time there is no perception of the class of two; for it is clear, that the

* For instance a sound by another, which follows it, or a perception, thought, etc. by a succeeding one.

109.—Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities.[81] Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring.[82]

110.—Point (atom of space) length, thickness, breadth, are the differences of quantity; in transient things it is transient, in eternal things eternal.[83]

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comprehending intellect is the cause of those numbers, and its destruction destroys also them. Therefore the class of two, produced by the comprehending intellect of A, is comprehended by the same A.

Nor must it be said, "that the comprehending intellect is the cause of the perception of the class of two," &c., because it is right for brevity's sake to assign it as the cause of the class of two, &c.

The comprehending intellect of the Yogis refers to compounds of two atoms, &c. which transcend the perception of the senses. The comprehending intellect of God (I'swara) or of the Yogis abiding in the mundane egg, refers to the atoms at the time of the creation of the world.

81.—*Comm.*—"Comprehending intellect is called the intellect which refers to many unities."

This is the intellect, which apprehends, that this is one, this is one, &c. It must be understood, that, where there is a knowledge of undefined unities, there is produced the number, referring to many, different from two, three, &c. as where there is a forest, an army, &c. This is the opinion of Kandalí-kára. The A'cháryas, however, think, that the class of many, is the class of three, &c. Therefore the class of many includes the class of three, &c. Although the class of three, &c. is included in an army, yet the class of the class of three, etc. is not apprehended, because this would be wrong. If this is the case, the notion is possible, that this army is greater than that, because if the class of many were without number, there could not exist the notion of a comparative and superlative degree.

82.—*Comm.*—"Quantity is the cause of the operation of measuring," viz. the non-intimate cause.

83.—"In transient things it is transient," viz. in a compound of two atoms, &c. "In eternal things it is eternal," viz. is the sky, &c.

111.—Transient quantity is produced from number, measure, and heaps. Quantity found in two and more atoms arises from number;[84]

112.—As met with in a jar and similar *extended* things it arises from measure; the conjunction of so called loose things, it is a heap. By this (conjunction)

113.—Measure is produced in such things for instance as cotton. If the place, upon which it (the measure) depends, is destroyed, it is also destroyed. Separatedness which is like number[85] is the cause of the knowledge of separate things.

114.—It cannot be said, that it is included in mutual negation; for it is not the same to say, "this is different from that," and, "this is not that."

115.—Conjunction is called the obtaining of two things unobtained before. It is threefold, the first kind is produced from the action of one of two;

84.—*Comm.*—"Quantity found in two and more atoms." The measure of one atom is not the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of two atoms, nor a compound of two atoms the cause with regard to the measure of a compound of three atoms, because a measure produces a measure which is greater than its own kind.* But the measure of a compound of two atoms is not greater than one atom, and the measure of a compound of three atoms has nothing of its own kind; therefore the non-intimate cause of a compound of two atoms is the number of two in an atom, and of a compound of three atoms the number of three in a compound of two atoms.

85.—*Comm.*—"Separatedness which like number," viz. the non-intimate cause of the knowledge of separatedness is separatedness. It is like number in its relation to eternal and transient things; viz. as the class of unity is eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things, as transient unity is produced in the second moment after *the production of* the thing upon which it depends, and is destroyed, when this is destroyed, so the same must be understood with regard to separatedness of two, three, &c.

* Vid. p. 8.

116.—The second from the united action of both, the third from conjunction. Of the first is an instance that of the falcon and the rock.

117.—Of the second, the fighting of two rams; of the third, the conjunction of the tree and the jar which is produced by the conjunction of the tree with one half of the jar.

118.—The conjunction which is effected by action is again two-fold, the one effected by violent, the other by soft motion; the first is the cause of sound.

119.—The second is not the cause of sound. Disjunction comprehends also three kinds. The one is produced by the action of one, the second by the action of two,

120.—The third by disjunction. This latter is again of two kinds; the one arises by the disjunction of the cause only, the other by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.[86]

86.—*Comm.*—With regard to the two first kinds of disjunction, the same examples are to be understood as with regard to the two first kinds of conjunction. The third is again two-fold, viz. as produced either by the disjunction of the cause, or by the disjunction of the cause and non-cause.

Where there is an action with regard to one half of a jar, there ensues a disjunction of the two halves, hence the destruction of the conjunction forming the jar, hence destruction of the jar, hence by the action, which consists in the disjunction of the half, the disjunction of the half of the jar from the other part of space, hence a destruction of the conjunction with the other part of space, hence the conjunction with another part of space, hence the destruction of the action.......

Where by an action of the hand, a separation of the tree and the hand takes place, there arises the belief that the tree is also separated from the body. Here in the separation of the body from the tree is the action of the hand not the cause, because they are not at one and the same place. Again there is no action in the body, as the action of a compound is regulated by the actions of each of its parts; therefore is here produced by the disjunction of cause* and non-cause also a disjunction of effect and non-effect.

* Cause, as it appears, is here the tree.

121.—Posteriority and priority are two-fold with regard to time, or to space, and are only applicable to material bodies.

122.—Posteriority of place (distance) is perceived from a greater space intervening between the conjunction of the sun, priority (nearness) by the perception of less space.

123.—The non-intimate cause of them is conjunction of space which is the substrate of them.* Posteriority with regard to time is produced by the knowledge of the anterior existence of the revolutions of the sun,

124.—Priority (recent time) from the knowledge of what succeeded the former. The non-intimate cause of them is the conjunction of things which are in time.

125.—If the comprehending intellect were destroyed, posteriority and priority would also be destroyed. Intellect has been previously nearly explained.

126.—What is left, will now be explained. Knowledge is two-fold, wrong notion and right notion.

127.—A knowledge, which manifests something where this something is not present, is a wrong notion.[87] Of this there are two kinds, mistake and doubt.

128.—The former is the certain knowledge of a thing where such a thing is not present, as for instance, the notion of the soul in the body, or yellow colour in a shell.

129.—Doubt[88] is a knowledge *in question,* whether for in-

87.—*Comm.*—If a knowledge, which manifests something, is transferred to something else, and represents itself at the same time as certain, it is error; for instance, if the knowledge of the soul in such sentences as: "I am reddish," &c., is transferred to the body, or yellow colour to a shell.

88.—*Comm.*—Doubt is a knowledge, determined by the contradictory absence or presence (of a predicate) in one and the same subject.

* Their substrate is: near or far with regard to space.

stance a thing is a man or a trunk. A knowledge which does not manifest something, where this something is not present, but, which manifests this something alone, is certitude.

130.—The apprehension of absence and presence in one and the same object is doubt. The cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute, &c.[89]

(The Bengalee Translation explains this as follows: A doubt is a knowledge such as this: Is this a man or a trunk? This kind of doubt is called a doubt of four extremes (चातुष्कोटिकं,) because there are four extremes, viz. the notions of a man and non-man, and the notions of trunk and non-trunk. The contradictory notions of presence and absence are called extremes. If it is questioned, whether the mountain is fiery or not fiery, the doubt is, whether one of the two extremes fiery or not fiery abides in the mountain.)

89.—*Comm.—There are three causes of doubt.*

1. Cause of doubt is the knowledge of a general attribute which is found in two extremes, for instance the notion of height, found in trunk and non-trunk, as if it is doubted, whether this is a trunk or not a trunk.

2. Cause of doubt is a non-general (special) attribute. (Non-general is a predicate, which is not found in the subject of the two extremes;) for instance, if the notion of sound, which is separated from the notions of eternal and non-eternal, (that is the notion of sound is not the general notion, under which eternal and non-eternal are comprehended) is conceived in sound, the doubt arises, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

3. *Cause of doubt* is contradiction (of two extremes,) *but not the contradiction*, referring to the mere sound alone, because a knowledge of a general predicate of sound is the cause of certitude only; for instance, if it is said: Sound is eternal, sound is not eternal, but the knowledge of the two extremes, which is produced by sound. The doubt takes place by the mind.

In the same way, if there is a doubt, that a knowledge is proved, there is also a doubt with regard to the object of the knowledge.

In the same way, if there is a doubt with regard to a subject in its

131.—Defect[90] produces wrong notion, excellence right notion. There are different kinds of defects as bile, distance, &c.

132.—Excellence as regards perception is the intercourse *of a sense* with what is determinable, determined by its determination. Excellence as regards inference

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invariable connexion with a predicate, there is also a doubt with regard to the predicate. But the cause of doubt is the knowledge of a subject, determined by an attribute, or the intercourse of a sense with such a subject.

90.—*Comm.*—Defect is the cause of wrong notion, and excellence of right notion. Defects as for instance, bile, &c. are only of a contingent nature; for their causality is established by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya and Vyatiréka; if the defect is there, the notion is wrong, if the defect is not there, the notion is not wrong). That excellence is the cause of right notion, on the other hand, is established by *simple* inference; for right notion is produced by a cause, different from the general cause of knowledge, because it is a knowledge that is produced, as wrong notion is. It cannot be said, 'that the absence of defects is the cause.' In the sentence, "the shell is yellow," bile is the defect; from this the right notion of shell is not obtained, because there is no authority to ascribe it more to the one member of the alternative than to the other, and it is right to assume a causality from one excellence in preference to a causality from the absence of numerous defects.

Nor can it be said: 'Let excellence even be granted, there is no perception of white colour in a shell, as bile is an obstacle to it; therefore the causality of the absence of defects, as for instance of bile, is necessary. Of what use is then the assumption of a causality of excellence?' for in this case the causality of excellence is proved by the argument of a general affirmative and negative. In the same way it is well said, that the absence of excellence is the cause of error.

What are those defects? "Bile," &c. Sometimes bile is a defect, when a yellow colour is mistaken for a white one (as in jaundice) sometimes distance, for instance if the moon, sun, &c. by their distance are mistaken for small bodies.

133.—Is the consideration connected with the place (subject of conclusion) which is determined by the conclusion. Excellence, as regards comparison, is the knowledge of similar objects, derived from words possessed of power.

134.—Excellence as regards verbal knowledge is the right notion of consistency or of the intention. Right notion is a knowledge without error.[91]

135.—Or right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind and accordingly predicated. A knowledge which is undetermined, is neither right notion nor error;

136.—For that which is without determination *and determinability* is not comprehended under any relation. Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt.[92]

91.—*Comm.*—"Right knowledge is a knowledge without error." As here the objection might be made, that,—if at the perception of silver and tin, both, silver and tin, are considered as silver,—also on the part of the silver a wrong notion is produced, because that knowledge is not free from error, a second definition is given: "Right notion is a knowledge which is of such a kind, and accordingly predicated." Here it must be understood, that, under which relation the right notion is perceived, under the same relation must be perceived that which is determined, and also the determination. Hence it is not against this definition, if a jar, &c. is comprehended by the same conjunction as the two halves of which it is composed, If this is the case, any thing without determination is no right notion, as there is no general notion, by which it is determined. A notion which is undetermined, is neither true, nor false.

92.—*Comm.*—"Right notion is not perceived by itself, but by the concurrence of doubt."

Namely, the Mímánsakas say, that right notion is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus* a knowledge is a right notion by its

* Col. Misc. Essays, Vol. I. p. 298. Next to him (Bhaṭṭa Kumárílaswami) is a writer usually cited under the title of Guru, more rarely under the designation of Prabhákara. His work I had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present

137.—The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition is the non-apprehension of what goes astray and the apprehen-

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own manifestation. (Bengalee Tr. They state the object of knowledge, for instance of a jar, to be three-fold, viz. the jar, the soul, and the knowledge of a jar &c. in connexion with that which is to be proved, because by the means of object of the knowledge, for instance of a jar, first the jar, further the soul, and lastly, the knowledge of the jar in connexion with that which is to be proved, form one and the same knowledge, which may be pronounced in the sentence: "I know the jar," which means, I have a knowledge, which manifests a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Bhaṭṭas* knowledge is beyond the senses; the notion (class) of knowledge, produced by that knowledge (which is beyond the senses) is perceptible; by this (notion) knowledge is inferred (B. T. According to the Bhaṭṭas knowledge, without determination as well as with determination, is beyond the senses; but after the knowledge of a jar there arises the notion of what is known with reference to the jar, &c. then the notion of what is known, viz. by me the jar is known, is perceived, and lastly, "I have a knowledge of a jar," &c. determined by the notion of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of the Murárimiśras knowledge is obtained by reflection (B. T. the Murárimiśras say, that after the knowledge

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essay, and he is known to me chiefly from reference and quotations; as in Mádhava's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Kumárilás, and in the text and commentary of Śástra-dípiká, where his positions are canvassed with those of numerous other writers.

* Id. p. 297. The annotations (Vártika to the Commentary of the Sútras of the Mímánsa, by Sabaraswámí) are by Bhaṭṭa Kumárílaswamí, who is the great authority of the Mímánsaká school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhaṭṭa, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sabara's gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, &c. . . . . . Id. 298. Kumárila Bhaṭṭa figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of Śankara Áchárya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Védas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy . . . . . The age of Kumárila, anterior to Śankara, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Bauddhas, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand year.

sion of what does not go astray; sometimes doubt is removed by discussion.[93]

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of a jar, &c. there is the reflection, I know the jar, by this there is a knowledge, manifesting the knowledge of a jar, &c.)

According to the opinion of all of them this or the other knowledge is right notion by a knowledge, manifesting this or the other knowledge; for knowledge is to be ascertained by its object; therefore the object is to be known by the knowledge of knowledge. This opinion is blamed in the text: "Right notion is not perceived by itself," &c. If right notion of knowledge were comprehended by itself, there would be no doubt with regard to knowledge, produced by practice; for if in this case knowledge is known, also its right notion (evidence) is known; hence how could doubt exist? On the other hand, if knowledge is not known, then, in the absence of the knowledge of something determined by an attribute, how can doubt arise? Therefore right knowledge is an object of inference; for instance: This knowledge is right notion, because it is produced by the agreement of those who discuss on it. That, which is not of such a kind, is not of such a kind, as wrong notion. For instance: This knowledge, the general notion of earth, is right notion, because the notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of earth, is found in that which has smell. In the same manner this knowledge of water is right notion, because the general notion of knowledge, representing the general notion of water, is found in that which has viscidity.

93.—*Comm.*—"The cause of the apprehension of a general proposition (Vyápti, the invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate) is the non-apprehension of what goes astray, and the apprehension of what does not go astray; sometimes a doubt is removed by discussion."

The invariable connexion of a subject with a predicate (Vyápti) has been before explained, but not the means of its apprehension. This is now done in the text, viz. "The cause," &c. 1st, The non-apprehension of what goes astray* is the cause, since, if this apprehension takes place, the general proposition (Vyápti) cannot be apprehended. The apprehension of what does not go astray (of similar instances) is the

* Vyabhichára: a reason goes astray, if it is connected with any subject, where the conclusion (major term) cannot abide. Sahachára; a reason does not go astray, if it has similar instances, in which the conclusion abides.

138.—Specification is an attribute which is contained in the conclusion, but not in the reason.[94] Its chief points will now be explained.

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cause, as proved by the argument from a general affirmative and a general negative (Anwaya Vyatiréka, if there are similar instances, there is also the general proposition; if there are no similar instances, there is no general proposition). Repetition (the repetition of similar instances) is no cause, since, although there be not an apprehension of what goes astray, yet the general proposition (Vyápti) is sometimes at once apprehended. Sometimes, however, repetition is required to remove a doubt with reference to what goes astray. Where by repetition the doubt does not disappear, discussion is required to guard against the contrary supposition. For instance, if there is a doubt, whether smoke be not also found with something, where there is no fire, this doubt is removed by the consideration, that fire and smoke are in the relation of cause and effect. If this *mountain* is without fire, it must also be without smoke, because an effect is not without its cause. If it is sometimes without cause, it is an effect without cause. In this case doubt arises, which is to be removed from its obstacle, in *such a manner:* If an effect is without cause, fire is not the invariable means to produce smoke, or food to satisfy hunger. Where doubt does not of itself arise, there discussion is not necessary. With this view it is said in the text: "Sometimes doubt is removed by discussion."*

94.—*Comm.*—"Specification is an attribute, which is contained in its conclusion, (major term) but not in its reason."

'If this definition is correct, then in the inference: "This man is black, because he is the son of Mittrá," the notion of the origin of black colour by her eating bad vegetables, would be no specification, because

* The Bengalee Translator says in illustration of this: For instance if hearth is the subject (minor term), smoke the conclusion (major term), and fire the reason (middle term), then is wet fuel the specification with regard to the faulty reason, viz. fire, because it is the condition of smoke, but not of fire; for where there is smoke, there is necessarily also wet fuel; but where there is fire, there is not (necessarily) wet fuel, as for instance a fiery iron-ball; on the other hand, if there is a faultless reason, for instance, if mountain is the subject, fire the conclusion, and smoke the reason, there is no specification, because the attribute, which is a condition of the conclusion, is also a condition of the reason.

139.—All admissible specifications abide in the same place with the conclusion. Those, which abide in the same place with the reason, go astray with regard to the conclusion.

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it is not contained in the conclusion; (black) for blackness is also found in a jar, &c.

Further: In the inference: "Air is perceptible" because it is the site of touch, the notion of proportionate greatness, would be no specification, because perception takes place also with regard to the soul, &c. where there is no greatness.

'Nor would the notion of existence (भावत्वं,) be a specification in the inference: "Destruction is transient from its being a production," because the notion of something transient is also in antecedent negation, and here, without any doubt, is not existence.'

We deny this; for the meaning is, that the specification, which is a condition of the conclusion, as determined by this or that attribute, is not a condition of the reason, as determined by the same attribute; thus for instance the notion of a production by bad vegetables is the condition of the blackness, which is determined by the notion of son of Mittrá. In the same manner is proportionate greatness the condition of the perception, determined by the notion of external things. Thus in the inference: "Destruction is transient from its being a production," is the notion of existence the condition of the conclusion, as determined by the notion of production.

In a faultless reason, there is no such attribute, viz. something, being a condition of a determined conclusion (major term), while it is not a condition of the reason under the same determination. But in a reason which goes astray, one of the two at least takes place, either that the place of the specification, which is also the place of the conclusion (major term) is the condition of the conclusion and the non-condition of the reason, or that the place, where there is not the specification, which is also the place, determining the absence of the conclusion, is the condition of the conclusion, and the non-condition of the reason.

95.—*Comm.*—"Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray." That is to say, the assumption of specification is necessary to infer, that the conclusion goes astray, which takes place by the

140.—Specification is necessary to judge, where a reason goes astray.[95] It is the opinion of the Vaiśéshikas that verbal

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specification going astray. Therefore, where there is a specification which is the condition of a conclusion without any further addition, there by the going astray of the specification which has no further addition, may be concluded also the going astray of the conclusion. For instance, where it is concluded that something smokes, from fire, there fire (as the reason of smoke) goes astray with regard to smoke, because wet fuel goes astray; for, if the more comprehensive notion goes astray, it is necessary that also the more narrow notion goes astray. But where the specification is of such a kind, as to be a condition of the conclusion (major term) as determined by any attribute (addition) how insignificant soever, there the inference, that the conclusion goes astray, follows from the going astray of the specification in a subject, determined by such an attribute (addition,) for instance, if it is inferred, that this person is black, because he is the son of Mittrá, the notion: "a son of Mittrá" goes astray with regard to blackness, because with regard to the son of Mittrá, goes astray the specification of a product of bad vegetables.

96.—*Comm.*—"Verbal knowledge and comparison are not different kinds of proof."

According to the opinion of the Vaiśéshikas there are only two kinds of knowledge, viz. perception and inference, verbal knowledge and comparison being included in the latter; for such sentences as: "Drive the cow away by the stick," or Védaic sentences, depend upon the knowledge of the connexion of the meanings of the words, which are recollected by the object the speaker has in view, because all the words, which form a sentence, have intention, consistency, &c., as in the sentence: "Bring the jar," &c.—Or: These meanings of words are mutually connected, because the words have consistency, &c., like similar meanings of words. The same is the case with regard to comparison. When a Gayal has been perceived, the word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal, because the old have attached this meaning to it, no other kind of proof being admitted, as the word of cow is the cause of the power with

knowledge and comparison, as included in inference, are not different kinds of proof.

141.—This is not correct, as, independent of inference, verbal knowledge and comparison are intelligible.

142.—The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold,[97] one positive and the other negative; the first has been explained, the other will now be explained.

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reference to what is determined by the notion of cow. Or: The word Gayal is the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal on the ground, that trustworthy people have attached this meaning to it. By this inference the cause of the power with reference to what is determined by the notion of Gayal is evident, viz. because there is a connexion of a general proposition with a minor term.

This opinion is blamed in the text *in the words :* "This is not correct;" for without the knowledge of a general proposition (of the Vyápti) an understanding is possible from the mere words. There is no proof, that after the hearing of words a general proposition is always necessary. Moreover, if it is assumed, that a general proposition (Vyápti) is always required with reference to the understanding of words, why then is it not admitted, that it is necessary to assume a verbal knowledge with reference to the understanding of an inference?

97.—*Comm.*—"The connexion of the subject with the predicate is twofold."

Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz. only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissimilar instances *with regard to the conclusion* (major term, that is to say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible, as every thing is an object of knowledge.

If it is said, 'that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is separated from all other notions' (that is to say, such a notion is separated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is

143.—The necessity of the absence of the conclusion where there is an absence of the reason, *is the second.*[98]

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merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether,* &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found any where, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.)

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects (of conclusion) for instance in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell;† for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.

3. Affirmative and negative inference take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances (of the conclusion or major term) for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.

98.—*Comm.*—The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition. (Vyatirékavyápti). For this reason the text defines the notion of a general negative proposition: "A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion" (major term) that is to say, a general negative is the absence *of the reason*, which (absence) is included in the absence of the conclusion (major term). Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion the more extensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows: by what connexion and notion the more comprehensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, &c. (see p. 7.) there

* Pratiyogi is that of which there is a negation (it is the contradictory opposition to its own negation) for instance a jar is the Pratiyogi of the negation of a jar. Apratiyogi is a thing, of which there is no negation, as for instance space, which is every where, and of which it cannot anywhere be said, there is no space.

† Here is earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and the reason smell.

144.—Presumption* is not considered as another proof, because it is included in negative inference. Happiness, the object of desire of all worlds, is produced by virtue.

145.—Unhappiness the effect of vice, is abhorred by all conscious beings. The desire of happiness and of freedom from unhappiness arises from the knowledge of either.[99]

146.—There is a desire of obtaining the means for those ends (avoiding misery and gaining happiness) if there is knowledge

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follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell; but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation of identity, there also is the negation of the other elements expressed by the relation of identity. This is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction for instance the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative. Others say: "By means of the negative the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, as a jar, &c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth" &c.

99.—*Comm.*—"The desire of freedom from unhappiness and of obtaining happiness arises from the knowledge of either."

Desire is *threefold,* viz. the desire whose object is the last end, (summum bonum, which is not the means to accomplish another object,) the desire whose object is a means (for something else) *and the desire of action.*

1. *The desire whose object is the last end.* The last end (फलं) is

* Vid. Col. M. E. Vt. p. 303. Presumption (arthápatti, one of the five modes of proof of the Mímánsakas) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.

of these means. The wish to act is the desire determined by what may be accomplished by action.

147.—The cause of this is the knowledge of what may be accomplished by acts and what may accomplish the object of a desire. The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle.[100]

148.—According to others the cause of the wish to act is the knowledge of what does not produce that abhorrence. The cause of aversion is the knowledge of what accomplishes things that are abhorred. Endeavour is of three kinds according to philosophers, viz. activity, cessation from activity and vital endeavour.

149.—The wish to act, the knowledge of what may be ac-

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happiness and freedom from unhappiness. The cause of the desire of the last end is the knowledge of the same; therefore it is of itself the object of man; for it follows from the definition, that any thing, which, when known, is desired by its own nature, is the object of man, and its full meaning is, that it is the object of a desire, not dependent upon another desire.

2. The desire whose object* is a means (for something else.) The cause of this is the knowledge of what accomplishes an object of desire.

3. The desire of action is the desire, whose object is an effect to be accomplished by action, which (desire) is determined by the notion of what may be accomplished by action. This depends upon an apprehension such as this: I shall accomplish cooking by action. The cause of the desire of action is the knowledge, that an object may be obtained by action, and the knowledge, that the object of desire may be obtained. Therefore there is no desire of action with reference to rain, because it cannot be obtained by action.

100.—*Comm.*—"The knowledge, that something is the cause of an object which is strongly abhorred, is an obstacle."

* The object of a desire, independent of any other desire, is the last object; this is happiness and deliverance from unhappiness; for both are not desired for the sake of any thing else, but for their own sake. An object of a desire, depending upon another desire, is a secondary object; such are for instance, the fruition of love, eating, the removal of the unhappiness of another, the refraining from desires, &c.

complished by acts and what accomplishes such or such a desire, and the perception of the material causes produce activity.

150.—Cessation from activity rises from aversion produced by[101] the knowledge of what accomplishes abhorred objects.

151.—Vital endeavour is constant,[101] it transcends the perception of the senses[102];

152.—It is the cause of the flux and reflux of the vital airs in the body. Gravity abides in earth and water, it is imperceptible to the senses;

153.—It is transient in what is transient, and eternal in what is eternal. It is the non-intimate cause of the action which is called falling.

154.—Fluidity is twofold, innate and derived from a cause; the first abides in water, the second in earth and light;

155.—In the atoms of water it is eternal, in every other thing transient. Derived fluidity is produced in clarified butter and similar substances when heated by the union with fire.

156.—Fluidity is the cause of trickling and instrumental cause in a collection (heap). Viscidity abides in water; it is eternal in atoms, non-eternal in a compound.

For instance, there is no desire of action with regard to honey, mixed with poison, because the strong aversion is an obstacle.

(Material or intimate causes are those substances by means of which a desire is accomplished; for instance the material causes of a sacrifice are: the presence of ghee, wood, rice, &c.)

101.—*Comm.*—" Is constant;" which means, it lasts as long as life does.

102.—*Comm.*—" It transcends the perception of the senses; for the flux and reflux of the vital airs, *when stronger than usually*, is accomplished by endeavour, for instance a stronger inspiration (this is evident from perception). If this is the case, then from the inference, that the flux of the vital airs is accomplished by endeavour (for there must be a cause of it) and further from the inadmissibility of an endeavour that is perceived (for in the ordinary function of respiration, &c. it is not perceived) it follows, that the flux of vital airs is accomplished by an

157.—By the abundance of this (viscidity) in oil combustion is favoured. There are three kinds of faculty, viz. velocity, elasticity and memory.

158.—Velocity abides only in bodies, and is twofold, either produced by action or by velocity.[103] Elasticity is according to some only found in earth, according to others in the four first elements.

159.—It is imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause of vibratory motion.[104] The faculty which has the name of memory, is found only in sentient beings; it is imperceptible to the senses.

160.—Its cause is certitude without inattention.[105] Memory is called also the cause of remembrance and of recognition.

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endeavour, which transcends the perception of the senses. This is vital endeavour.

103.—*Comm.*—"It is twofold, either produced by action, or by velocity." Velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by conjunction without noise, (vid. v. 118,) hence from the destruction of a former action arises another action. In the same manner all the subsequent actions must be considered. And without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to another, the destruction of a former action, and the production of a subsequent one were impossible. Where velocity is effected by velocity, for instance, where the velocity in a jar is effected by the velocity of its half, there is velocity, produced by velocity.

104.—*Comm.*—Elasticity is proved for instance by the fact, that a branch which is attracted, returns to its former position, when released. The opinion of some, that elasticity abides in the four first elements, is not supported by any evidence.

105.—*Comm.*—"Its cause is certitude without inattention." If it is said: 'Is certitude, different from inattention, rather not the cause of remembrance? And if this is the case, let us say, that knowledge in general is the cause of memory.'

We object; for as there is no authority of assuming an alternative, it is evident, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory. Moreover, with reference to inattention, the assumption of

161.—Fate is twofold, merit and demerit. Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained.[106] It is a practice of ablutions in the Gangá, &c. and of sacrifices, &c.

162.—It is thought perishable by the contact with the water of the Karmanásá.* Demerit is the cause of hell, &c. and is produced by blamable works.

163.—It may be destroyed by expiations, &c. Both qualities abide in living creatures.[107] They are produced by desire and destroyed likewise by knowledge.[108]

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memory is complicated (superfluous) and hence it is proved, that certitude, different from inattention, is the cause of memory.

The proof of this is given in the words: "It is called the cause of remembrance and recognition." That is to say, memory produces remembrance and recognition; therefore memory is assumed, for it is impossible, that a former perception produces, without intercourse, remembrance, because a cause is impossible, if it is not in respective intercourse with either of the two (remembrance or recognition.) Nor can it be said, 'that, as memory, determined by the category of identity, is the cause of recognition, remembrance is obtained, because recognition is produced by memory;' for there is no cause for this.

106.—*Comm.*—"Merit is the means by which heaven, &c. is obtained."

That is to say, it is the means of obtaining the happiness of heaven and all other happiness, and of bodies fit to enjoy the happiness of heaven.

107.—*Comm.*—"In living creatures," because merit and demerit cannot be assigned to God.

108.—*Comm.*—"They are produced by desire, and destroyed likewise by knowledge."

"By desire," that is to say, if good or bad acts are done by one who has perfect knowledge, they are of no effect. "Likewise by knowledge." "Likewise" is said to indicate enjoyment.

'But how (it may be objected) can the knowledge of truth destroy merit and demerit? for this (the destruction of merit and demerit)

* The name of a small river, which separates the territory of Benares, Kási, from Bihar.—Vid. Lassen's Ind. Alterth. Vol. I. p. 130.

164.—There are two kinds of sound, inarticulate and articulate; the first is produced by a drum, &c. and the latter, as ka and other letters, by the contact of the throat with the palate.

165.—Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear.[109] Some say, its production takes place like a succession of waves.

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would be contrary to the passage (of the Yoga-*s*ástra): "An action, of which the effect is not experienced (which has not produced its due consequence in the soul of the agent, viz. happiness, if a good action, and unhappiness, if a bad one) does not perish even in a hundred crores of Kalpas." If this is the case, then the destruction *of merit and demerit* takes place in this manner, that a person who knows the truth, experiences the consequences of all *his* works at once by all his bodies.' (viz. all the bodies which he is to assume in future births.)

There, *however*, "to experience the consequences of works," is only given as an example of the various ways, in which *works* are destroyed according to the Védas. How could otherwise works be destroyed by expiations? &c. It is said (in the Bhagavadgíta.) "The fire of knowledge *consumes* all works." And in the *S*ruti: "All his works perish, when the general and individual souls are known."

If it is said: 'In this case there cannot exist for him who knows truth, the state of the body, nor happiness, unhappiness, &c. as by knowledge all works are destroyed,' we object; for only the works different from those which are commenced, are destroyed; for only the work which is the cause of the enjoyment of this or that body, has been commenced.

109.—*Comm.*—"Every sound abides in the ether, but it is perceived, when it is produced in the ear."

Abiding in the ether, means, that the ether is its intimate cause. As a sound, when distant, is not perceived, it is said, "in the ear." As it may be doubted, how a sound, produced in the space determined by a drum, &c., is produced in the ear, it is said: "Its production takes place like a succession of waves," its sound produces another, determined by a space, external to the first, and the second produces again a third, and so on. In this manner it is perceived, when it is gradually produced in the ear.

166.—According to others, like the bud of the Kadamba plant.[110] From the knowledge,[111] that the letter ka is produced, and that it is destroyed, non-eternity of sound would follow.

167.—The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon the perception of general knowledge.[112] "This is the medicine," such and other sentences depend upon general knowledge.

110.—*Comm.*—"Like the bud of the Kadamba plant." In this manner: From the first sound ten sounds are produced in the ten divisions of space. Hence ten other sounds are produced. As this assumption is complicated, it is said in the text: "according to some."

111.—*Comm.*—"From the knowledge," &c. To remove the objection, that sound is not produced, because it is eternal, it is said: "From the knowledge," &c.

112.—*Comm.*—If it be objected: 'The eternity of sound follows from the fact, that this letter ka is recognised as that letter ka,' the text gives the answer: The knowledge, that this ka is that ka, depends upon community of class,' &c. Here is the object of recognition, the community of class of this and that object, but not the identity of this and that individual; because it is contrary to the knowledge which has been mentioned. If this is the case, there cannot be a mistake with regard to those two perceptions (viz. sound is not eternal, and this is that sound).

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N. B. The translation counts one verse more than the original, as the invocation, forming the first verse of the former, has not been taken into the text of the latter.